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Appeal No. 154(R) of 1984, decided on 17th December, 1986.
---S. 4--Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5--Appeal before Tribunal- Delay--Condonation of, on ground of illegality of impugned order--Order passed by public authority, even if not made according to law, held, was still an act capable of legal consequences--Unless competent proceeding was taken at law to establish cause of illegality and to get it quashed, such order would remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders--Court or Tribunal would invalidate an order only if right remedy was sought by right person in right proceedings and circumstances--After prescribed period of limitation had elapsed, door of justice was closed and no plea of injustice, hardship or ignorance could be of any avail--For exercise of discretion to condone, delay has to be reasonable, based on sound footing and could be resorted to in very special circumstances, when each day's delay stands accounted for.
---S. 4--Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5--Appeal before Tribunal--Delay, condonation of--Repeated departmental representations, held, would not enlarge time prescribed for filing appeal before Service Tribunal--Neither assurance given by executive authority nor ignorance of law or want of knowledge of civil servant about his remedy before tribunal against impugned orders would constitute valid grounds for condonation of delay--Petition for condonation of delay of five years being devoid of merit dismissed by Service Tribunal and in consequence appeal was dismissed as incompetent and barred by limitation.
Muhammad Asghar Khan for Appellant.
Sardar Muhammad Amir Akbar Khan for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 20th July, 1986.
--By way of present appeal the appellant seeks to challenge the order of the competent authority notified on 10-7-1978 whereby the appellant then Joint Secretary/ Officer on Special Duty in the Establishment Division, was reverted from the post of Joint Secretary and his services were replaced at the disposal of Air Headquarters for appointment to a post to which he would have been appointed under the Air Headquarters but for his appointment as Joint Secretary under the Federal Government.
2. The present appeal having been filed on 27-3-1984 against the aforesaid order conveyed to the appellant in July, 1978, is quite obviously time-barred by more than five years. The appellant has filed an application for condonation of delay which was contested by the learned counsel for the respondent.
3. The only ground averred in the petition for condonation of delay is that the impugned order being illegal, the delay may not be allowed to defeat the appellant's right and that in view of such legal question involved in the appeal, the delay merits to be condoned. We have in an earlier case held that an order passed by a public authority, even if not made according to law, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of illegality upon its forehead. Unless a competent proceeding is. taken at law to establish the cause of illegality and to get it quashed, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. The reality of the matter, therefore, is that the Court or Tribunal will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically illegal but the Court or Tribunal may refuse to quash it because of many legal reasons such as the plaintiff's lack of standing or because he approached the Court/ Tribunal after the expiry of limitation prescribed by law. A common case where an order, howsoever illegal, becomes valid where a statutory time limit expires after which its validity cannot be questioned. It is quite true that the primary duty of this Tribunal is to do substantial justice to the civil servants and to avoid technicalities but only in' cases for which no specific law exists. A large number of decisions o: the superior Courts have insisted that the Statutes of Limitation shall be applied without regard to equitable considerations and the doctrine' of equity, justice and good conscience cannot be applied so as to override and abrogate the express provisions of Limitation Act. It now stands confirmed by the judicial pronouncements that the question of limitation cannot be ignored even if the impugned order be termed as illegal and in such a case also time would start from the date of knowledge of such order. Indeed limitation period provided in a statutory. provision for invoking a remedy runs also against an order which is illegal and person aggrieved thereby must invoke his remedy against such presumed illegal order within the prescribed time competent Court/Tribunal alone and not individual has been empowered to ignore or set aside an order which is illegal. If an aggrieved person ignores an order presuming it to be illegal, he does so at his own risk. The contention of the appellant, therefore, is devoid of any substance and is accordingly repelled.
4. It was next submitted by the appellant that against the impugned order passed on the 10th of July, 1978, he represented to the Establishment Division, Chief of the Army Staff and the President of Pakistan and waited for a reply thereto till October, 1979, when he suddenly went abroad and immediately on his return, he made yet another representation on 15-12-1983 to the President/ C. M.L.A. in continuation of his earlier petitions but even then had received no reply. However, he was informed by an appropriate authority that the President of Pakistan had decided to reconsider the cases of the Army Officers being reverted from the civil service and had approved that no officer would be reverted to the Army from the civil service as a general rule. Finally the appellant frankly confessed that he did not approach this Tribunal in time mainly for the reason that he was not aware that he could bring his matter before this Tribunal. According to the well-settled legal position, however, repeated departmental representations do not enlarge time prescribed for filing appeal before this Tribunal; and that depending on an assurance given by an executive authority also does not furnish a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Likewise ignorance of law being no excuse, want of knowledge of the appellant about his remedy before this Tribunal against the impugned order also does not constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay.
5. To be brief, after the prescribed period of limitation has elapsed, the door of justice is closed and no plea of injustice, hardship or ignorance can be of any avail. For, exercise of discretion to condone the delay has to be reasonable, based on sound footing and not arbitrary, and can be resorted to in very special circumstances and only when each day's delay stands accounted for. As discussed above, the appellant has utterly failed to explain and account for such an inordinate delay which is inexcusable and uncondonable. This being so, we need not advert to the merits of the appellant's claim.
6. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for condonation of delay, is rejected and in consequence the appeal is dismissed as incompetent being barred by limitation.
No order as to costs.
A. A./357/Lb/S
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