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Appeal No. 211(R) of 1984, heard on 8th September, 1986.
‑‑‑S. 4‑‑Service Tribunal, jurisdiction of‑‑Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal, held, was limited to redress grievances affecting terms and conditions persons in service of Pakistan‑‑Service Tribunal has no jurisdiction to lay down terms and conditions of service‑‑Mere fact that rules made by Authority were harsh would not empower Tribunal to annul same.
‑‑‑S. 4‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5‑‑Service appeal filed beyond limitation‑‑No cogent reason given to explain delay‑‑No application for condonation of delay‑‑In absence of cogent reasons to explain delay in filing appeal and application for condonation of delay, Service Tribunal, held, would have no jurisdiction to redress grievances of civil servant.
M.S. Siddiqi for Appellant.
M.A.A. Khan assisted by S. Karrar Haider and Muhammad Munawar Hussain for the State.
Date of hearing: 8th September, 1986.
.‑‑Mr. Abdul Rashid Iqbal, Assistant (Accounts) Central Zakat Administration, Ministry of Finance, has appealed against Office Memorandum, dated 18th August, 1983 regarding the re‑organization of junior and senior Auditors in the Audit Department. The appellant submitted a representation against this re‑organization to the President of Pakistan and three others, on 7‑9‑1983. He did not receive any reply from the President of Pakistan but the A.G.P.R. sent a reply vide his No. ADMN‑II/RE‑ORG/ A.A. A./440, dated 8‑4‑1984. The present appeal was filed on 28‑4‑1984.
2. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is a non‑graduate Audit and Accounts Assistant in B‑11 and one of the senior most Clerks‑incharge (working in the post of Accountant Grade 16). He has 25 years service to his credit; 12 years as Auditor and 13 years as Audit and Accounts Assistant as well as Assistant Superintendent and Clerks incharge. The impugned order, dated 18th August, 1983, it was contended, has adversely affected the terms and conditions of the service of the appellant. This is a discrimination against him. It was submitted that the re‑organisation of the cadre vide impugned order has placed a bar on further promotion of the appellant both in terms of seniority as well as qualification. Being a non‑graduate, although his work in the present job is more than satisfactory, he cannot be placed with the graduates who have been placed in higher scale i.e. B‑13. It was submitted that if this reorganization had not been ordered the appellant had much better chances of promotion to higher posts because in that case it was not the educational qualification which would have come in his way. The promotion would have been decided purely on the basis of efficiency‑cum‑seniority. It is very difficult at his late stage of service and age of the appellant to qualify the B.A. Examination.
3. As regards the question of limitation of time, it was argued that the appeal was filed well in time because the A.G.P.R. furnished a reply to the appellant vide their letter, dated 8‑4‑1984. The present appeal was filed within 20 days of the receipt of the reply and is, therefore, well in time. It was further submitted that discrimination against the Audit and Accounts Assistants be removed either by placing 25% of them in Grade B‑14 or they may be re‑designated as senior auditors and thereafter implementation of the reorganization scheme be ordered as per impugned order.
4. As regards the question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere in this case, where the policy of reorganization has been ordered by the Government, the learned counsel for the appellant placed the reliance on the judgment in the cases of Iqan Ahmed Khurrum v. Government of Pakistan P L D 1979 S C 610‑615 para. 3(b) and also in the case of Province of Punjab v. Kamaluddin P L D 1983 S C 126. It was contended that the discrimination in the case of the appellant is more than established because this policy is against the spirit of Article 25 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that Supreme Court did not interfere in the order of the Service Tribunal and that it should be assumed that it agreed that in such matters the Tribunal has the jurisdiction. We have gone through the judgment of the Supreme Court and we find that question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal was not discussed in that case, and in fact it was not allowed to be raised, because the same was not taken up before the Punjab Service Tribunal. The question of jurisdiction in these circumstances, stands undecided as far as the Supreme Court is concerned.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the impugned order is a policy letter issued by the respondent. Article 240 of the Constitution provides that the terms and conditions of persons in the service of Pakistan shall be determined by or under the Act of Parliament. The Act of Parliament which determines terms and conditions is the Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973). The rules made thereunder are the rules deemed to have been made thereunder determining the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Government. The Office Memorandum of 18‑8‑1983 is in the nature of rules which derives its authority from the Constitution and the Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973). This Office Memorandum has, therefore, the force of statutory rules.
6. As regards late filing of appeal by the appellant, it was contended that it is badly time‑barred because it was submitted to the President of Pakistan, on 7‑9‑1983, in the event of no reply from the respondent the appellant should have come to the Tribunal within 120 days which exhausted on 5‑1‑1984. The reply sent by the A.G.P.R. on 8‑4‑1984 cannot be considered valid cause of action in this case because the A.G.P.R. is not the competent authority to decide the appeal in this case. It is only the President of Pakistan who is competent authority. The delay has not been explained in any form. Therefore, the appeal should be rejected outright on this count.
7. In view of the above arguments, we are of the considered opinion that the Tribunal has no power to legislate. if we interfere in the decision taken by the Government we would be legislating ourselves. The mere fact that the rule made under the Civil Servants Act is harsh does not empower us to annul it. Our jurisdiction is limited to redress grievances affecting terms and conditions of persons in the service of Pakistan. We have no jurisdiction to lay down the terms and conditions ourselves.
8. In any case the appellant has failed to submit his appeal in time. No cogent reason has been given to explain the delay and there is no application for the condonation of delay.
9. For the reasons stated above we hold that the appeal is badly time‑barred and also Tribunal has no jurisdiction to redress the grievances of the appellant. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs.
A . A .
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