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Old No. 246(L) of 1984, New Appeal No. 410(R) of 1985, decided on 12th May, 1986.

‑‑‑S 17(1‑A)‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 3 & 5‑‑Appeal‑ Limitation‑‑Application for condonation of delay‑‑Delay in filing appeal occurring due to filing of review petition which was not competent from order passed under section 17(1‑A) of WAPDA Act, 1958‑‑Authority had been encouraging review petitions, considering same and accepting some of them‑‑‑Tribunal on similar facts had been condoning delay in several other cases‑‑Application for condonation of delay granted in circumstances.

‑‑S. 17(1‑A)‑‑Removal from Service‑‑Allegations made against appellant found baseless on inquiry and no action taken against him on charge sheets and show‑cause notice‑‑Sufficient grounds not existing for authorities for passing order of removal of appellant‑--Order of removal from service set aside and appellant reinstated.

‑‑S. 4‑‑West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act (XXXI of 1958), S.17(1‑A)‑‑Re‑instatement‑‑Consequential relief‑ Appellant went in review which was not competent and which caused delay in filing appeal before Tribunal‑‑Consequential relief not granted on reinstatement.

S. Jamshed Ali for Appellant.

Muhammad Amir Akbar Khan for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 24th April, 1986.

‑‑The appellant, M . Sarwar Maqbool, was removed from service by order, dated 10‑7‑1983 passed under section 17(1‑A) of the WAPDA Act. The present appeal to challenge the order was fil6d before the Tribunal, on 22‑8‑1984.

2. The learned counsel for respondent has taken a preliminary objection with regard to limitation, but it appears that when the order of removal was passed, the appellant made a review petition on 10‑8‑1983, which was rejected, on 26‑6‑1984, but the order was communicated to the appellant on 24‑7‑1984. Counting the time from that date, the appeal is within time. The learned counsel for respondent contends that no review petition was competent against an order passed under section 17(1‑A) of the WAPDA Act, and, therefore, the time spent by the appellant in pursuing that petition cannot be excluded. Legally, there is no right of review from an order passed under section 17(1‑A), but the fact cannot be denied that the Authority has not only been considering the review petitions, but had also been encouraging the filing of such petitions, and, in fact, some review petitions had actually been accepted. On similar facts, we have granted condonation in several other cases and in the present appeal also, we accept the application for condonation of delay and propose to dispose the appeal on merits.

3. The only point to be determined is whether there was sufficient material before the Authority for taking an action against the appellant under section 17(1‑A). There were two charge‑sheets against the appellant‑‑one dated 29‑9‑1980 and the other, dated 17‑10‑1982. There was a show‑‑cause notice of 29‑11‑1982 also. It, however, appears that on inquiry the allegations made against the appellant were found baseless and, therefore, no action had been taken against him. The learned counsel for respondent also says that the action was not taken against the appellant on the basis of these charge‑sheets and show‑cause notice. He, however, contends that the appellant was living beyond his means, inasmuch as, he was having a car it his possession and that the said car was jointly owned by him and an S.D.O. It appears from the record that the appellant had been using car bearing No. JM 550 off and on. The car is not registered in his name, but is registered in the name of a person, who is not related to him and who is rich enough to own more than one car. The allegations were that the ca was jointly owned by the appellant and one Azeemullah, S.D.O., Chunian. Strangely enough that no action has been taken against the said S.D.O. The ownership of the car by the appellant or by the S.D.O. also does not appear to have been established. There is sufficient element of doubt about the appellant's share in the car. The mere use of car by the appellant does not establish ownership.

4. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that there was no sufficient ground for the Authority in passing an order of removal of the appellant under section 17(1‑A). We, therefore, accept this appeal, set aside the impugned order of removal and reinstate the appellant into service. However, since the appellant did not approach the Tribunal immediately, but went in review to the Authority and that caused delay, we do not think it proper to pass any order with regard to the consequential benefits The period the appellant remained out of job shall be treated as extraordinary leave without pay.

M.Y.H.

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