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Appeal No. 168-Q of 1983, decided on 3rd August, 1986.

---S.17(1-A)--Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), S.4--Resignation- Appeal against order of acceptance--Impugned order of acceptance of resignation attaching stigma to conduct of appellant by saying that he was guilty of subversive activities--Such remarks in order, not only uncalled for but passed without affording opportunity to appellant of explaining his conduct--Such order, held, was void--But appeal filed by appellant hopelessly barred by time as appellant went in departmental representation which was not competent against order of acceptance of resignation--No application for condonation of delay made by appellant- Appeal dismissed as barred by time.

---S. 3--Void order--Limitation--Where impugned order had taken effect, period of limitation, held, could not be circumvented by pleading that such order was void.

Mst. Rehmat Bibi v. Punnu Khan 1986 S C M R 962 ref.

Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, District Screening Committee 1980 S C 14 R 711 rel.

Mehta W.N. Kohli for Appellant.

H. Shakeel Ahmad for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 3rd August, 1986.

--The appellant, Syed Abdus Salam, while serving as L.D.C. in Quetta under the WAPDA, submitted his resignation, on 1-1-1983. Immediately thereafter, on 26-1-1983, he withdrew the resignation. This prayer was not accepted, as the inter-departmental correspondence, dated 29-2-1983 shows. Subsequently, however, on 7-4-1983, the following order was passed:--

"Consequent upon the subversive activities of Mr. Abdul Salam, L.K.B/L.D.C. office of the R.O.I, Wapda, Quetta, the resignation so far tendered by him and already rejected is hereby accepted with immediate effect as his case was under process under section 17(1-A) being undesirable."

2. It appears that on 20-4-1983, the appellant made a representation against the aforesaid order of 7-4-1983, which remained undecided. On 21-8-1983, the present appeal was filed to challenge the order.

3. The impugned order having been passed on 7-4-1983, the last date for filing the appeal before the Tribunal was 7-5-1983. The appeal having been filed on 21-8-1983 is, as such, hopelessly barred by time. The departmental appeal made on 20-4-1983 is of no avail inasmuch as no departmental representation can be made by a WAPDA employee B against the order accepting the resignation.

4. There is no application for condonation of delay. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that the impugned order being void ab initio, the period of limitation did not run against the appellant, and that in such cases the question of limitation does not arise at all. In support of this argument reliance has been placed on the case of Mst. Rehmat Bibi v. Punnu Khan 1986 S C M R 962, wherein it was held that where an order is nullity in law, question of limitation does not arise.

5. The impugned order on the very face of it is void, inasmuch as, instead of accepting the resignation simplicitor, it attaches stigma to the conduct of the appellant by saying that he was guilty of subversive activities. The remarks in the order were uncalled for. They were not only unnecessary but were inserted without affording opportunity to the appellant of explaining his conduct. The question of limitation, however, does not end there. In an earlier case in service matters reported as Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, District Screening Committee 1980 S C M R 711, the Supreme Court had held that where an impugned order takes effect, the period of limitation cannot be circumvented, by pleading that the said order was void. The case of Mst. Rehmat Bibi is distinguishable, inasmuch as, in this case the time-barred appeal of Punnu Khan was accepted, as he was a sitting allottee of the property in dispute and as such the order appealed against had not affected him and he could very well ignore it. In fact, Punnu Khan had not been heard at all when the order appealed against had been passed. The present case is covered by the decision in the case of Sharif Ahmad Hashmi, the reason being that immediately after the impugned order was passed, the appellant was deprived of his remuneration and he was not allowed to work, his resignation having been accepted.

6. In the above circumstances, we hold that the appeal is barred by time and since no condonation application has been made, we dismiss it as such, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

M.Y.H.

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