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Cases Nos. 732/1039 and 733/1040 of 1980.
‑‑‑S.4‑‑Limitation‑‑Stgrts from final order of departmental authority‑ Police Official dismissed for misconduct. on charge of letting under‑trial offender escape through gross negligence and facing simultaneously criminal trial‑‑Departmental appeal and review petition rejected but on acquittal by criminal Court, making application to departmental authority for reconsideration of case and such application disposed of as "filed"‑ Plea that limitation for purpose of appeal before Tribunal would start from date of disposal of subsequent application because in departmental appeal and review petition it was prayed that verdict of criminal Court may be awaited hence appellant acquired a valuable right to have order of Court considered as final order‑‑Plea rejected‑‑Held: departmental authorities were not bound to wait for Court judgment and legally could go on with disciplinary proceedings and limitation would start from final order of rejection of review petition.
‑‑‑Disciplinary proceedings‑‑Criminal trial‑‑Effect of acquittal in criminal case‑‑Police Constable dismissed from service on charge of escape of under‑trial prisoner facing murder charge through gross negligence‑ Acquittal by criminal Court for want of evidence and not that accuses considered by Court as entirely innocent and blameless‑‑Does riot entitle accused to re‑instatement‑‑Punishment of dismissal from service, in circumstances, upheld by Service Tribunal.
Naveed Rasool Mirza for Appellants.
Malik Azam Rasool for Respondents.
.‑‑In these two cases Khalid Hussain and Zulfiqar Ali impugn the same order, dated 18‑2‑1979, passed by the S.P., Gujranwala, whereby they were dismissed from service as Constables on a charge of letting an under‑trial prisoner to escape from their custody. Their appeals to the D.I.‑G. of Police, Gujranwala Range was dismissed by a joint order, dated 2U‑‑4‑1979. Revision‑cui; mercy petitions filed before the Inspector‑General of Police, Punjab was also rejected by one order, dated 4‑2‑1979. These two appeals will also be disposed of by a single order.
2. Before arguments on facts could be heard learned counsel for the respondents raised objections on the point of limitation. It was stated that the final order in these cases was the one passed by the I.‑G. Police on 4‑12‑1979 and time would start running against the appellants from that date and not from 30‑11‑1980 when the application made by them to the I.‑G.P. after being acquitted by the trial Court was disposed of by that authority as "filed". No application for condonation of delay had been filed with the appeals and, therefore, the appeals merited dismissal on this score alone. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended that the appellants, in their appeals to the D.I.‑G., and revision‑cum‑mercy petitions to the I.‑G.P., had requested that the verdict of the Court in the case registered in connection with their alleged misconduct be awaited, and thus they" acquired the valuable right to have the Court order considered as they final order. In any case, since no enquiry had been held the decision, of the Court would be the only correct measure to judge as to what extent the appellants were guilty of misconduct imputed to them. After hearing learned counsel on this point I am convinced that in the circumstances of the case, the respondents were not bound to wait for the Court judgment and, under the law and rules could go on with the proceedings taken under the E&D Rules. The final order in the matter was the I.‑G.P's. order rejecting the revision petitions of the appellants and their case, therefore, does suffer from limitation.
3. I would have been open to taking a lenient view on limitation had the appellant's case been otherwise of merit. But after hearing the parties I am convinced that the action taken against them was justified by the facts. As these facts go, on 23‑12‑1978, the appellants (Zulfiqar Ali being duly armed with rifle and cartridges) took accused Jehangir alias Jajji from Gujranwala District Jail to produce him before a Magistrate in Lahore. On their way back‑ from the Court they were going on McLeod Road when the appellants, at the suggestion of the accused, conducted him to an office in the Ishardas Building, opposite Rattan Cinema, to enable him to go to the latrine. There, the chain which bound him with the appellants was handed over to the accused who decamped from the latrine through a window and made good his escape. The appellants then went to P.S. Qila Gujjar Singh and got the F.I.R. registered about the escape.
4. It was stated on behalf of the appellants that they committed n misconduct in allowing the accused to answer the call of nature, and B since, the trial Court too had acquitted them of the offence with which they were charged there was no cause with the S.P. to dismiss them from service.
5. I have gone through the F.I.R. which was registered in the name of appellant Khalid Hussain. It states that the persons sitting in the office where the accused was taken to the lavatory knew the accused personally and exchanged greetings with him. This fact alone should have been enough to alert the appellants that they were in territory favourable to the accused and possibly hostile to themselves. Then, before allowing the accused to go untied inside the lavatory, the appellants should have made certain that the lavatory did not offer an escape route. But apparently they were oblivious of these considerations to which any average policeman would have given due importance. They were thus guilty of gross negligence particularly when the accused was involved in a murder case, and I do not know how the S.P. could have taken a lenient view of their lapse. Also I find from a perusal of the judgment of the trial Court that the learned Magistrate let off the appellants for want of evidence and not because he considered them entirely innocent and blameless. In view of these observations I cannot see my way to accepting the contentions and arguments made on behalf of the appellants.
6. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed, on facts as well as for being time‑barred.
A. E.
Appeals dismissed.
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