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Case No. 5 of 1984, decided on 31st November, 1985.

--‑‑‑S. 420/468/471/477‑A‑‑Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)‑‑Specimen signatures/handwriting Identity of‑‑Accused admitting his specimen signatures/handwriting‑‑Police official having obtained such specimens in presence of Magistrate, deposing so‑‑Accused admitting police official having obtained specimens‑‑Magistrate in whose presence specimens were taken, not produced‑‑Necessity of producing Magistrate as witness, held, was obviated by circumstances and identity of such specimens stood established.

‑‑---S. 420/468/471/477‑A‑‑Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5 (2)‑‑Evidence as to identity of handwriting‑‑Appreciation of‑‑Seven bogus entries allegedly made by accused in ledger cards‑‑Two entries made by type machine while remaining five handwritten‑‑Witness stating entries being made by accused without showing his ability to identify handwriting of accused‑‑Witness not questioned as to factum of accused being responsible for typed entries nor cross‑examined challenging correctness of his evidence regarding handwritten entries‑‑Accused, held, might be deemed to have accepted correctness of statement of witness and admitted entries on ledger cards being in his handwriting‑ When witness stated that accused made false entries, he meant to say that he identified writing of bogus ledger card entries to be in handwriting of accused ‑and by implication of his statement, he was acquainted with handwriting of accused in circumstances.

Muhammad Sadiq Javeed v. The State P L D 1969 (W.P.) Pesh. 12 and Sailendra Nath Halder v. The‑State P L D 1970 Dacca 690 ref.

‑‑‑S. 420/468/471/477‑A‑‑Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)‑‑Non‑production of natural witnesses‑‑Effect of----Ledger clerk and his officer having custody of ledger cards‑‑Best direct evidence in case, being in position to identify handwriting of accused not produced by prosecution‑‑Clerk and Officer subordinate to accused who were under day to day obligation of accused, held, could not be considered to constitute best evidence in case‑‑Prosecution was, therefore, under no obligation to produce such persons as evidence.

‑‑‑S. 420/468/471/477‑A‑‑Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 3947), S.5 (2)‑‑Falsification of account‑-Seven credit entries in Ledger Cards found fake‑‑No deposit vouchers available in bank record‑‑No entry in receiving cashiers book‑‑No amount pertaining to said entries put in bank account‑‑Five entries found in hand of accused‑‑Accused, held, responsible for falsification of account punishable under S.477‑A, P.P.C.

‑‑‑S. 420/468/471/477‑A‑‑Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2) En-cashing of cheques‑‑Whether offence‑‑Cheques found to be signed and issued by genuine account holder‑‑Accused receiving sums of said cheques from bank‑‑Accused signing on back of cheques to acknowledge receipt of money‑‑Accused bona fide bearer thereof‑ Accused, held, did not commit any offence merely because he had received money on said cheques.

‑‑‑S. 420/468/471/477‑A‑‑Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)‑‑Forged cheques.‑‑Withdrawal of amount Two cheques written and signed by accused purporting to be issued by account holder‑ Amount already falsely credited to said account, fraudulently withdrawn by accused‑‑Signatures on cheques compared by Court and found different from those of account holder‑‑Cheque book taken unauthorizedly by accused‑‑Accused, held, committed offence punishable under S.467, P.P.C. by preparing cheques and forging signatures of account holder thereon.

‑--‑‑S. 420/468/471/477‑A‑‑Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)‑‑Forged cheques submitted in bank for encashment‑‑Accused, held, used forged cheques as genuine, knowing them to be forged and thus, committed offence punishable under S.471, P.P.C.

‑‑‑S. 420/467/468/471/477‑A‑‑Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2) Dishonest and fraudulent inducement‑‑Forged cheques submitted in bank by accused‑‑Cheques encashed‑‑Accused, held, dishonestly and fraudulently induced bank to make payment to him and thus committed offence punishable under 5.420, P.P. C.

‑‑‑S. 420/468/471/477‑A‑‑Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)‑‑Public servant‑‑Pecuniary advantage by illegal means‑‑Bank Officer a public servant‑‑Accused, public servant, misappropriating amount of bank and thus drawing pecuniary advantage by illegal means by abusing his official position, held, committed offence under S.5 of Prevention of Corruption Act.

Sardar Nazar Hussain Dogar, Special Prosecutor for the State.

Kh. Muhammad Farooq for the Accused.

The charge against Khan Muhammad, accused, is that while working as officer incharge of C.D. and S.B. department of Habib Bank Ltd. Main Market Gulberg Branch, Lahore, he had made following bogus credit entries in the ledger cards of Saving Bank Account No. 11354 of one Muhammad Iqbal of the total value of Rs.49,150:‑‑

Date Amount

02‑12‑1978 Rs. 9,500

04‑12‑1978 Rs. 7,500

12‑12‑1978 Rs. 3,900

14‑12‑1978 Rs. 8,750

16‑12‑1978 Rs. 3,500

13‑01‑1979 Rs. 7,000

15‑03‑1979 Rs.9,000

‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑

Total: Rs.49,150

‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑

The next allegation is that the accused and said Muhammad Iqbal had withdrawn the said amounts by bogus cheques as detailed below: ‑‑

It is also alleged that the demand draft for Rs.1,10,000 in, favour of said Muhammad Iqbal was issued against the above Cheque No. 207117, dated 14‑12-1978 and the rest of the cheques were encashed by accused Khan Muhammad' himself of which Cheque No. 322841 and 322844 were not only written by him but also signed by him as account‑holder. Another allegation is that these two cheques had been taken from the cheque book bearing Nos. 322841 to 322850 which was obtained by accused Khan Muhammad himself from the bank without any authority from the said account‑holder. The final allegation is that the accused Khan Muhammad had thus dishonestly and fraudulently, by resort to forgery and cheating, deprived the bank of said sum of Rs.49,150 and misappropriated the same while acting as a public servant. In the complaint letter, dated 14‑7‑1979, Exh. P.W.1/1, on the basis of which formal F.I.R. Exh. P.W.2/1 was recorded by P.W.2 Muhammad Sarwar, Head Constable, on 15‑7‑1979, Iqbal Beg Mirza, Manager of the said Branch, had described that Muhammad Iqbal account‑holder was in league with Khan Muhammad accused but the police challaned accused Khan Muhammad only and cited Muhammad Iqbal as a prosecution witness.

3. They trial in this case started in the Court of Special Judge (Central). He framed charge against the accused for offences under sections 477‑A, 468, 471, 420, P.P.C. and for offence under section 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

4. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In all five witnesses were examined in this case on behalf of the prosecution. The account‑holder Muhammad Iqbal was given up as having been won over. In his statement, under section 342, Cr.P.C., the accused denied the correctness of the incriminating evidence available against him on record which had been put to him and attributed his implication in this case to enmity towards him of his higher officers. He stated that he would not produce any defence evidence. That also meant that he would not appear as a witness in his own defence in exercise of the option available to him under subsection (2) of section 340, Cr.P.C. as it stood before its amendment in 1985. The said amendment through substitution of subsection (2) of section 340, Cr.P.C., by virtue of Federal Act XII of 1985, made it incumbent upon the Court to record the statement of accused on oath as witness in his own defence. Since, however, the case of the accused related to a period prior to the said amendment, the question arose whether the said amendment law could be applied to his case and whether in the circumstances the accused should be compelled to make statement under section 340, Cr.P.C. as a witness in his own defence or not. On this point arguments were heard and by a detailed order, passed by me on 12‑6‑1985, I held that the option to appear or not as a witness in his own defence, available to an accused under subsection (2) of section 340, Cr.P.C., as it stood before its amendment was a substantive right available to an accused person at that time and, therefore, the new law promulgated subsequently was not operative with retrospective effect and did not apply to the pending cases. I, therefore, did not compel the accused to come in the witness‑box, to appear as a witness in his own defence to disprove the charges levelled against him.

5. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have ,thoroughly gone through the record of this case.

6. I now proceed to consider the evidence in the case. First, in order of preference is the evidence in respect of filing of the complaint with the police and registration of formal F.I.R. That evidence is furnished by P.W.1 Iqbal Beg Mirza and P.W. 2 Muhammad Sarwar. P.W.1 Iqbal Beg was Manager of Habib Bank Ltd., Main Market Gulberg Branch, Lahore on 14‑7‑1979. He made a complaint, dated 14‑7‑1979, Exh. P.W.1/1, for registration of the case in the P.S. Gulberg, Lahore. The details of the allegations made in the said complaint are already given in para. 1 above. On the basis of the said complaint, P.W. 2 Muhammad Sarwar who was Moharrar H.C. in P.S. Main Market, Gulberg, recorded on 15‑7‑1979 formal F.I.R. Exh. P.W. 2/1. This part of to evidence of the said two witnesses has not been controverted and, therefore, these matters stand proved on the record.

7. Next is the evidence in respect of production of the documents on 15‑7‑1979 and taking of the same into possession by the Investigating Officer. This was furnished by P.W. 1 Iqbal Beg Mirza, P.W. 4 Pervaiz A. Sheikh and P.W. 5 Abdul Ghafoor A.S.I. P.W. 1 Iqbal Beg Mirza stated that during investigation he produced 5 cheques Exh. P.W. 1/2, P.W.1/3, P.W. 1/4 and Cheque No._207118 Exh. P.W.1/5 and Cheque No. 609022, Exh. P.W.1/6, and ledger card, Exh. P.W.1/7, and ledger card, P.W.1/8 which were taken into possession by the Investigating Officer, vide memo. Exh. P.W.1/9. The same is the evidence of P.W. 4 Pervaiz A. Sheikh and P.W. 5 Abdul Ghafoor A.S.I., Investigating Officer. That matter also, therefore, stands proved.

8. Next comes the evidence in respect of taking of samples of writing/ signatures of the accused P.W. 5 Abdul Ghafoor, Investigating Officer stated that he had taken the specimen signature and writing of the accused on sheets Exh: P.W.3/1 to Exh. P.W.3/45 in the presence of a Magistrate First Class, Lahore, and that all the documents were signed by the Magistrate who also got a seal affixed thereon in his presence. In cross‑examination, he stated that he had sent the said cheques, and two ledger cards and specimen signatures and writing of Khan Muhammad to the handwriting expert.

9. In order to prove the identity of the said specimen signatures and writings, it was necessary to record the statement of the Magistrate before whom the said specimens had been taken by the Investigating) Officer but the accused whose statement was recorded on 11‑12‑1984 by me on this question admitted that the said specimens of handwriting and signatures on the sheets Exhs. P.W. 3/1 to P.W. 3/45 were his and had been taken by A.S.I. Abdul Ghafoor, P.W.5, in the presence of a Magistrate First Class. This obviated the necessity of production of the Magistrate as witness in this case. Accordingly the identity of the said specimen signature and writing of the accused on specimen sheets Exhs.P.W.3/1 to Exh. P.W. 3/45 stands established on record.

10. The remaining evidence in this case relates to the essential merits of the prosecution case against the accused. It can conveniently be classified into the following five‑distinct categories:

(i) Evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 4 in respect of the said 7 credit entries in ledger card Exh. P.W. 1/7 and Exh. P.W. 1/8 of Saving Account No. 11354 of Muhammad Iqbal account‑holder being bogus and 5 out of these 7 bogus entries being in the handwriting of the accused.

(ii) Evidence of P.W. 3 Muhammad Sarwar handwriting expert in respect of identification of the signature of accused on the reverse of three cheques Exh. P.W.1/2, Exh. P.W.1/5 and Exh. P.W.1/6 to be in the hand of the accused.

(iii) Evidence of P.W.1 and P.W. 4 in respect of identification by them of body writing of two cheques No. 322891, Exh. P.W.1/3 and No. 322844, Exh. P.W. 1/4 and signature of drawer thereon reading as Muhammad Iqbal to be in the handwriting of the accused and corroborating the same evidence.

(iv) Evidence of P.W.3 Muhammad Sarwar. Handwriting Expert in respect of identification of signature on the back of cheque Exh. P.W. 1/4 to be of Khan Muhammad, accused showing that accused got the payment of sum of Rs.4,000 of the said cheque.

(v) Evidence of receipt of money by the accused on cheques P.W. 1/3 and P.W. 1/4.

11. The above categories of evidence comprise of two sets of transactions. The first set consisting of category No. (i) is in respect of seven bogus credit entries in ledger Card No. Exh. P.W. 1/7 and Exh. P.W. 1/8 of Saving Account No. 11354 and the second set comprising of remaining four categories relates to withdrawal of amounts out of the total amount so credited in the said account.

Evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 4 in respect of the said 7 credit entries in ledger card P.W. 117 and P.W. 118 of Saving Account No. 11354 of Muhammad Iqbal account‑holder being bogus and 5 out of these 7 bogus entries being in the handwriting of the accused.

12. P.W.1 Iqbal Beg Mirza, the Manager of Habib Bank Ltd., Main Market. Gulberg Branch, stated that Saving Account No. 11354, holder of which M. Iqbal was introduced by Khan Muhammad accused, was at first inoperative for over a year but became alive on 21‑8‑1978 and. thereafter accused Khan Muhammad made seven bogus credit entries, namely, entry, dated 2‑12‑1978 for Rs.9,500 entry, dated 4‑12‑1978 for Rs.7,500 entry. dated 12‑12‑1978 for Rs.3.900. entry, dated 14‑12‑1978 for Rs.8,750 entry, dated 16‑12‑1978 for Rs.3,500, entry dated 13‑1‑1979 for Rs.7,000 and entry dated 15‑3‑1979 for a sum of Rs.9.000, totalling Rs.49,150 in the ledger cards Exh. P.W.1/7 and Exh. P.W.1/8.

13. Out of these 7 entries, namely, one, dated 2‑12‑1978 for a sum of Rs.9.500 and the second, dated 14‑12‑1978 for a sum of Rs.8.150 are machine entries but there was no cross‑examination questioning the factum of accused being responsible for these two false entries as well and. therefore, the accused must be deemed to have accepted that he had made these typed entries in the ledger card, Exh. P.W.1/7 with the type machine.

14. As for the remaining five handwritten entries also, there is absolutely no cross‑examination contesting the correctness of evidence of this witness that these five entries were in the handwriting of the accused and, therefore the accused must be deemed to have accepted the correctness of the said statement of this witness and admitted that the said five entries on ledger cards, Exh. P.W.1/7 and Exh. P.W.1/8 were in the handwriting of the accused.

15. The learned counsel for the accused has, however, criticised the statement of this witness on .the ground that in his statement, he did not state that he could identify the handwriting of the accused. It is, however, self‑apparent and on the face of it obvious that the statement of this witness was that he could identify the handwriting of the accused. who was his direct subordinate. When he said in his said statement that he accused made false entries in the ledger card Exh. P.W.1/7 and Exh. P.W.1/8 of Account No. 11354 of Muhammad Iqbal, he meant to say that he identified the writing in digits of bogus credit entries in the ledger cards to be in the handwriting of the accused. The said sentences spoken by this witness in his statement visualized and contemplated as a basic fact in them that he was capable of identifying the writing of the accused. It is also notable in that connection that on this aspect of the matter there again was no cross‑examination by the learned counsel for the accused. It must, therefore be assumed that the defence conceded that said implied part of the evidence of this witness was correct and it was admitted that the said witness had by implication stated that he could identify the writing of the accused. In my view, therefore, the mere fact that this witness had not in so many words stated that he identified the handwriting of the accused is of no adverse consequence in this case.

16. A similar question was raised in Mahanth Jagdish Das and others v. The Emperor A.I.R 1938 Pat. 497, wherein the P.W., a Headmaster, while giving evidence had merely stated that draft was in the handwriting of Damodar Narain without also stating that he knew the man's handwriting and an objection was taken that his evidence did not amount to proof of handwriting of the accused. It was, however, noted that learned Sessions Judge had pointed out that there was ample evidence to show that Headmaster was familiar with handwriting of Demodar Narain and when giving evidence, the Headmaster had actually proved that he acted as clerk to Damodar Narain on occasions. It was held by the Patna High Court that when the Headmaster stated that the document was in the handwriting of Damodar Narain that was evidence of fact and was not rendered inadmissible by the absence of mere statement I know the handwriting 'particularly when his evidence throughout indicated that he must have been acquainted with the handwriting of the Damodar Narain. Same is the position in the present case. P.W. 1 was the Manager of the branch of the bank while the accused was his direct subordinate and it is not difficult to visualize that the said witness had seen the accused written digits (and words and make his signatures) number of times within his view and at any rate, documents purporting to be written by the accused must have been usually submitted to him in the ordinary course of business of the bank to enable him to get fully acquainted with his handwriting. It is the normal incident of relationship between accused subordinate and the Manager, his immediate superior, that former should usually submit documents written and signed by him to the latter in ordinary course of business of the bank for the latter to authenticate them by appending his signature thereto or otherwise. No capital can, therefore, be made out of the mere circumstance that the said witness omitted to state in clear words that he could identify the writing/ signature of the accused.

16‑A. The next submission of the learned counsel for the accused to the validity of the said identification by P.W.1 Iqbal Beg Mirza is that he has not stated in so many words and has thus riot proved the source of his acquaintance with the handwriting/ signature of the accused within the ambit of the explanation to section 47 of Evidence Act, 1872 (now section 61 of Qanoon‑e‑Shahadat. 1984) and, therefore, his statement has not established legally his capacity to identify the handwriting of the accused. I have given my serious thought to this point too but am afraid 1 cannot accept the same. It is true that in the beginning in Re: Basrur Venkata Roy I L R 36 Mad. 159=14 I C 418 (Mad.) Sundara Ayyar, J. had remarked that when a witness had said that the documents were in appellant's handwriting without saying how he was acquainted with his handwriting, that was not legal evidence of knowledge of the handwriting of the accused, but thereafter this view underwent a change. The following cases show the contrary view which continues to hold the field so far:‑‑

In Shankar Rao Gangadhar v. Ramji Harijivan I L R 28 Born. 58 after considering the said view in the above‑said case, it was held that:----

"The correct statement of law is that a witness need not state in the first instance how he knows the handwriting since it is the duty of the opposite party to explore on cross‑examination the source of his knowledge, if he be dissatisfied with the testimony as it stands."

In this case in proof of a document, a witness simply stated that he was acquainted with the handwriting of the writer but he was not asked in the examination‑in‑chief any question which would elicit from him any of the several matters indicated in the explanation to section 47 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The witness was also not cross‑examined on the point on these facts on the basis of above dictum of law it was held that his evidence as to the handwriting ought to be accepted even though he had not stated in his evidence as to hour he claimed to be acquainted with the handwriting which he was examined to prove. Again in Mahanth Jagdish Dass and others v. The Emperor after making a reference to the above‑mentioned view of Sundara Ayyar. J. in Re: Basrur Venkata Roy it was observed by James, J:‑‑

"The more correct view if I may say so with due respect appears to me to be that expressed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Shankarrao Gangadhar v. Ramji Harjivan (28 Bombay 58) wherein he approved of the proposition that the witness need not say in the first instance how he knows the handwriting since it is the duty of the opposite party to explore on cross‑examination the source of his knowledge if he is not satisfied with the, testimony as it stands."

The said view was reiterated by Fazal Ali, J. in Shyam Partab Ram Missir v. Beni Narth Dubey and others A I R 1942 Pat. 449. In Pusaram and others v. Manmal and others A I R 1955 Raj. 186, a case from Indian Jurisdiction it was: observed as below:‑‑-

"Section 47 of the Evidence Act provides that the opinion of a person acquainted with the handwriting is a relevant fact and then follows the explanation which defines, what the words acquainted with the handwriting mean and considering the manner in Which section 47 is framed, it has been held by the Courts generally that it is enough for a witness to say in examination‑in- chief that he is acquainted with, the handwriting and that if it is desired to challenge that statement of his, he has to be cross‑examined on that statement to show that he could not be acquainted; with the handwriting in the circumstances of any, particular case. The English Law on the point stood thus summarised by Taylor on Evidence (Volume 2 Edn. 12, para. 1863, p. 1151. The witness need not state in the first instance how he knows the handwriting since it is the duty of the opposite party to explore on cross‑examination the source of his knowledge if he be dissatisfied with the testimony as it stands. The Indian Law of Evidence is based on the said English Law and there is nothing in section 47 of Evidence Act, 1872 which goes against the principle which has been accepted by the English Courts and following this principle the Indian High Court have also taken the same view."

Finally in a case of our own country titled as Muhammad Sadiq Javeed v. The State P L D 1969 (W.P.) Pesh. 12. Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah a learned Judge of High Court of West Pakistan (as then his Lordship was) held as below:‑‑-

"When once a witness states in examination‑in‑chief that he is acquainted or familiar with the, handwriting of a person, the details as to how he is acquainted with, being a matter of Explanation to section 47, of the Evidence Act, is the duty of cross‑examiner to bring to light, if the competency of such a witness is questioned by the cross‑examiner and if no such cross‑examination is done it Will be assumed that the competency of the said witness was not challenged."

The learned counsel for the accused has, however, quoted Surendra Krishna Roy and another v. Mirza Muhammad Sayed Ali Mutawali and others A I R 1936 P C 15. In that case the question raised before their Lordships of the Privy Council was that Kabuliyat of 1892 said to have been executed by Kurban Ali was not proved. In this connection the learned Judges referred to statement of a witness who had stated that in the partition suit "A receiver was appointed to the estate, Mr. Fergusan was the receiver, then Mr. Dunne was Receiver. This is the signature of Mr. Dunne in the Kabuliyat executed by Kurban Ali signature proved." In cross‑examination, however the said witness stated that the said signature of Mr. Dunne was not made to his presence. Upon this their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that the learned counsel for the appellant was justified in his comment that evidence was not properly given of the fact which under section 47 of the Evidence Act it was necessary to prove. Learned counsel for the accused relies on this observation of their Lordships of Privy Council and submits that it is necessary to prove the facts given in the explanation to section 47, Evidence Act before the evidence of identification .of a person writing/ signature can be given. He has, however, conveniently forgotten that the question whether the said signature had been made in his presence had been asked in cross -examination. He has also ignored that their Lordships went on to observe' that on the other hand the learned trial Judges' note "Signature proved contained no hint of objection taken at the time and the only cross -examination on the point appeared to be directed not to showing that the witness is unacquainted with the handwriting of Mr. Dunne, but merely to, the fact that he did not witness the signature. It is thus clear that their Lordships had not finally relied upon the said earlier observation and had attached importance to the cross‑examination which may elicit the capacity of the witness to identify the disputed handwriting /signature of a person in any one of the three different modes given in the explanation to section 47 of Evidence Act. It is true that in‑the end the said evidence of this witness was not relied upon by their Lordships of the Privy Council and it was not held on its basis that the said document stood proved but that appears to be so because on facts of that case, there was no necessity to do so, as j it had been found that Kabuliyat was thirty years old and tinder section 90 of Evidence Act, 1872 was to be presumed to be a genuine, document.' The said decision is, therefore, not an authority for the proposition canvassed by the learned counsel for the accused. The learned counsel for the accused has next cited Sailendra Nath Halder v. The State P 1) D 1970 Dacca 690 in which the two witnesses who had stated that they knew the signature /initial of the accused and had identified the same on the documents in that case, had not stated how they came to know the signature or initials of the accused person, and on that ground it was held that the requirement of law, as regards proof of the signature of the accused (in either of the three modes given in explanation to section 47 of Evidence Act) had not been complied with. It is, however, notable that the point decided in the above‑noted authorities had not been raised and decided in that case nor the said authorities had been considered therein. The said case is also, therefore, distinguishable. The learned counsel has next quoted two cases from the Indian Jurisdiction. :First of these is Dalim Kumar Sain and others v. Sant Nandarani Dassi and another A I R 1970 Cal. 292 in which evidence of Dalim Kumar Sain to the effect that he had seen his father sign on many occasions and that signature on letter, dated May 12, 1946 was his father's hart been held to have rightly proved the said letter on the ground that ,by the said evidence Dalim Kumar's acquaintance with the signature of his .father within the meaning of the explanation to section 47 of the Evidence Act was well‑established. It was further held that that being so, even the opinion evidence of a non‑expert which Dalim Kumar was, became good evidence to go by. On the basis of these observations, again, the learned counsel for the accused submits that opinion evidence of P.W. 1 could have become relevant only when he had said in his statement that he was familiar with the handwriting of the accused provided the said familiarity was covered by the explanation to section 47 of the Evidence Act in this case. However, the contrary view taken in above‑mentioned cases was neither canvassed nor considered in this case too. The second case in that connection is Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmad and others A I R 1975 S C 290. It is no doubt given in that decision that evidence of opinion of a person as to the identity of the person who had made a particular writing/ signature is hearsay and becomes relevant only if the condition laid down in section 47 of the Evidence Act is first proved but it 'has been at the same time, stated therein that there is conflict of judicial opinion in this matter and that they (the learned Judges of the Supreme Court of India) need not resolve it in the circumstances of that particular case. The Supreme Court of India has not, therefore, definitely laid down that evidence of identification becomes relevant only if any one f the conditions laid down in section 47 of the Evidence Act is first proved. The said decision of Supreme Court of India too does not help the learned counsel for the accused.

19. Thus, the law regarding identification of handwriting or signature by a person acquainted with the handwriting/ signature of a person as laid down in Muhammad Sadiq Javed v. The State P L D 1969 (W.P.) Pesh. 12, which remains unreversed so far and is supported by decisions of Bombay, Patna and Rajastan High Courts, is that it is sufficient for a witness to state that he is familiar with the handwriting of a person and it is for the cross‑examiner to explore the source of his said acquaintance within the ambit of the three modes of identification given in explanation to section 47 of the Evidence Act and if no such cross‑examination is undertaken, the other party should be deemed to have accepted the correctness of the statement of that person that he is in a position to identify his handwriting/signature. As a corollary when a witness states on oath that a particular writing is writing of such and such person, it should be deemed to contain in it his implied statement that he is acquainted with the handwriting of that person and his said statement should be considered to be sufficient evidence of the identification of the author of the said writing and it is for the other side to cross‑examine the said witness to explore whether the source of his acquaintance with that person's handwriting falls within the scope of any one of the three modes given in explanation and if no cross‑examination is undertaken then the other party must be deemed to have accepted that his evidence of identification is correct. It is in the light of this proposition of law that the evidentiary value of statement of P.W. 1, as regards his identification of the writing of the accused, is to be assessed. The said P.W. clearly stated in his statement that Khan Muhammad accused made seven bogus credit entries; totalling Rs.49,150, in ledger cards Exh. P.W. 1/7 and Exh. P.W.1/8. Out of these five entries are handwritten. The said witness is, therefore, to be considered to have said that so far as the said five entries are concerned, the accused made those entries in his own hand. There is, however, no cross‑examination of any sort by the defence contesting the capacity of the said witness to identify the writing of the accused id digits and words and controverting his evidence that said bogus entries had been made in the ledger cards by the accused who must, therefore, be deemed to have accepted that the said entries are in his hand. Therefore, the factum of the accused having made the said credit entries stands established on the basis of said statement of P.W.1 Iqbal Beg Mirza alone.

20. P.W.4 Pervaiz A. Sheikh is the other witness who deposed in respect of the detail and identification of the bogus credit entries in ledger card Exh. P.W.1/7 and Exh. P.W.1/8. He stated that these entries were seven in number out of which two, namely, one dated 2‑12‑1978, for Rs.9,500 and the other, dated 14‑12‑1978, for a sum of Rs.8,750, were entries made by machine while the remaining five credit entries, dated 4‑12‑1978, 12‑12‑1978, 16‑12‑1978, 13‑1‑1979 and 15‑3‑1979, respectively for Rs.7,500, Rs.3,900, Rs.3,500, Rs.7,000 and Rs.9,000 were handwritten which were in the handwriting of the accused Khan Muhammad. He deposed that on 15‑7‑1979 he was posted as Officer on Special Duty at Zonal Office, Habib Bank Ltd., Lahore and under instructions from his Zonal Chief, he visited the Main Market, Gulberg Branch of Habib Bank Ltd. and during his inspection he found seven bogus credit entries, totalling Rs.49,150, in Saving Bank Account No. 11354 of Muhammad Iqbal. He stated that he recognized the handwriting of the accused as he had been seeing his handwriting in routine in the course of his normal official duties allocated to him‑by his Zonal Office. He stated that he had been visiting the said branch in connection with scrutiny of the record of the branch and had frequently come across the writings and signatures of accused Khan Muhammad as it was part of his duty as Officer on Special Duty to look into these matters as he was incharge of Audit, Inspection Fraud and Forgery Inspection Cell. Learned counsel for the accused cross‑examined this witness at length and was able to elicit from him that he had never seen the accused write in his presence nor there had been any official correspondence between him and the accused to enable him to identify the handwriting of the accused but he did not contest the claim of this witness to be able to identify the handwriting of the accused in words and digits on the basis of the third mode of acquaintance with the handwriting of the accused as given in explanation to section 47 of Evidence Act, 1872, now section 61 of Quanoon‑e‑Shahadat, 1984, namely, his capacity to identify it on the ground that in the ordinary course of banking business documents purporting to be written by the accused had been usually submitted to him in the course of duties allocated to him by the Zonal office of his bank and the learned counsel for the accused was not able to find any fault with the capacity of the said witness to identify the handwriting of the accused both in digits and words on that ground. That part of deposition of the said witness which stated that he identified handwriting of the accused as he had been visiting the branch in normal course of his duties as O.S.D. incharge of Audit, Inspection, Fraud, Forgeries Cell in 1979 and had frequently seen the writing/initial and signatures of the accused, does not stand negated in cross‑examination of the said witness. Furthermore, it cannot be said that during the course of 10 long years of his service as O.S.D. with different duties at different times, the documents written and signed by the accused had not been usually submitted to this witness in the ordinary course of business of the bank. This witness was undoubtedly the incharge of inspection cell during the relevant period and he had also worked as O.S.D. Recoveries and Expenditure and Protocol at other times. It is also clear that during the course of these duties this witness had to visit the branches of the bank frequently in connection with the inquiries to be made in performance of variegated duties assigned to him and it is not improbable for the writing of the accused both in digits and words, to have been submitted to him in the course of his official duties. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that it stood established on the basis of evidence of this witness that he was fully acquainted with the handwriting of the Accused.

21. Learned counsel for the accused hasp, however, submitted that this witness had admitted that he did not depose before the police that he was familiar, with the handwriting etc. of the accused and had given an explanation that he had not done so as the police had never asked him that question. The said admission taken alongwith the explanation does not conclusively show that he was not acquainted with the handwriting and signature of the accused and do not make that part of his statement unreliable. It only puts the Court on its guard and compels it to seek corroboration of the capacity of this witness to identify the handwriting/ signature of the accused. That corroboration is available in the accepted or proved facts and circumstances of this case. One of these is that, as already stated; this witness was O.S.D., Audit Inspection, Fraud, Forgery, Inspection Cell etc. during as long a period of his service as 10 years. His evidence that he had frequently come across the writing and signature of the accused in routine on official duties allocated to him by the Zonal Office as O.S.D. incharge of Audit, Inspection, Fraud, Forgery, Inspection Cell etc. cannot be incorrect. Therefore, his capacity to identify the handwriting of the accused cannot be doubted. The other circumstance in that connection is that the accused had deposed that his Zonal Chief had instructed him to inspect the H.B.L., Main Market Gulberg Branch, Lahore, and he had accordingly inspected the branch and during the course of his scrutiny in the said inspection, he had found that there were seven bogus credit entries in the said ledger cards and the same had been made by the accused. This earlier part of the evidence of this witness was not subjected to cross‑examination. The factum of his being O.S.D. incharge of Audit, Inspection, Fraud, Forgery Inspection Cell and the circumstances of his having made inspection of the branch and found the said credit entries as bogus was not contested in the cross‑examination. In the circumstances, it is most probable for him to have raked up his memory and recalled and found out the handwriting of said entries to be of the accused. He had deposed that he identified the same at the time of the inspection‑‑much before F.I.R. was lodged but there was no cross‑examination to controvert the same. Only his present capacity to identify handwriting of the accused was subjected to cross‑examination. The C.D. and S.B. department of this branch of which accused was the incharge fell equally well within the ambit of his vigil‑ and he could not have failed to have frequent chances of direct observation of handwriting of the accused while working in Zonal Office under, which Habib Bank Ltd., Main Market Gulberg Branch, Lahore functioned. In these circumstances this witness could not be a witness of mere production of documents alone in this case as suggested by learned counsel for the accused. This witness had during the enquiry before the F.I.R. was lodged, identified the said bogus entries to be in the hand of the accused and, therefore, his evidence at the trial stage in respect of his identification of the handwriting of the accused cannot be considered to be an afterthought. For the above reasons, I am of the view that the evidence of identification by this witness of the said 5 out of 7 credit entries in ledger cards Exh.P.W.1/7 and Exh.P.W.1/8 to be in the handwriting of the accused is unexceptional and the said matter stands proved satisfactorily.

22. The learned counsel for the accused has next contended that as elicited by him in cross‑examination of this witness, there were two other employees of the bank directly concerned with the entries in the ledger cards, namely, ledger clerk/machine operator who had the immediate custody of the ledger cards and the officer under whom he worked while accused was the final incharge over them and the said two persons were in a position to identify the handwriting of the accused on the ledger cards and non‑production of said two natural witnesses, who constituted the best evidence in the case, was fatal to the prosecution plea of accused having made the said false entries. I have considered this plea of learned counsel for the accused. The learned counsel was not able to suggest the names of the clerk and the officer in cross‑examination. He did not elicit from the witness whether the said two persons were still available in the bank and were alive to give evidence in this case to enable the prosecution to get them summoned under section 540, Cr.P.C, toward off his objection. In any way, it is clear from the very argument of learned counsel that the clerk and the officer were subordinate of the accused. That being so, they were G under day to day obligations of the accused, their direct superior, and therefore, cannot be expected to be prepared to appear and depose truthfully against the accused. In these circumstances, they cannot be considered to constitute best evidence in the case on the subject. The prosecution was under no obligation to produce them to prove the said matter and could competently make a choice to produce one who could be expected to be under no obligation of the accused. The prosecution did make that choice and produced Pervaiz A. Sheikh who was superior in rank to the accused and could not get influenced by the position of the accused in the branch and could give independent evidence. It is pertinent to note that the defence counsel did not suggest to P.W.4 that these fake entries had in fact been made by any other person and not the accused. In the circumstances the identification by this witness in respect of the said five, out of seven, entries to be in the handwriting of the accused is not open to any exception.

23. Learned counsel has next contended that the prosecution has not been able to prove that the said seven entries are fake as no receiving cashier's book had been produced nor the cashier had been put in the witness‑box to depose that on the relevant date, no such sums had been deposited in the bank. It is difficult for me to accept this argument. P.W.1 Mirza Iqbal Beg had also stated that accused had made seven bogus credit entries, totalling Rs.49,150, in Account No. 11354 of M. Iqbal. In cross‑examination not a single question was asked from this witness contesting the allegation of said Seven credit entries being bogus i.e. entries against which no actual sum had been deposited in the bank. In the circumstances, on the statement of this witness alone, it stands proved in this case that the said seven credit entries made in ledger cards Exh.P.W.1/7 and Exh.P.W.1/8 were bogus. Nothing contained in the examination‑in‑chief of and nothing elicited cross‑examination, of P.W.4 Pervaiz A. Sheikh, reverses this position So far as P.W.4 Pervaiz A. Sheikh is concerned he stated examination‑in‑chief that when under instructions from his Zonal he visited Habib Bank Ltd. Main Market Gulberg Branch, Lahore, he found during his inspection seven bogus credit entries totalling Rs.49,151 in Saving Bank Account No. 11354 of Muhammad Iqbal made by accused Khan Muhammad. In cross‑examination, he stated that from seven bogus, credit entries he meant entries which were not supported by any supporting vouchers whereby any sum had been deposited in the bank The learned counsel for the accused was able to elicit from this witness that on deposit of a sum in bank, besides deposit voucher, which remains as record in the bank, an entry is also made in the receiving cashier's book of the receipt of the said sum before the entry of the same is made in the ledger card. On the basis of this admission learned counsel for the accused contends that the mere fact that there were no vouchers available in the bank in respect of some credit entire in the 'ledger cards, it cannot be said that the said entries were fake and to prove so, the production of receiving cashier's book was necessary. I regret that I cannot accept this argument. documents are the deposit vouchers and without those, the entire even in receiving cashier's book would be fictitious. In any way, Pervaiz A. Sheikh stated that the said seven entries were fake because these were no deposit vouchers showing any deposit available in to branch to support the said credit entries he also meant that there was no entry in receiving cashier's book and that no sum pertaining said entries had been put in the funds of the bank. The witness was an experienced officer, an O.S.D. charged with the duty of finds out frauds and forgeries in the bank and when under the order of his Zonal Chief, he inspected the could not have failed that apart from money deposited such deposit made it is difficult to understand absence of credit entries that the entries to note that the learned counsel for the accused did not cross‑examine P.W.4 Pervaiz A. Sheikh and suggest that entry deposit of any such sum was actually available in the receiving cashier's book. He did not even summon the receiving cashier's book in defence. If deposit entries of said sums were available in the receiving cashier's book, the learned counsel for the accused could not have failed to summon the record to prove the existence of said entries which would have scrapped the entire case against the accused. The plea of the learned counsel is, therefore, hypothetical, based on vague suppositions and surmises and has no basis in actual facts. I, therefore, overrule this objection of the learned counsel for the accused and hold that the said seven entries were fake and bogus.

24. The sum total of the above discussion is that out of the above mentioned 7 fake credit entries, 5 have been proved to have been made by the accused in his own, hand. The result is that it has been established that he committed the offence of falsification of account punishable under section 477‑A, P.P.C.

Evidence of P.W.3 Muhammad Sarwar, Handwriting Expert, in respect of identification of signature of the accused on the reverse of three cheques P.W.1/2, P.W.1/5 and P.W.1/6 to be in the hand of the accused.

25. Muhammad Sarwar, Handwriting Expert, appeared as P.W.3 in this case and stated that disputed Urdu signature Exxh.P.W.1/5/1 on the back of cheque Exh.P.W.1/5 (Cheque No. 2018, dated 24‑12‑1978 for a sum of Rs.5,000) was similar in characteristics with the specimen signatures of the accused Khan Muhammad on specimen signature sheets Exh.P.W.3/10 to P.W.3/18. He further stated that similarly the questioned English signature on Exh.P.W.1/6/1 on the back of cheque Exh.P.W.1/6 (Cheque No. 906022, dated 27‑2‑1979 for a sum of Rs.7,000) corresponded with the specimen signature and writing of accused Khan Muhammad on sheets Exh.P.W.3/1 to Exh.P.W.3/9. It is well‑known that signatures on the back of Cheques, are made in acknowledgement of the receipt of sums of money given on the said Cheques. From the said evidence read in the light of the said two Cheques, it is clear that the accused received these sums from the bank and signed on the, back of the said two Cheques to acknowledge the receipt of money on them. The said statement of the expert is corroborated by the statement of P.W.1 Iqbal Baig Mirza which is to the effect that the Cheques Exhs.P.W.1/5 and P.W.1/6 had been got encashed by the accused himself from the bank. It is, therefore, proved that the accused got these sums from the‑branch by encashment of these Cheques.

26. In this connection, it is notable that it had been conceded by the prosecution that Cheque Exh.P.W.l/2 (Cheque No. 207117, dated 14‑12‑1978 for a sum of Rs.1,10,000) had been issued by Muhammad Iqbal account holder against which he got a demand draft issued for the same amount in his favour on Shaheed Road, Jhang Sadar Branch. It has been specifically stated by P.W. Iqbal Baig Mirza, Manager in his statement that cheque No. 207717 Exh.P.W.1/2 for Rs.1,10,000 was drawn by Muhammad Iqbal account‑holder. It is, therefore, clear that this cheque was a genuine one and bore genuine signature of Muhammad Iqbal, one on its obverse side and two on its reverse in token of his having received consideration thereof in the form of a demand draft which he got prepared in his favour for Shaheed Road Jhang Sadar Branch. Under section 73 of the Evidence Act, 1872 now section 84 of Qanoon‑e‑Shahadat, 1984, this Court is competent to make a comparison of the disputed signature with the accepted signature to find out whether they correspond with such other or not. I have compared these three accepted signatures of Muhammad Iqbal account‑holder on cheque Exh.P.W.1/2 with the signature of drawer reading as Muhammad Iqbal on cheques Exh.P.W.1/5 and P.W.1/6 and I find that they exactly correspond with each other. Thus, on cheque Exh.P.W.1/5 and Efh.P.W.l/6 the signature of Muhammad Iqbal, account‑holder as drawer are genuine and it is he who had drawn these cheques.

27. However, the said genuine cheques which have been proved to be signed by Muhammad Iqbal as drawer are drawn in favour of self or bearer and, therefore, unless it is proved that the accused was not a holder of those cheques or a holder in due course thereof and had obtained the said cheques when they were unclaimed or had secured them through theft or some other offence and was not a valid bearer thereof, the accused cannot be held to have committed any offence merely because he had received the money on the said cheques. Following provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are relevant in this context:‑

"(8) Holder.‑‑ The 'holder' of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque means the payee or indorsee who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof but does not include a beneficial owner claiming through a Benamedar.

Explanation.‑‑‑ Where the note bill or cheque is lost and not found again, or is destroyed, the person in possession of it or the bearer thereof at the time of such loss or destruction shall be deemed to continue to be its holder.

(9) 'Holder in due course'.‑‑ Holder in due course' means any person who consideration becomes the possessor of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque if payable to bearer, or the payee or indorsee thereof, if payable to order, before it became overdue, without notice that the title of the person from whom he derived his own title was defective.

Explanation.‑‑--For the purposes of this section, the title of a person to a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque is defective when he is not entitled to receive the amount due thereon by reason of the provisions of section 58.

(10) Payment in due course'.‑‑ Payment in due course' means payment in accordance with the apparent tenor of the instrument in good faith and without negligence to any person in possession thereof under circumstances which do not afford a reasonable ground for believing that he is not entitled to receive payment of the amount therein mentioned.

(58) Defective title.‑‑ When a promissory note bill of exchange or cheque has been lost or has been obtained from any maker, drawer, acceptor or holder thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for an unlawful consideration, neither the person who finds or so obtains the instrument nor any possessor or indorsee who claims through such person is entitled to receive the amount due thereon from such maker, drawer, acceptor or holder, unless such possessor or indorsee is, or some person through whom he claims was, a holder thereof in due course.

(85) Cheque payable to order.‑‑ (1) Where a cheque payable to order purports to be endorsed by or on behalf of the payee, the drawee is discharged by payment in due course.

(2) Where a cheque is originally expressed to be payable to bearer, the drawee is discharged by payment in due course to the bearer thereof, notwithstanding any indorsement whether in full or in blank appearing thereon, and notwithstanding that any such indorsement purports to restrict or exclude further negotiation.

In the facts and circumstances of the present case, Muhammad Iqbal drawer of these cheques was the only person who could have said that accused was not the bearer of the said cheques and the same had been lost by him and found by the accused or had been obtained from him by the accused by means of an offence or fraud or for an unlawful consideration. However, the prosecution has not examined said Muhammad Iqbal and has given him up as having been‑won over. If, therefore, by means of these two self/bearer cheques drawn by Muhammad Iqbal account‑holder as a drawer under his genuine signature, the accused had actually got the money from the bank, he cannot be held to be guilty of having withdrawn any sum from the bank fraudulently and it is Muhammad Iqbal who could have been held liable for having got fraudulently withdrawn from the bank any sum deceitfully credited in his account. I do not, therefore, think that the accused is guilty of having committed anyone of the schedule offices with which he has been charged on the basis of actual receipts of sums on cheques P.W.1/5 and P.W.116.

28. P.W.3 Muhammad Sarwar, Handwriting Expert had also stated that questioned English signature in red ink on Exh.P.W.1/2/1 on cheque Exh.P.W.1/2 are similar in characteristics with the specimen signature written by accused Khan Muhammad on specimen sheets Exhs.P.W.3/28 to P.W.3/36. The said signature in red ink of the accused is on the back of this Cheque and it is clearly written over the said signature of accused that, the person signing below as Muhammad Iqbal (in token of his, having received the sum of Rs.1,10,000 in cash or a bank draft in lieu of the said sum, of Rs.1,10,000 was personally known to him. Mere identification of Muhammad Iqbal, the genuine account‑holder in writing on the back of the Cheque is of no criminal consequence and, therefore, this part of the evidence of the expert also does not incriminate the accused in any manner and he cannot be held guilty of misappropriation of sum of Rs.29,150 of first four bogus credit entries which stood included in the said sum of Rs.1,10,000 simply because he identified Muhammad Iqbal who has been accepted by P.W.1 to have issue the said Cheque and got issued a bank draft in his favour in lieu thereof.

Evidence of P.W.1 Iqbal Beg Mirza, Manager and P.W.4 Pervaiz A. Sheikh in respect of identification by them of the body writing of two Cheques Exh.P.W.1/3, and Exh.P.W.1/4 and signature of drawer reading as Muhammad Iqbal on their obverse side to be in the handwriting of the accused.

29. P. W.1 Iqbal Beg Mirza, who was Manager at Habib Bank Ltd. Main Market Gulberg Branch, Lahore, on 14th July, 1979 stated that out of the five Cheques through which the sums, falsely credited in the Account No. 11354 of Muhammad Iqbal, had been fraudulently withdrawn, two Cheques namely Cheque No. 322841 Exh.P.W.1/3 Cheque No. 322844 Exh.P.W.1/4 were not only written by Khan Muhammad accused but were also signed by him in the name of Muhammad Iqbal drawer. For reasons already recorded identification by this witness of the handwriting of the accused on these Cheques is not open to any exception and establishes the matter beyond any shadow of doubt. P.W. Pervaiz A. Sheikh had also stated that out of five Cheques through which amounts of fake credit entries had been withdrawn from the bank, two Cheques one for Rs.5,000, Exh.P.W.1/3 and the other for Rs.4,000 Exh.P.W.1/4 were written and signed by Khan Muhammad as account‑holder. Reasons for the capacity of this witness to identify the handwriting of the accused have already been given in detail in earlier part of this judgment. Therefore, the circumstance that the body writing of the said Cheques and signatures thereon purporting to be of Muhammad Iqbal as drawer on the said two Cheques are in the handwriting of the accused stands established.

30. The above conclusion of mine is fully supported by another circumstance in this case. As already shown the statement of P.W.1 is that the Cheque No. 207117 Exh P.W.1/2 for Rs.1,10,000 had been drawn by Muhammad Iqbal himself on which he had got issued a demand draft for the same amount in his favour for Shaheed Road, Jhang Sadar Branch of Habib Bank. Obviously, therefore, the case of the prosecution was that the signatures of Muhammad Iqbal on the said Cheque were genuine, one on obverse side and two on its reverse side. I have compared the said signature of Muhammad Iqbal with the signature of Muhammad Iqbal as drawer on two Cheques P.W.1/3 and P.W.1/4. The said signatures on the said two Cheques are on the face of it wholly different .in characteristics from the genuine signature of Muhammad Iqbal on Cheque Exh.P.W.l/2. The difference is apparent to the naked eye. It is so marked that no serious effort is needed top come to the conclusion that the said signatures of the drawer as Muhammad Iqbal on the said two Cheques are forged.

31. The correctness of the said conclusion of mine is further confirmed by the circumstance that the Cheque Book Nos. 322841 to 322850 out of which the said two cheques namely Exh.P.W.1/3, Cheque No. 322841 and Exh.P.W.1/4 Cheque No. 322844 were used, had been taken away by the accused from the bank unauthorizedly. P.W.1 Iqbal Beg Mirza, Manager of the branch had deposed in his statement that the said cheque book was unauthorizedly obtained by Khan Muhammad accused. The said statement of the said witness was not subjected to any cross- examination and accused must be deemed to have accepted this part of the statement of the said witness. P.W.4 Pervaiz A. Sheikh also stated that a cheques book bearing Nos. 322841 to 322850 to which these two cheques pertained was also obtained by Khan Muhammad, accused without any authority from the account‑holder. This witness was cross‑examined on this part of his testimony. He stated therein that for the issuance of cheque book, a cheque book requisition slip is obtained by the bank duly signed by the account‑holder but he did not find on the record of the bank any requisition slip in respect of the issuance of second cheque book, for Muhammad Iqbal, account‑holder. It is true that the said witness' admitted that the entry of the issuance of the second cheque book had been found by him in the cheque book issuance register against initial of an officer of the bank but it must be remembered that such an entry must be supported by the basic document namely the cheque book requisition slip and in the absence of the same such entry must be considered to be fictitious and had rightly been ignored by Pervaiz A. Sheikh. It, therefore, stands proved that the said cheque book had been taken away by the accused from the bank without any authority from the account‑holder. It is true that Muhammad Iqbal had not been produced by the prosecution to prove that he submitted no cheque book requisition slip in, the bank but it is notable that he had been given up by the prosecution as having been won over and in these circumstances, it was for the accused to show that the said cheque book had been obtained on his requisition. He, however, failed to produce said Muhammad Iqbal in his own defence. The prosecution evidence to the effect that the said cheque book had been obtained unauthorizedly does not stand negated and stands proved to the hilt. As already stated the said proved circumstance further confirms my finding that the body writing of cheques P.W.1/3 and P.W.1/4 and signatures thereon reading as Muhammad Iqbal as drawer are in the handwriting of the accused.

32. In my opinion, therefore, it is established that the accused wrote in his own hands the body of cheques P.W.1/3 and P.W.1/4 and R forged the signature of Muhammad Iqbal account‑holder as drawer on them and thus committed offence under section 467, P.P.C.

Evidence of P.W.3 Muhammad Sarwar, Handwriting Expert in respect of identification of signature on the back of cheque Exh.P.W.I/4 to be of Khan Muhammad, accused which shows that accused got the payment of a sum of Rs.4,000 of the said cheque.

33. P.W.3 Muhammad Sarwar, Handwriting Expert had also deposed in his statement that questioned signature Exh.P.W.1/4/1 on the back of cheque Exh.P.W.1/4 (Cheque No. 322844, dated 7‑5‑1979 for a sum of Rs.4,000) corresponded with the specimen signatures of Khan Muhammad on sheets Exh.P.W.3/1 to Exh.P.W.3/9. He gave his reasons for the same. Learned counsel for the accused attacked the opinion given by this witness in his said statement on the ground that in the original report submitted by the expert, no reasons had been given and reasons given by him in the Court are an afterthought. The said expert, however, explained in cross‑examination that in dockets sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, the final opinion of the Handwriting Expert had been asked for and there was nothing in the docket requiring the expert to give reasons. He further explained that never a docket had been received in which handwriting expert of a Forensic Science Laboratory had been at any time asked to give reasons and the experts, therefore, never give reasons in their reports and give the same in their statements in Courts. This appears to be satisfactory explanation and, therefore, the reasons given by this witness cannot be said to be an afterthought and cannot be rejected on that ground. The reasons given by the expert in his Court statement appear to be that free hand movement, fluency, all the connecting strokes, initial, final impulses, habit of releasing pen pressure was/were the same in both the questioned signature as well as in specimen signatures of the accused. In cross‑examination, the learned counsel suggested to the said witness that his reasons were general in character and of sweeping nature but the said witness denied the suggestion and stated that reasons given by him were specifically in regard to particular questioned signatures available on the questioned documents. Learned counsel had not been able to find any fault with the statement of this witness. His evidence has, therefore, proved the fact that signature Exh.P.W.1/4/1 on the back of cheque Exh.P.W.1/4 is of Khan Muhammad accused.

Evidence of receipt of money by the accused on cheque Exh.P.W.1/3 and P.W.1/4.

35. The statement of P.W.1 Iqbal Beg Mirza shows that his evidence is also to the effect that the accused had himself got cheques P.W.1/3 and P.W.1/4 encashed from the bank. There was, however, no cross‑examination by the learned counsel for the accused on this part of testimony of this witness and, therefore, the accused must be deemed to have accepted this portion of evidence of the said witness.

36. The portion of the testimony of this witness to the effect that accused himself had got encashed the cheque Exh.P.W.1/4 is supporter by the statement of P.W.3 Muhammad Sarwar, Handwriting Expert discussed above. As already stated, he has deposed that signature P.W.1/4/1 on the reverse of the cheque P.W.1/4 (which are made in token of acknowledgement of receipt of the sum on the cheque) corresponded with the specimen signature of accused Khan Muhammad available on sample sheets Exh.P.W.3/1 to Exh.P.W.3/9. The said signature Exh.P.W.1/4/1 is of accused Khan Muhammad. It, therefore, stands established that the sum of Rs.4,000 of the said cheque was received by the accused from the bank on the basis of the said cheque.

37. The testimony of P.W.1 Iqbal Beg Mirza to the effect that accused Khan Muhammad had got cheque Exh.P.W.1/3 encashed from the bank is supported by other facts and circumstances of the case. It has been held above that signature of drawer Muhammad Iqbal on obverse side of the cheques ExhS.P.W.1/3 and Exh.P.W.1/4 are in the handwriting of the accused. Comparing signature purporting to be of Muhammad Iqbal on the back of cheque Exh.P.W.1/3 with the said signature on obverse side of cheques Exhs.P.W.1/3 and P.W.1/4 (which I am entitled to do by virtue of section 73 of Evidence Act, 1872, now section 84 of Qanoon‑e‑Shahadat, 1984) I find that signatures purporting to be of Muhammad Iqbal correspond exactly with the signature of drawer on obverse side of cheques Exh.P.W.1/3 and Exh.P.W.1/4. It is clear, therefore, that the said signature purporting to be of Muhammad Iqbal is also a false signature which had been forged by the accused. The said signature on the back of cheque Exh.P.W.1/3 is for acknowledgement of receipt of the sum of Rs.5,000 of the said cheque and proved that the accused had received the said sum too from the bank.

38. The accused is thus, proved to have received the sums of Rs.4,000 and Rs.5,000 totalling Rs.9,000 from the bank on the basis of said forged cheques. These sums are out of the sums fraudulently credited in the account of Muhammad Iqbal. He misappropriated the said sum. The accused is an officer of the bank, who is covered by clause ninthly of section 21, P.P.C. and is, therefore, a public servant. In misappropriating the said sum dishonestly and fraudulently as a public servant or in thus drawing pecuniary advantage by illegal means of a sum of Rs.9,000 by abusing his official position as a public servant, the accused committed the offence under section 5 of Prevention Corruption Act, 1947, also.

39. It is clear from the above facts that the accused submitted these cheques in the bank for encashment and dishonestly and fraudulently induced the bank on the basis of said forged cheques to make payment to him of said sum of Rs.9,000. He thus, committed offence under section 420, P.P. C.

40. On the same facts it is clear that he used the said forged cheques as genuine knowing them to be forged when he submitted the S same in the, bank for encashment. He thus, also committed offence under section 471, P.P.C.

41. In his statement under section 342, Cr.P.C. besides denying the incriminating evidence put to him the accused also stated that this case had been made against him on account of the fact that in the investigation of another case he had pointed out to the investigating Officer that Raza Haider was the real culprit in that case and that Raza Haider was real brother of Liaqat Haider, the then Area Manager and the officers of the bank had, therefore, become hostile to him and had begun to involve him in every case of fraudulent withdrawal of money from the bank and is implication in this case is also in consequence of the malice of the Area Manager and other bank officials. He also stated that the said case against Raza Haider had been withdrawn by the Special Prosecutor from this Court. He also stated that most of the witnesses who appeared against him were bank employee and had deposed against him on account of the influence exerted by the then Area Manager. It is, however, strange that the accused did not cross‑ examine Iqbal Beg Mirza and Pervaiz A. Sheikh, the only bank employee who appeared against him in this case, in respect of these matters. His counsel never asked Iqbal Beg Mirza in cross‑examination that this case against the accused was a false one and had been made against him at the instance of the Area Manager. On the other hand, the question that was asked and denied was that the accused was involved in this case because he had introduced Muhammad Iqbal when he opened the account in the bank. Even Pervaiz A. Sheikh who had been examined after the case had been received in this Court has not been cross‑examined in respect of any malice on his part on account of influence by the then Area Manager nor it had been asked from him that he had made statement falsely on account of pressure of Liaqat Haider, the then Area Manager. Furthermore, the accused hat not produced any witness in his defence to show hostility of the officers of the bank towards him. 'He has not given the full details of the case against Raza Haider to enable this Court to check whether any such case existed in which he pointed out to the Investigating Officer that real culprit in that case was Raza Haider or whether any such case had been withdrawn from this Court. His plea that most of the witnesses were the bank employees and had deposed against him on account of the influence exerted by the then Area Manager, Liaqat Haider, real brother of Raza Haider is not, therefore, substantiated. There is, therefore, nothing to impinge upon the correctness of the findings recorded by me above.

41. As a result of the foregoing discussion I convict the accused Khan Muhammad of offences under sections 477‑A, 467, P.P.C: section 5 of Act II of 1947 and sections 420 and 471, P.P.C.

42. For offence under section 477‑A. P.P.C. read with sections 6(2) and 6(3) of Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984 (IX of 1984) I sentence the accused to R.I. for five years and a fine of Rs.1.00,000 (rupees one lac) and in default of payment of said fine to undergo R.I., for a further period of 1 years. For offence under section 467. P.P.C. I sentence him to R.I. for seven years and a fine of Rs.20,000 (rupees twenty thousand) and in default of payment of fine to R.I. for a further period of three months. For offence under section 5 of Act II of 1947. I sentence the accused to R.I. for five years and a fine of Rs.20,000 (rupees twenty thousand) and in default of payment of fine to R.I. for a further period of three months. For offence under section 420, P.P.C. I sentence the accused to R.I. for five years and a fine of Rs.20,000 (rupees twenty thousand) and in default to R.I. for a further period of three months and for offence under section 471, P.P.C. I sentence the accused to R.I. for the years and a fine of Rs.20,000 (rupees twenty thousand) and in default of payment of fine to R.I. for a further period of three months. The sentences shall run concurrently. The accused shall be entitled to benefit of section 382‑B. Cr.P.C. and the period of his detention as under‑trial prisoner shall be deducted from the period of his sentence.

S. A. Order accordingly.

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