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FEROZE versus BAKHSHA


The trial court acquitted eight of the fifteen accused, based on ocular testimony, motives, retrieval and medical evidence against the witnesses wanted for acquittal of Sections 302, 307, 452, 148 and 149. Because the prosecution's witnesses are interested and their testimony can be found. Appealing without free association and against which there was no evidence of a motive in the High Court, on appeal, the purpose itself could not be accepted as a confirmatory situation, leaving the rest of the accused with the benefit of the doubt, Appealed to the Supreme Court, there was no complex rule that the statement of the interested witness could never be accepted without collusion and that the principle of the interested witness was generally accepted. The need for mutual support did not necessarily mean that an independent witness called Ink Support Inc. Ni should have a word. It is possible to co-operate with anything under the circumstances nces of a case

1986 S C M R 545

Present: Muhammad Haleem, C.J., Nasim Hasan Shah and Shafiur Rahman, JJ

FEROZE‑‑Appellant

versus

BAKHSHA and 14 others‑‑Respondents

Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1980, decided on 2nd December,1985.

(On appeal from the judgment and order, dated 28‑2‑1979 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1977).

(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑

‑‑‑Art. 185(3)‑‑Appeal against acquittal‑‑Appreciation of evidence‑‑Leave to appeal granted to examine question whether established principles of appreciation of evidence in criminal cases were followed by High Court while ordering acquittal of accused.‑‑[Evidence].

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)‑‑

‑‑‑Ss. 302, 307, 452, 148 & 149‑‑Appeal against acquittal‑‑Interested witness‑‑Corroboration of‑‑Daylight murders‑‑Prosecution relying on ocular testimony, evidence of motive, recoveries and medical evidence‑ Trial Court acquitting eight out of fifteen accused because prosecution witnesses were interested and their testimony could not be accepted without independent corroboration and against whom there was no evidence of motive‑‑High Court, in appeal, holding that motive by itself could not be taken as confirmatory circumstance, gave benefit of doubt to remaining accused‑‑Appeal to Supreme Court‑‑Held, was no inflexible rule that statement of an "interested witness" could never be accepted without corroboration and that the rule that statement of an interested witness ordinarily needed corroboration did not necessarily mean that there should be a word of an independent witness supportink story put forward by an interested witness but that corroboration might be afforded by anything in circumstances of a case which tendered sufficiently to satisfy mind of Court that witness had spoken truth and circumstances such as number of culprits required for an attack of the kind which was subject‑matter of proceedings and probability of persons named as culprits joining attack could in a particular case be considered as sufficient corroboration‑‑Accused and most of acquitted accused had taken part in attack in which four innocent persons were killed and one injured, acquittal of accused proceeded on artificial and superficial grounds resulting in grave miscarriage of justice‑‑Appeal accepted, convictions of accused restored but sentences of death altered to transportation for life and fine.‑‑[Appeal against acquittal].

Niaz v. State P L D 1960 S ,C 387 and Nazir and others v. State P L D 1962 S C 269 rel.

Ali Sher v. The State and others P L D 1980 S C 317 ref. Nemat Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Iqbal Ahmad Qureshi, Advocate‑on‑Record (absent) for Appellant.

M.B. Zaman, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents Nos. 1 to 6.

Nemo for Respondents Nos. 7 to 14.

Ch. Ghulam Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court for Advocate General, Punjab and Sh. Ijaz Ali, Advocate‑on‑Record (absent) for the State.

Date of hearing: 2nd December, 1985.

JUDGMENT

NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.‑

‑This appeal, by leave of this Court, is directed against the judgment and order passed in Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1977 by the Lahore High Court on 28‑2‑1979.

Fifteen persons, namely:‑

(1) Bakhsha son of Rahman.

(2) Yusuf son of Rahman.

(3) Bakhsh son of Muhammad.

(4) Nazra son of Lala.

(5) Bashir son of Rahman.

(6) Nazra son of Muhammad.

(7) Dosa son of Hata.

(8) Bakhsh son of Khushi.

(9) Muhabbat son of Sher.

(10) Dosa' son of Salehon.

(11) Yusuf son of Salehon.

(12) Sulha son of Ghana.

(13) Bakhsha son of Salehon.

(14) Sarja son of Salehon.

(15) Lala son of Wali .

were accused of the murder of four persons, namely:‑

(1) Mohri (brother of Feroze, appellant herein).

(2) Mst. Rasulan daughter of Mohri,

(3) Mst. Rasulan wife of Feroze, and

(4) Saee, maternal‑uncle of the appellant,

and were charged under sections 148, 452/149/302, 149, P.P.C. However, before their trial could commence, Lala son of Wali, the 15th accused, died. Consequently, the remaining 14 persons, named above, were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sargodha for the abovementioned offences.

The trial Court acquitted the accused listed at Serial Nos. 7 to 14 of the above offences but convicted the first six mentioned accused; the first four were sentenced to death, while Bashir son of Rahman and Nazra son of Muhammad figuring at Serial Nos. 5 and 6 above were sentenced to imprisonment for life. All six were also awarded various sentences of imprisonment and fine for the remaining offences.

The convicted accused filed an appeal before the High Court while the complainant filed a revision petition against the acquittal of the remaining 8 acquitted accused. The appeal of the convicts was accepted and they, too, were acquitted, while the revision petition of the complainant, directed against the acquittal of the 8 co‑accused, was dismissed by a consolidated judgment passed by the High Court on 28‑2‑1979. Feeling aggrieved, Feroze complainant moved this Court for leave to appeal against the abovementioned judgment and order of the High Court.

The learned counsel for the complainant, during the hearing of the leave petition, did not press for grant of leave against the accused who were acquitted by the learned trial Court, namely, the accused listed at serial Nos. 7 to 14 above but only pressed for leave against the order of acquittal recorded by the learned High Court with respect to respondents Nos. 1 to 6 on the ground that the High Court had not, applied its mind to the evidence against them and that their acquittal was not ordered in the proper exercise of its judicial powers. This Court found force in this submission and, accordingly, granted leave with a view to seeing if the established principles of appreciation of evidence in criminal cases were followed by the High Court while ordering the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1 to 6 herein.

The complainant party and the deceased are related inter se but despite this relationship a gruesome incident took place on 30th September, 1971, wherein the members of the accused party brutally murdered four co‑relatives and caused injuries to some others. The motive for this ghastly incident is stated to be that Mst. Rasulan deceased, the wife of Mohri deceased, was a daughter of Muhammad son of Mutali. The said Mutali gifted his land to her because of the death of his only son Muhammad during his lifetime. Bakhsha, Yousuf and Bashir sons of Rehman and Nazra son of Muhammad respondents, who considered themselves to be his heirs being collaterals, felt aggrieved on this account. Bakhsha son of Rehman respondent had wanted to marry Mst. Rasulan deceased for getting the land but she and her mother did not like the idea. In this background, Mohri deceased abducted Mst. Rasulan and married her. This act infuriated the respondents. However, the couple had left the village after the abduction and marriage but had returned, about two months prior to this incident. The attack on the complainant party by the respondents was made for avenging the insult of abduction and also to grab the land.

The attack was launched on 30‑9‑1971 at about Degarwela. Feroze (P.W. 12) alongwith Mohri and Saee deceased were sitting in the courtyard of his house. Mst. Ras.ulan deceased wife of Feroze (P.W. 12) was lying on a cot in the residential Kotha. The respondents together with the eight acquitted co‑accused and Lala (since dead) variously armed with hatchets, spears, Lathis and a pistol entered the house. Bakhsha son of Rehman respondent raised a Lalkara while Nazra son of Lala respondent opened the attack by giving a hatchet below on the neck of Mohri deceased followed by a hatchet blow each by Bakhsha son of Muhammad respondent and Dossa son of Salehon. Feroze (P.W. 12) escaped through the stairs to the roof and raised an alarm. Dossa son of Hata and Sarja son of Salehon struck a hatchet blow each on the head and back of Saeed deceased. When Mst. Rasulan deceased intervened to rescue her husband Mohri deceased, she was given a spear blow by Bakhsha son of Rehman respondent. She ran into a Kotha and chained the door but Bakhsha son of Muhammad and Nazra son of Lala respondents and Sultan broke open the door and killed her with their hatchets. Mst. Rasulan deceased wife of Feroze (P.W. 12) apprehending danger chained the door but Sarja, Doss. son of Hats. and Bakhsha son of Khushi broke open the door with their hatchets and dragged her into the courtyard whereupon Yousuf son of Salehon and Sultan gave her Lathis and a hatchet blow. In all, as many as 62 injuries were inflicted by the accused on the four deceased persons. majority of which were caused with sharp‑edged weapons.

The F.I.R. about the incident was lodged by Feroze (P.W. 12) and during the investigation blood‑stained clothes and weapons were recovered and taken into possession from the six convicted accused and four others. At the trial, the prosecution relied on the ocular testimony, the evidence of motive, the evidence of the recoveries and the medical evidence. The accused, however, denied their guilt.

The learned trial Court convicted only the six respondents, out of the 14 accused and acquitted the remaining eight. The convictions of the said respondents was recorded under sections 148, 452/149, 302/149, P.P.C. on four counts and under section 307/149, P.P.C. The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that the P.Ws. were interested witnesses and their testimony could only be accepted by some independent corroboration. In acquitting the 8 co‑accused he found that their case was distinguishable from the case of the respondents inasmuch as the latter had a motive to commit the crime, while the acquitted accused did not have any such motive. According to him, the corroboration was furnished by the motive. The learned High Court, on appeal, opined that since neither Bakhsha son of Muhammad and Nazra son of Lala respondents had any motive to kill the deceased nor motive by itself could be taken as a confirmatory circumstance, it would be unsafe to base a conviction on this criterion. It, therefore, proceeded to give the benefit of doubt also to the six convicted accused and acquitted all of them.

We have gone through the evidence and are of the view that the approach adopted by both the Courts below in this case was erroneous. They overlooked the law laid down by this Court in two leading cases viz. Niaz v. State P L D 1960 SC 387 and Nazir and others v. State P L D 1962 S C 269 expounding the rules to be followed in cases like the present. It was ruled in these judgments that there is no inflexible rule that the statement of an "interested" witness can never be accepted without corroboration and it was also explained that the rule that the statement of an interested witness ordinarily needs corroboration does not necessarily mean that there should be the word of an independent witness supporting the story put forward by an interested witness but that corroboration may be afforded by anything in the circumstances of a case which tends sufficiently to satisfy the mind of the Court that the witness has spoken the truth and circumstances such as number of culprits required for an attack of the kind, which is the subject‑matter of the proceedings and the probability of persons named as culprits joining the attack can in a particular case, be considered as sufficient corroboration in the circumstances of the said case.

In the present case, there were two eye‑witnesses who were natural witnesses, one of whom even sustained injuries in the assault. The number of injuries sustained by the deceased and the P.W., the motive for attack and all the other circumstances taken together left no manner of doubt that the respondents and most of the acquitted accused had taken part in the attack in which four innocent persons were done to death and a P.W. also injured. Consequently, the acquittal of the respondents proceeded on artificial and superficial grounds and has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice.

We would, accordingly, accept this appeal, set aside the order of acquittal passed in favour of six respondents and restore the order of conviction passed against them by the trial Court, except that the sentences of death passed against respondents Nos. 1 to 4 is altered to transportation for life, as also that of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 on all the four counts. Each of the six respondents is also ordered to pay compensation of Rs.10,000 on each of the four counts (i.e. Rs.40,000 in all) to the heirs of the deceased or in default to undergo further six months' R.I. on each count i.e. in all undergo 2 years' R.I. The other convictions and sentences are maintained, which, however, shall run concurrently. The benefit of section 382‑B, Cr.P.C. is also allowed including the benefit for the period of imprisonment undergone after their arrest under orders of this Court while granting leave to appeal, as was allowed in the case of Ali Sher v. The State and others P L D 1980 S C 317, in the matter of computation of sentence still to be undergone by the respondents.

This appeal is allowed in the above terms.

M.I. Appeal allowed.

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