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Civil Appeal No. 744 of 1984, decided on 6th March, 1985.

(On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 10‑10‑1983 in Civil Revision No. 619 of 1983).

-------Art. 185 (3)‑Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), Ss. 4, 4‑A, 47 & 48‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 2, 4, 115 & 141 West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), Ss. 2, 3, 4, 5, 14, 17 & 25‑Custody of minor‑Revision in guardianship matters before High Court‑Leave to appeal granted inter alia to examine contention that judgment of High Court, on which High Court, relied for holding that revision was competent viz Parveen v. Muhammad Azhar P L D 1975 Lab. 334 had been disapproved in Supreme Court Judgment Sakhawat Ali and another v. Mst. Shui Khelay P L D 1981 S C 454.

Mrs. Parveen v. Kh. Muhammad Asghar P L D 1975 Lab. 334 and Manzoor Hussain's case P L D 1977 Lah. 911 not approved.

Sakhawat Ali and another v. Mst. Shui Khelay P L D 1981 S C 454 mentioned.

Mst. Zaibun Nisa v. Muhammad Mozammil P L D 1972 Kar. 410; Muhammad Ismail v. Mst. Zubeida Khatoon P L D 1973 Kar. 503 and Mst. Farida Parveen P L D 1971 Kar. 118 approved.

Ghulam Hussain v. Mst. Farzana (minor) 1981 S C M R 953 ref.

Muhammad Deen Malik 1982 S C M R 1223 disting.

‑‑--S. 47, proviso [as amended by Guardians and Wards (Amend ment) Ordinance (XI of 1980), S. 2]‑Historical perspective of amendment in S. 47‑Amendment made by legislature in . S. 47, held, was under some misapprehension.

‑‑Two different views expressed by separate High Courts‑Such views although have pursuasive value for each other but were not as such binding on each other.

‑‑Presumption‑Redundancy‑Although presumption is that redun dancy is not to be imputed to an enactment nor ignorance of law is to be imputed to law‑making Agencies, but such presumption can differ from case to case‑Superior Courts, in proper situations can make corrections where legislature is demonstrably shown to have made a visible error.

------Amendment in law‑Amendment in statute made earlier to decision of Supreme Court‑.Such amendment, held, would not be deemed to have diluted, in any way, effect of law declared by Supreme Court‑[Precedent].

Sakhawat Ali and another v. Mst. Shui Khelay P L D 1981 S C 454 mentioned.

‑‑Art. 189‑Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), S. 47 [as amended by Guardians and Wards (Amendment) Ordinance (XI of 1980), S. 2]‑Amendment made in Act earlier to decision of Supreme Court ‑Declaration of law by Supreme Court, in pursuance of mandate of Constitution, held, would override amendment made in Act and nullify its effect by virtue of Art. 189 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 189.

-----Ss. 25, 17 & 14‑Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), Ss. 47, proviso and 48 ‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 141, 115 & 2‑Guardianship ‑ Application of S. 25, West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964‑Family Court ‑"Procedure" to be adopted in trial ‑Revisional and appellate jurisdiction of High Court‑Extent Section 25 of Family Courts Act, 1964 excludes application of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 at stage when original trial ends (except when original trial Court implements its own orders or regulates conduct or proceedings of guardian or similar other matters)‑Words "matter" in S 25, West Pakistan Family Courts Ac , 1964‑Significance‑Section 25, West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 cannot be interpreted so as to extend it to appeals or revisions but S. 25 applies to a Family Court which was firstly to be deemed to be a District Court and then shall follow "procedure" when conducting a trial, as prescribed in Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and not in West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 5. 25, West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 does not apply to higher forums particularly High Court when dealing with an appeal or revision ‑Revisional forum under S. 41, Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 was thus excluded from ambit of S. 25, West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964‑High Court, therefore, has no revisional jurisdiction whether in cases dealt under West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 or those dealt under Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 by virtue of S. 25, West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 Appeals provided under S. 14, West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 continues and will continue to cover field of remedy, of course, apart from constitutional jurisdiction.

Section 25, West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 permitted the Family Court when deemed to be District Court under the Guardians and Wards Act to adopt the "procedure" prescribed in the Guardians and Wards Act as a mode of trial during the trial and thereafter in so far as the said Act is concerned, the Family Court becomes functus officio. It does not need any further repetition or support of reason. Section 25 is very clear on this question. It clearly excludes the application of the Guardians and Wards Act to the stage when the original trial ends except when the original trial Court, according to the various provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act, implements its own orders or regulates the conduct or proceedings of the guardian and similar other matters. The use of the word "matter" in section 25 of the Family Courts Act is in this context (in addition to the trial) and not in the context of appeals and revisions. This also explains the omission of the expres sion, "mode of trial" or for that matter "trial" from section 25 of the Family Courts Act: For another reason also section 25 of the Family Courts Act cannot be interpreted so as to extend it, to appeals or revisions because it obviously applied to a Family Court which according to this provision shall firstly be deemed to be a District Court and then shall follow the procedure when conducting a trial, as prescribed in the Guardians and Wards Act and not in the Family Courts Act. The section obviously does not apply to the higher forums particularly the High Court when dealing with an appeal or revision because it is only for a Family Court that a deviation has been made to a limited procedural extent from what is provided in the Family Courts Act and nothing is said in section 25 about any other Court including the High Court. A revisional forum under section 47 is thus excluded from the ambit of section 25. Yet another argument namely, that section 141, C.P.C. would operate independently so as to make scope for the High Courts exercising revisional powers in cases decided by a Family Court even under the Family Courts Act notwithstand ing section 17 of that Act which generally bars its application, has no force. Whether in the present context a revisional forum will be one relatable to procedure or not is not very important because for anther very strong reason the argument has no force. Section 141, C. P. C. is attracted only when all its conditions are satisfied and no provision is made to the contrary in the legislation which otherwise covers the case. Family Court will have to be treated as out of the scope of the C. P. C. not only because of section 17 which excludes the application of C. P. C. but also because the entire provisions of the Family Courts Act make a departure from the major stages of procedure prescribed in the Civil Pro cedure Code. The intention was to provide speedy disposal of matters mentioned in the Schedule to the Family Courts Act. Therefore, the application of C.P.C. was excluded except in so far as it has been specifi cally made applicable. That intention being clear, revisional power cannot be assumed by the High Court on the basis of the general provision namely, section 141 of the C.P.C.

To attract revisional jurisdiction of the High Court by virtue of section 115 read with section 141, C. P. C., it would be essential that the conditions laid down in section 115 of the C. P. C. are also satisfied. As soon as this exercise is commenced to see whether the various conditions (like those of "case decided" "subordinate Court" etc. prescribed in section 115) are satisfied or not, reference and reliance would have to be made to C.P.C. For example, for discovering the definition of "subordinate Court", section 2, C.P.C. will have to be referred to. But section 17 of the Family Courts Act clearly bars any reference to the C. P. C. when dealing with the proceedings before or the legal position of a Family Court.

Held: The High Court has no revisional jurisdiction whether in cases dealt under the Family Courts Act or those dealt under the Guardians and Wards Act by virtue of section 25 of the Family Courts Act. Section 14 providing for the appeals continues and will continue to cover the field of remedy, of course, apart from the Constitutional remedy.

Sakhawat Ali and another v. Mst. Shui Khelay P L D 1981 S C 454 affirmed.

Mrs. Parveen v. Kh. Mrrhammad Ashar P L D 197 Lab. 334 and Manzoor Hussain P L D 1977 Lah. 911 not affirmed.

Mst. Zaibun Nisa v. Muhammad Muzammil P L D 1972 Kar. 410 Muhammad Ismail v. Mst. Zubeida Khatoon P 1, D 1973 Kar. 503 and the case of Mst. Farida Parween P L D 1971 Kar. 118 approved.

Muhammad Deen Malik 1982 S C M R 1223 disting.

Mrs. Parveen v. Kh. Muhammad Ashar P L D 1975 Lab. 334 ; Sakhawat Ali and another v. Mst. Shui Khelay P L D 1981 S C 454 ; Ghulam Hussain v. Mst. Farzana (minor) 1981 S C M R 953; Abdul Ghafoor Gill v. Mst. Nussarat Khan P L D 1984 Lab. 332; Fazal Muhammad v. Ali Ahmad Awan 1982 C L C Lab. 2354 ; Mst. Mussarat Jehan v. Mustafa Ali Beg 1982 C L C Kar. 205 ; Syed Shamim Ahmad v. Mst. Riaz Fatima P L D 1975 Kar. 448 ; Muhammad Ismail v. Mst. 7. ubeida Khatoon P L D 1973 Kar. 503 ; Mst. Zaibun Nisa v. Muhummad Muzammil P L D 1972 Kar. 410 ; Mst. Farida Parwin v. Qadeer uddin Ahmad Siddiqi P L D 1971 Kar. 118; Mst. Tehseen Akhtar v. Mahmood ul‑Hassan P L D 1971 Lab. 875 : Wajahat All Hasnie v. Mst. Ghazala P L D 1970 Lab. 641 ; Mst. Maqsoodan Bibi v. Mst. Bhano P L D 1.965 Lab. 183 ; Muhammad Deen Malik v. 14dditional District Judge 1982 S C M R 1223 ; Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal P L D 1969 S C 187; Alif Din v. Mst. Parveen Akhtar P L D 1970 S C 75 ; Khizar Hayar Khan Tiwana v. Mst. Zainab Begum P L D 1967 S C 402 ; Manzoor Hussain v. District Judge P L D 1977 Lab. 911; Muhammad Daud v. Abbas Ali P L D 1969 Lab. 699 ; Muhammad Is.mail v. Fazal Ahmad P L D 1969 Lab. 834; Juma Khan v. Mst. Gul Ferosha P L D 1972 Pesh. 1 ref.

‑‑Ss. 17 & 25‑Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), S. 25 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 141 & O. IX, r. 9‑Guardian sbip/custody of minor/wards‑Powers of Family/Guardian Courts Family Court while acting as a Guardian Judge exercises parental jurisdiction and technicalities should not be allowed to frustrate substantial justice‑Second application wherever permissible and is in accordance with conditions for filing such an application before Family Court (if there is substantial change of circumstances and situation) is not barred‑Family Court when acting as ‑Guardian Judge is empowered also (when it is necessary) to regulate conduct or proceedings of any guardian appointed or declared by it‑Same principles would be applicable to regulation of custody of minors/ wards‑Relief regarding visits or question of meetings between minors and parent can also be regulated through application to Family Court.

Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana v. Mst. Zainab Begum P L D 1967 S C 402 affirmed.

A. W. Butt, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Salah‑ud‑Din, Advocate -on‑Record (absent) for Appellant.

Mushtaq Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court and S. Wajid Hussain Advocate‑on‑Record (absent) for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 6th March, 1985

This appeal through leave of the Court is directed against judgment, dated 10‑10‑1983 of the Lahore High Court whereby in a guardianship/custody matter judgment,, of a Family Court earlier upheld by the Appellate District Court was modified on a civil revision filed by the respondent.

The appellant's (father's) application for custody of the minor children of the parties herein wa3 allowed by a learned Civil Judge functioning as Guardian (Family) Judge on various findings of fact with regard to welfare of Vie minors rendered against the respondent (mother). Her appeal before the District Court which was heard by a learned Additional District Judge was dismissed on affirmation of the said findings of fact. The respondent then tiled an application for revision under section 48 of the Guardians and Wards Act (No. VIII) of 1890 read with section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code before the High Court. Notwithstanding the preliminary objection with regard to its competency the same was partly allowed on 10‑10‑1983 by a learned Single Judge. The preliminary objection was overruled by making reference to another Single Bench judgment of the same High Court in Mrs. Purveen v. Kh. Muhammad Ashar (P L D 1975 Lah. 334). Although the findings of fact rendered against the respondent were considerably modified, the learned Judge declined to handover the custody to her on the main ground that the minors had expressed the desire to live with the appellant. She was, however, permitted temporary custody of the children during the vacation period when they would be free from the studies. It is against this last mentioned order/direction that the appellant sought leave to appeal. It was granted to examine, inter alia, the contention "that the judgment of the High Court, on which the learned Judge relied for holding that the revision was competent viz. Parveen v. Muhammad Ashar (P L D 1975 Lah. 334) had been disapproved by this Court in Sakhawat All and another v. Mst. Shui Khelay (P L D 1981 S C 454).

Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the afore‑noted judg ment of this Court in Sakhawat Ali's case and has also cited some more cases to support the contention that no appeal or revision in guardianship matters, was competent before the High Court under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, after the enactment of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act (No. XXXV) of 1964. The cases cited are:

Ghulam Hussain v. Mst. Farzana (minor) 1981 S C M R 953 ; Sakhari‑at Ali v. Mst. Shui Khelay P L D 1981 S C 454 ; Abdul Ghafoor Gill v. Mst. Mussarat Khan P L D 1984 Lah. 332; Fazal Muhammad v. Ali Ahmad Awan 1982 C L C Lah. 2354 ; Mst. Mussarat Jehan v. Mustafa Ali Beg 1982 C L C (Kar.) 205 ; eyed Shamim Ahmad v. Mst. Riaz Fatima P L D 1975 Kar. 448 ; Muhammad Ismail v. Mst. Zubeida Khatoon P L D 1973 Kar. 503 ; Mst. Zaibwr Nis, v. Muhammad Muzammil P L D 1972 Kar. 410 ; Mst. Farida Parwin v. Qadeeruddin Ahmad Siddiyi P L D 1971 Kar. 118 ; Mst. Tahseen Akhtar v. Mahmood‑ul‑Hassan P L D 1971 Lah. 875 ; Wajahat Ali Hasnie v. Mst Ghazala P L D 1970 Lah. 641 and Mst. Maqsoodan Bibi v. Mst. Bhano P L D 1965 Lah. 183.

In reply learned counsel for the respondent has relied on

Muhammad Deen Malik v. Addl. District Judge 1982 S C M R 1223 ; Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal P L D 1969 S C 187; Alif Din v. Mst. Parveen Akhtar P L D 1970 S C 75 ; Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana v. Mst. Zainab Begum P L D 1967 S C 402 ; Manzoor Hussain v. District Judge P L D 1977 Lah. 911 ; Mrs. Parveen v. Kh. Muhammad Ashar P L D 1975 Lah. 334 ; Muhammad Daud v. Abbas Ali P L D 1969 Lab. 699 ; Muhammad Ismail v. Fazal Ahmad P L D 1969 Lah. 834 ; Alif Din v. Shaukat Ali P L D 1969 Pesh. 62 and Juma Khan v. Mst. Gul Ferosha P L D 1972 Pesh. 1 ;

as also on a leave granting order, dated 13th December, 1981 reported as Muhammad Deen Malik v. Additional District Judge, Karachi 1982 S C M R 1223 wherein it was observed that on account of an amendment made in section 47 of Guardians and Wards Act of 1890 it might be necessary for this Court to re‑consider the view taken in Sakhawat Ali's case. It may be mentioned that according to the office report the appeal arising out of the said case was not decided on merits as the same was withdrawn.

The relevant provisions of law for consideration in this appeal (of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act (No. XXXV) of 1.964 ; the Guardians and Wards Act (No. VIII) of 1890 ; and the Code of Civil Procedure are reproduced below

Family Courts Act

2. Definitions.‑(1). . . . . . . . . .

(a). . . . . . . . . . . .

(b) "Family Court" means a Court constituted under this Act ;

The powers of 1st Class Magistrate have been conferred on every Judge of the Family Court so that he may act under section 488, Cr. P. C. and may make orders for maintenance under that section.

(2) Words and expressions used in this Act but not defined, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Government shall establish one or more Family Courts in each District or at such other places as it may deem necessary and appoint a Judge for each of such Courts.

No person shall be appointed as a Judge of a Family Court unless he is or has been a District Judge, an Additional District Judge, a Civil Judge or a Qazi appointed under the Dastur‑ul‑Amal Diwani, Riasat Kalat.

Subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and the Conciliation Courts Ordinance. 1.961, the Family Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon matters specified in the Schedule.

(1) Notwithstanding anything provided in any other law for the time being in force, a decision given or a decree passed by a Family Court shall be appeal-able‑

(a) to the High Court, where the Family Court is presided over by a District Judge, an Additional District Judge, or a person notified by Government to be of the rank and status of a District Judge or an Additional District Judge, and

(b) to the District Court in other case.

(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by a Family Court‑

(a) for dissolution of marriage, except in the case of dissolution for reasons specified in clause (d) of item (viii) of section 2 of the Dissolution of Marriages Act, 1939.

(b) for dower not exceeding rupees one thousand ;

(c) for maintenance of rupees twenty‑five or less per month.

(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872, and the Code of Civil Pro cedure, 1908 except sections 10 and 11 shall not apply to proceedings before any Family Court.

(2) Sections 8 to 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873, shall apply to all proceed ings before the Family Courts.

A Family Court shall be deemed to be a District Court for the purposes of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, shall in dealing with matters specified in that Act, follow the procedure prescribed in that Act.

*Schedule‑(See section 5)

(1) Dissolution of Marriage, (2) Dower. (3) Maintenance. (4) Restitution of conjugal rights, (5) Custody of children. (6) Guardianship. (7) Jactitation of marriage.

The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.

4. Definitions.‑(1) . . . . . . . . .

(2) . . . . . . . . . . .

(3) . . . . . . . . . . .

(4) "District Court" has the meaning assigned to that expression in the Code of Civil Procedure, and includes a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction ;

(5) "the Court" means‑

(a) the District Court having jurisdiction to entertain an application under this Act for an order appointing or declaring a person to be a guardian ; or

(b) where a guardian has been appointed or declared in pursuance of any such application

(i) the Court which, or the Court of the officer who appointed or declared the guardian or is under this Act deemed to have appointed or declared the guardian ; or

(ii) in any matter relating to the person of the Ward the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the ward for the time being ordinarily resides ; or

(c) in respect of any proceeding transferred under section 4‑A, the Court of the officer to whom such proceedings has been transferred.

4‑A. Power to confer jurisdiction on subordinate judicial officers and to transfer proceedings to such officers.‑(I) The High Court may, by general or special order, empower any officer exercising original civil jurisdiction subordinate to a District Court, or authorise the Judge or any District Court, to empower any such officer subordinate to him, to dispose of any proceedings under this Act transferred to such officer under the provisions of this section.

(2) The Judge of a District Court may, by order in writing, transfer, at any stage any proceeding under this Act pending in his Court for disposal to any officer subordinate to him empowered under sub section (1).

(3) The Judge of a District Court may at any stage transfer to his own Court or to any officer subordinate to him empowered under sub. section (1) any proceeding under this Act pending in the Court of any other such officer.

(4) When any proceedings are transferred under this section in any case in which a guardian has been appointed or declared, the Judge of the District may, by order in writing, declare that the Court of the Judge or office, to whom they are transferred shall, for all or any of the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the Court which appointed or declared the guardian.

An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order made by a Court,‑

(a) under section 7, appointing or refusing to appoint or declare a guardian ; or

(b) under section 9, subsection (3), returning an application ; or

(c) under section 25, making or refusing to make an order for the return of an award to the custody of his guardian ; or

(d) under section 26, refusing leave for the removal of a ward from the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or imposing conditions with respect thereto ; or

(e) under section 28 or section 29, refusing permission to a guardian to do an act referred to in the section ; or

(f) under section 32, defining, restricting or extending the powers of a guardian ; or

(g) under section 39; removing a guardian ; or

(h) under section 40, refusing to discharge a guardian ; or

(i) under section 43, regulating the conduct or proceedings of a guardian or settling a matter in difference between joint guardians, or enforcing the order ; or

(j) under section 44 or section 45, imposing a penalty

*Provided that, where the order from which an appeal is preferred is passed by an officer subordinate to a District Court, the appeal shah lie to the District Court."

*Proviso added by Ordinance XI of 1980 on 26‑3‑1980.

Save as provided by the last foregoing section and by section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order, made under this Act shall be final, and shall not be liable to be contested by suit or otherwise.

Civil Procedure Code:

2. Definitions.‑ (1) . . . . . . . . .

(2) . . . . . . . . . . .

(3) . . . . . . . . . . .

(4) "district" means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a "District Court", and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court

(1) In the absence of any specific provision to the con trary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.

(2) . . . . . . . . . . . .

(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears‑

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit:

Provided that, where a person makes an application under this sub‑section, he shall, in support of such application, furnish copies of the pleadings, documents and order of the subordinate Court and the High Court shall, except for reasons to be recorded, dispose of such application without calling for the record of the subordinate Court.

(2) The District Court may exercise the powers conferred on the High Court by subsection (1) in respect of any case decided by a Court subordinate to such District Court in which no appeal lies and the amount or value of the subject‑matter whereof dons not exceed the limits of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court.

(3) If any application under subsection (1) in respect of a case within the competence of the District Court has been made either to the High Court or the District Court, no further such application shall be made to either of them.

(4) No proceedings in revision shall be entertained by the High Court against an order made under subsection (2) by the District Court.

The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction."

The afore‑quoted provisions have been commented upon in one or the other context in the cited case law. However two main questions for con sideration in this appeal are:

One : Whether it is covered by the pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in the case of Sakhawat Ali. And if so.

Two : Whether the said decision needs to be re‑considered.

In Sakhawat Ali's case no doubt the question on merits directly involved was whether an appeal from the judgment of a Guardian Judge under section 47 (unamended) of the Guardians and Wards Act, before the High Court was competent. The answer rendered was in the negative. The reasoning which then prevailed with the Court is based mainly upon the consideration of the two highly relevant provisions of the Family Courts Act namely sections 14 and 25. It can be divided into two parts : One, which would apply to the appeals as also revisions under the Guardians and Wards Acc and thus would have to be treated as the law declared relating to both the appeals and revisions. While another, part of the reasoning relates only to the appeals. The context in which the general reasons covering both the appeals and the revisions, were recorded was with clear implication of the same being declared as law and applicable accordingly and not as mere obiter. It will be of advantage to reproduce some of these reasons from page 457 of the report.

(a) The section (25) does not, in terms, repeal section 14 nor does it refer to the litigants' right of appeal.'

(b) The (contrary) contention assumes that section 25 amounts to an implied repeal of section 14 in all guardianship matters. If that had been the intention of the Legislature, it would have enacted accord ingly, because repeals are not to be lightly implied.'

(c) Even on the footing that a statute has to be read as a whole, what does section 25 enact. It only prescribes that the procedure of the Guardians and Wards Act shall be followed by the Guardian Judge and not the procedure contained in the said Act (Family Courts Act). Therefore, we would explain here that the mode of trial prescribed in the said Act contains sweeping departures from the mode of trials in the suits under the Civil Procedure Code . And the mode of trial laid down in the said Act is expressly excluded by section 25.

(d) As according to this section (25), the Guardian Judge has to "follow the procedure prescribed" in the Guardians and Wards Act, it would be sufficient to observe that whilst this Act (the Guardians and Wards Act) does not contain elaborate provisions for the conduct of a trial in guardianship cases, it contains some provisions for regulating such trials, and the effect of the words quoted is that these provisions have to be followed by Family Courts, whenever they hear guardianship cases. But the procedure prescribed for hearing a case under the Guardians and Wards Act has nothing to do with the question of the forum in which an order under this Act can be challenged by the aggrieved party.

(e) And, this section (25) neither states nor implies that it is intended to govern the rights of parties after the Family Court has become functus officio by deciding the case before it.'

After the afore‑quoted elaborate reasons the judgment proceeds at pp. 458 to 460 of the report to deal mainly with the question of appeal ; but before that we find a very weighty reason which is in seriatim reproduced below .‑

(f) 'The obligation imposed by section 25 to follow the procedure prescribed in the Guardians and Wards Act is an obligation imposed on the Court, and there is nothing in the section to support the view that it was intended to regulate the rights of the parties after the Family Courts had become functus officio.'

Not only the aforementioned reasons but also the fact that the Lahore High Court's judgment in the case of Mrs. Parvern was not approved as declaring correct law, would further show that the decision by this Court rendered in the case of Sakhawat Ali was intended to cover both the appeals and revisions arising out of guardianship matters ; because the said case of Mrs. Parveen arose out of revision filed in the High Court and dealt with the question of its competency which was held by the High Court to be competent. It is also interesting to note that the Division Bench case of Manzoor Hussain decided two years later (P L D 1977 Lah. 911) which had affirmed the view taken in the case of Mrs. Parveen was also not approved by this Court as having laid down correct law. On the contrary, two judgments of the erstwhile Sind and Baluchistan High Court in the cases of Mst. Zaibun Nisa v. Muhammad Mozammil (PLD 1972 Kar. 401) and Muhammad Ismail v. Mst. Zubeida Khatoon (P L D 1973 Kar. 503) were approved as having laid down the correct law. In one of those judgments (Mst. Zaibun Nisa), it was clearly held that section 17 of the family Courts Act having excluded the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (except sections 10 and 11) in so far as the Family Courts were concerned, the litigants could not invoke section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and thus a revision under the said section was not main tainable. The case of Mst. Farida Parwin (P L D 1971 Kar. 118) decided by one of us (Muhammad Haleem, H.C.J. while as a Judge of the Sind and Baluchistan Hign Court) with the finding that on account of the bar contained in section 17 of the Family Courts Act, one of the main requirements of section 115, C. P. C. that the matter brought under revision must be a "case decided" by a subordinate Court was not satisfied, was also approved in the Karachi Full Bench case of Mst. Zaibun Nisa. It may be mentioned here that another judgment by one of us (Nasim Hasan Shah, J. while as a Judge of the Lahore High Court) is to the same effect but on a different reasoning namely, that the object of the Family Courts Act was to provide a speedy remedy to settle family disputes and for that reason the combined reading of sections 14, 17 and 25 of the Family Courts Act had excluded the application of section 115, C. P. C. therefore a revision in the High Court in the guardianship matters decided by a Family Court was not competent. In yet another case Ghulam Hussain v. Mst. Farzana (minor) (1981 S C M R 953 ) this Court refused to set aside the High Court's view that a revision in a guardianship matter was not competent and indirectly held the same view but the controversy was not examined in its details.

The foregoing analysis of the law declared in the case of Sakhawat Ali, namely, it is also applicable to the revisions and that being so the impugned judgment merited to be set aside would not end the controversy in this case, because, the learned counsel relying on a leave granting order of this Court in Muhammad Deen Malik (1982 S C M R 1223) argued that the point noted therein for reconsideration of the view in Sakhawat All's ,case, be examined. The con tention noted therein was as follows:

"It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that this amendment in law (the addition of the proviso after clause (j) of section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1980) was nut brought to the notice of this Court at the time of decision of Sakhawat All's case and, therefore, its effect has not been considered. The argument is that according to well‑established rule of interpretation of statutes redundancy, is not to be imputed to any enactment. If, therefore, the view that section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act, has been made dormant, in view of the combined effect of sections 5, 14 and 25 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, as held in Sakhawat Ali's case and the right of appeal is regulated by section 14 of the said Act, the amending Ordinance of 1980 would be rendered totally redun dant. It is further argued that if effect is to be given to the amending Ordinance, it will have to be held that the right of appeal would be regulated by section‑47 and the consequence will be that, no appeal would lie from an order passed by a Family Court under section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act. The submission of the learned counsel raise a serious question of law, requiring the re examination of the view adopted by this Court in Sakhawat Ali's case."

The context in which leave to appeal was granted in the case of Muhammad Deen Malik is slightly different: whether an appeal from an order of temporary custody under section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act would at all be competent ‑ if section 47 is applied it would not be ; but if the matter is dealt with under section 14 of the Family Courts Act, it might be competent as an appeal against a decision of a Family Court. The main question nevertheless was the same as was considered in Sekhawat Ali's case whether section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act would be applic able to the guardianship matters dealt with by a Family Court constituted under the Family Courts Act.

Section 47 in its purview enacted that all appeals from orders referred therein passed under the Guardians and Wards Act by 'the court' (as defined in the Guardians and Wards Act) would lie to the High Court (before the amendment). The decision of 'the Court (defined in section 4(5)(a) of the Guardians and Wards Act as the "District Court") even if it was presided over by a Civil Judge subordinate to a District Court, by virtue of enabling provision contained in section 4‑A of the Guardians and Wards Act, was appealable under section 47 only to the. High Court. The amendment made in 1980 provided that when 'the Court' was presided over by a Civil Judge subordinate to the District Court the appeal shall then lie to the District Court and not to the High Court. The argument advanced in the case of Muhammad Deen Malik was that if an appeal under section 47 was not competent in a case decided by a Family Judge, then there was no need for the legislature to have made the amend ment at all. Prima facie the argument is attractive, that is why leave to appeal was granted. But on deeper scrutiny it seems that the amendment B was made by the legislature under some misapprehension. It seems that the law declared by the Lahore High Court in the case of Parveen and Manzoor Hussain (decided in 1,975 and 1977) was treated to have concluded the controversy and the contrary view taken in the earlier cases decided in 1971 ; 1972 and 1973 (Karachi), it was assumed to have been superseded by the Lahore vases. If so, it was wrong assumption because the two different views were expressed by separate High Courts and although the view of one had persuasive value for the other, they were not as such binding on each other. Be that as it may, the overruled view expressed in the Lahore cases was, it has been noted earlier, made the basis for bringing, by amendment the proviso in section 47 ; on the assumption, that the appeal (as held in the Lahore cases) was competent under section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act and not under section 14 of the Family Courts Act. This incorrect assumption led to the enactment of the proviso.

Although the presumption is that redundancy is not to be imputed to, an enactment nor ignorance of law is to be imputed to the law‑making Agency ; but this presumption can differ from case to case. And in proper situations the superior Courts have even made corrections where the legis lature is demonstrably shown to have made a visible error. Here one visible error is that the Karachi view was deemed to have been subordinated to the Lahore view which on no jurisprudential basis can be upheld as correct. The two judgments were not rendered by the same Court as it used to be the situation when the West Pakistan High Court had different Benches at Karachi and Lahore. Secondly for a more weighty reason the amendment would not be deemed to have diluted, in any way, the effect of the law declared by this Court in Sakhawat Ali's case, which was decided on 22nd of March, 1981 while the amendment was made on 26th of March, 1980. The declaration of law in the case of Sakhawat Ali by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in pursuance of the mandate of the Constitution will overrides the amendment made in section 47 and nullify its effect by virtue of Article 189 of the Constitution.

For yet another reason the proviso added to section 47 would have no effect as even on the argument advanced from the respondent side it would be rendered inoperative in cases like the present one. It took note of the fact that section 4‑A was added to the Guardians and Wards Act by way of an amendment in the original Act and provided that when the Court is presided over by an officer (Civil Judge) subordinate to the District Court an appeal shall lie to the District Court. The argument advanced from the respondent side and accepted by the High Court on the basis of the judgment in Parveen's case, proceeds on the assumption that a Family Judge when dealing with a guardianship matter is deemed to be a District Court under tae Guardians and Wards Act. It loses its original position as a Family Court and thus the appeal from such a Court would lie to the High Court under section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act and not to the District Court under section 14 of the Family Courts Act ; because an appeal under section 14 (1) (b) to the District Court would not be maintainable against the decision of another District Court. This latter argument relating to section 14 was noted and rejected in the case of Sakhawut Ali. However, the argument advanced from the respondent side son the basis of the proviso added to section 47 will be subjected to, similar criticism namely, that if a Family Court which is presided over by a Civil Judge is for all purposes converted into a District Court under section 25 of the Family Courts Act when hearing a guardianship matter the under the newly added proviso to section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act the appeal from such so‑called and deemed District Court shall "lie to the District Court". The error and fallacy is obvious and it need not be commented upon any further. For all these reasons no justification has been made out for re‑consideration of the case of Sakhawat Ali on the basis of the newly added proviso to section 47.

Learned counsel for the respondent tried to raise other arguments for re‑consideration of the decision in Sakhawat Ali's case and has relied, amongst others, on the cases, Adnan Afial v. Capt. Sher Afial (P L D 1969 S C 187) and Alifdin v. Shaukat Ali (P L D 1969 Pesh. 62), to contend that the provision in law, of a forum of trial, is to be deemed to be one of procedure. And that being so, the argument that the word "procedure" used in section 25 of the Family Courts Act would not cover appeals and revisions (accepted in the case of Sakhawat Ali), should now be rejected because the provision for a forum of the appeal has also likewise to be treated as one of procedure. This question has thoroughly been dealt with in Sakhawat Ali's case. Although the two cited cases are not mentioned in the judgment but that will not make any difference because it was nowhere held in these two cases that the provision for forum of appeal is necessarily a subject‑matter of pro cedure. Rather there are observations indicating otherwise. Similarly, the argument that appeal is in principle a continuation of the trial for the rea sons given in Sakhawat Ali's case wherein this contention was also examined does not require any further comment.

As to the argument that revision when compared to an appeal is not a matter of right and should be distinguished as one of procedure and thus competent under section 48 of Guardians and Wards Act and/or under section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, is also without any force. There is elaborate discussion to Sakhawat Ali's case regarding interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Family Courts Act. It was held and rightly so that section 25 permitted the Family Court when deemed to be District Court under the Guardians and Wards Act to adopt the "procedure prescribed in the Guardians and Wards Act as a mode of trial during the trial and thereafter in so far as the said Act is concerned, the Family Court becomes functus officio. It does not need any further repetition or support of reason. Section 25 is very clear on this question. It clear excludes the application of the Guardians and Wards Act to the stag when the original trial ends except when the original trial Court, according to the various provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act, implements its own orders or regulates the conduct or proceedings of the guardian and similar other matters. The use of the word "matter" in section 25 of the Family Courts Act is in this context (in addition to the trial) and not in the context of appeals and revisions. This also explain H the omission of the expression, "mode of trial" or for that matter "trial" from section 25 of the Family Courts Act.

For another reason also section 25 of the Family Courts Act cannot b interpreted so as to extend it to appeals or revisions because it obviously applies to a Family Court which according to this provision shall firstly be deemed to be a District Court and then shall follow the procedure when conducting a trial, as prescribed in the Guardians and Wards Ac and not in the Family Courts Act. The section obviously does not apply to the higher forums particularly the High Court when dealing with a appeal or revision because it is only for a Family Court that a deviation has been made to a limited procedural extent from what is provided in the Family Courts Act and nothing is said in section 25 about any other Court including the High Court. A revisional forum under section 47 is thus excluded from the ambit of section 25.

Yet another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the dent, namely, that section 141, C. P. C. would operate independently so to make scope for the High Courts exercising revisional powers in cases decided by a Family Court even under the Family Courts Act notwithstanding section 17 of that Act which generally bars its application, has be force. Whether in the present context a revisional forum will be one relatable to procedure or not is not very important because for another very strong reason the argument has no force. Section 141, C. P. C. is attracted only when all its conditions are satisfied and no provision in made to the contrary in the legislation which otherwise covers the case, Here in the present case Family Court will have to be treated as out of the scope of the C. P. C. not only because of section 17 which excludes the application of C. P. C. but also because the entire provisions of the Family Courts Act make a departure from the major stages of procedure prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code. The intention obviously as held in the case of Wajahat Ali Hasnie v. Mst. Ghazala (P L D 1970 Lah. 641) was to provide speedy disposal of matters mentioned in the Schedule to the Family Courts Act. Therefore the application of C. P. C. was excluded except in so far as it has been specifically made applicable. That intention being clear revisional power cannot be assumed by the High Court on the basis of the general provision namely, section 141 of the C. P. C.

There is yet another weighty reason which prevailed in the case or Farida Parwin. It cannot be ignored. To attract revisional jurisdiction, of the High Court by virtue of section 115 read with section 141, C. P. C., it would be essential that the conditions laid down in section 115 of the C.P.C. are also satisfied. As soon as this exercise is commenced to see whether the various conditions (like those of "case decided" "subordinate Court" etc. prescribed in section 115) are satisfied or not, reference and reliance would have to be made to C.P.C. For example, for discovering the definition of "subordinate Court", section 2, C. P. C. will have to be referred to. But section 17 of the Family Courts Act clearly bars any reference to the C. P. C. when dealing with the proceedings before or the legal position of a Family Court.

For all these reasons it has rightly been held in Sakhawat All's case that the High Court has no revisional jurisdiction‑whether in cases dealt under the Family Courts Act or those dealt under the Guardians and Wards Ac, by virtue of section 25 of the Family Courts Act. Section 14 providing for the appeals continues and will continue to cover the field of remedy, of course, apart from the Constitutional remedy.

In the light of the foregoing discussion this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside as without jurisdiction because the revision filed in the High Court was not competent. There shall be no order as to costs.

Before parting with this judgment it needs to be observed that as held by this Court in the case of Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana v. Mst. Zainab Begum (P L D 1967 S C 402) the Family Court when acting as a Guardian Judge exercises parental jurisdiction and the technicalities in so far as it is possible should not be allowed to frustrate substantial justice. A second application wherever ft is permissible and is in accordance with the conditions for filing such an application before the Family Court (if there is substantial change of circumstances and situation) is not barred under the relevant law. Ana the Family Court when acting as a Guardian Judge is empowered also (when it is necessary) to regulate the conduct or proceedings of any Guardian appointed or declared by it. This principle will apply to the regulation of the custody of the minors/wards in cases like the present one. The relief sought by the respondent regarding visits to the respondent or question of meetings between the minors and the parent can be regulated through an application to the Family Court.

M. B. A. Appeal allowed.

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