صرف 1000 روپے میں 10 وکلاء تک کی براہِ راست رابطہ تفصیلات حاصل کریں اور کال یا واٹس ایپ کے ذریعے موزوں قانونی ماہر سے رابطہ کر کے اپنا معاملہ پورے اعتماد کے ساتھ آگے بڑھائیں۔
Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 442‑R of 1985, decided on 2nd July, 1986.
(From the judgment/order of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 12‑10‑1985 passed in Civil Revision No. 370‑D of 1985).
‑‑‑Art. 185(3)‑‑Punjab Pre‑emption Act (I of 1913), S.15‑‑Vendee claiming equal right of pre‑emption as against pre‑emptor on ground of having purchased land in same Khata‑‑Sale‑deed relied by vendee not proved by evidence and Courts below treating alleged sale as spurious‑ Vendee's plea that he made an application before Trial Court for allowing additional evidence to prove yet another sale in his favour also appearing to be an afterthought and not accepted by High Court‑‑Leave to appeal against dismissal of vendee's revision by High Court was not granted.
Mian Inamul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Ghulam Dastgir, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
Nemo for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 2nd July, 1986.
Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment, dated 12‑10‑1985 of the Lahore High Court; whereby a Civil Revision filed by the petitioner (vendee) which had arisen out of a pre‑emption suit filed by the respondent, was dismissed.
The respondent's suit for pre‑emption regarding purchase of two Kanals of land by the petitioner was decreed by the learned trial Court on the ground that he had a superior right being a co‑sharer in the same Khatta from which the land in dispute was sold. The appeal and revision having been dismissed, he has now sought leave to appeal.
The main contention raised by the learned counsel is the same as was advanced before the High Court, namely, that the petitioner on account of a purchase of 5 Marlas of land in the same Khatta in 1974 (the sale of land in favour of the petitioner which is the subject‑matter of the suit was in 1978) had an equal right of pre‑emption, therefore, this suit could not have been decreed in favour of the respondent.
This alleged sale was treated as spurious by the learned Courts below. The observations made by the High Court in this behalf are as follows: ‑
"None. of the marginal witnesses appeared to prove Exh. D.3 (the sale‑deed relied upon by the petitioner). The land so stated was mutated in the name of the petitioner vide Mutation No. 1575, dated 5‑4‑1980. The document that was reduced into writing round .the year 1974 was not incorporated in the relevant record. The petitioner did not mention that deed in his written statement submitted on 19‑2‑1980 and also in his statement which was recorded by the learned trial Court before the framing of issues on 6‑3‑1980. The sale‑deed was not registered. In his opinion the sale‑deed Exh. D.3 was not in existence at the time of the impugned sale nor that was available at the time of the institution of the suit in the year 1979. There was no mention of the factum of the sale in the Roznamcha Waqiati in the year 1974. According to him the sale‑deed Exh. D.3 was procured after the institution of the suit and as there was no other evidence to show that the petitioner was an owner within the estate, therefore, the trial Court was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the respondent had a superior right of pre‑emption as against the petitioner."
Learned counsel remained unable to meet the points noted in the above quotation. He in the alternative stated that there was another sale also in favour of the petitioner which could be pleaded against the respondent's suit for pre‑emption and that an application filed in this behalf for additional evidence before the appellate Court was not disposed of.
This point was also raised before the High Court and was disposed of as follows:‑
"Nothing has been placed on the file of this case so as to show that the application (for additional evidence) was in fact pressed upon by the petitioner. The judgment is silent on the point so the presumption is that the above‑said application was not pressed before the learned Additional District Judge."
Moreover, this plea was not taken before the trial Court and appears to be an afterthought like the other plea which was repelled by the High Court.
None of the argument raised by the learned counsel has any force. This petition accordingly fails and, is dismissed.
M. Y. H. Petition dismissed.
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