Find a Lawyer

Civil Petition No.9‑R of 1984, decided on 15th April, 1986.

(On appeal from the judgment and order dated 3‑12‑1983 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in W.P. No.466/S of 1982).

Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑

‑‑‑Art. 185(3)‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss.25‑A & 38(3)‑‑Labour Appellate Tribunal, powers of‑‑Dismissal from service by competent authority affirmed by Labour Court and set aside by Labour Appellate Tribunal and substituting lenient punishment for dismissal‑‑Question arising whether Appellate Tribunal had power to substitute any punishment for one imposed by competent authority‑‑Held, Appellate Court had no power to substitute a punishment for that imposed by competent authority.

Inspector‑General of Police and others v. Muhammad Farid 1983 S C M R 242; Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala v. Muhammad

Yaqub and others P L D 1978 S C 207 and Abdul Rashid v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal and others 1984 P L C 386 ref.

Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Channan Khan and others 1980 PLC 981 rel.

Munir A. Shaikh, Advocate Supreme Court and Akhtar Ali Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.

Khawaja M. Naim, Advocate Supreme Court and M.Afzal Siddiqi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 15th April, 1986.

An inquiry was held against the petitioner while he was posted as a Clerk in the Habib Bank Limited at Kharian Cantt Branch in 1969, and out of eight charges leveled against him, the competent authority held him guilty on charges 1 to 4 and 7, whereas he was exonerated on charges Nos.. 5. 6 and 8, and ordered to be dismissed from service.

Against this order the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969, which upheld the order of the competent authority and maintained his dismissal. In appeal, the Appellate Labour Court held him guilty on charges 1 and 2 and exonerated him of the remaining charges. However, it set aside the punishment of dismissal and ordered him to be reinstated, but denied to him the back benefits. ‑He then invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court but did not succeed as the High Court held that his reinstatement was without lawful authority and remanded the case to the competent authority for considering the question of punishment afresh on the basis of only two charges having been proved against him.

The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the Appellate Labour Court had power to substitute any punishment for the

one imposed by the competent authority and in that behalf relied on subsection (3) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and also the cases cited as the Inspector‑General of Police and others v. Muhammad Farid 1983 S C M R 242, Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala v. Muhammad Yaqub and others P L D 1978 S C 207 and Abdul Rashid v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal and others 1984 P L C 386.

Subsection (3) of section 38 only refers to the appellate powers exercisable by the Labour Appellate Tribunal over a decision rendered by the Labour Court under section 25‑A, but does not empower the Tribunal to substitute a penalty for that awarded by the competent authority. This power is only exercisable where a sentence is passed under clause (c) of subsection (5) of section 35, and if, at all, the power to substitute the penalty was implicit then it should have been so stated while referring to the award or decision given under section 25‑A in the subsection. This power was sought to be substituted from the cases cited above, but the first turns on the interpretation of the powers of Service Tribunal constituted pursuant to the Tribunals Act promulgated under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, while the other two refer to the powers exercisable by the Labour Court under subsection (5) of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The dictum laid down in the first case will not be of any help to the petitioner as the powers exercised by the Tribunal flow from the language of the constitutional provision and the Act which is co‑extensive with the powers of the competent authority. The principle laid down in the other two cases goes to elucidate the powers to be exercised by the Labour Court while construing the words "adjudicating and determining a grievance", which reflect the jurisdiction to be exercised, in that, that the Court could go behind a dismissal order and can see for itself as to whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the dismissal was justified or not both on merits as well as in law. In effect, the dictum deals with the scope of the inquiry and converses exclusively to the controversy relating to the infraction of the right guaranteed or secured to the worker by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force and not with the substitution of the punishment. In Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Channan Khan and others 1980 P L C 981, this question was directly posed for answer, and it was held that the Labour Court had no power to substitute a punishment for that awarded by the competent authority.

Accordingly, the High Court was correct in holding that the Appellate Labour Court had no power to substitute a lenient punishment for that imposed by the competent authority.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is without any substance and is dismissed.

M.I. Petition dismissed.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.