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Civil Appeal No. 61 of 1961, decided on 10th April, 1962.
(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, dated the 15th March, 1960, in Writ Petition No. 557 of 1959).
‑‑ S. 3‑Punjab Municipal Act (III of 1911), Ss. 231, 232 & 233 ---Employees of Municipal Committees‑Powers of Central Government to constitute or direct to be constituted, one or more screening committees ‑‑ Procedure ‑ Duty of Provincial Government ‑ No powers were delegated by Central Government to Provincial Government to authorise Deputy Commissioner to constitute screening committee‑Central Government had not regarded Deputy. Commissioners as Heads of smaller Municipal Corporations‑Order of Provincial Government empowering Deputy Commissioner to constitute screening committee, held, was beyond powers of Provincial Government.
The Central Government in pursuance of the provisions of S. 3 had not at any stage delegated its power to appoint Screening Committee to the Deputy Commissioner. No such order or direction of the Central Government were shown or available in record. Nor is there anything to show that action of the Provincial Government in giving authority to Deputy Commissioner to constitute Screening Committee was subsequently rectified by the Central Government. It may be that the intention of the Provincial Government was to give greater security to the officers of smaller corporations. But the fact remains that no such mandate was given by the Central Government. The tenor of section 3 of the Ordinance makes it plain that the Screening Committee is to be constituted in accordance with the directions of the Central Government. The Central Government entrusted the power of constituting the Screening Committees to the Heads of the Statutory Bodies. The Provincial Government, there fore, could not invest itself with powers beyond that conferred by the Central Government. The duty was clearly cast on them to exercise the power conferred upon them in accordance with the direction of the Central Government. The order of the Provincial Government empower ing the Deputy Commissioner to constitute Screening Committees, therefore, was beyond its power.
Deputy Commissioners were not regarded by the Central Government as heads of the smaller corporations.
It is not correct to say that simply because under sections 231, 232 and 233 of the Punjab Municipal Act, a Deputy Commissioner exercises supervisory control over the affairs of the Municipal Committee, he can be regarded as Head of the Municipal Committee.
Held, the Deputy Commissioner not being the Head of the Municipal Committee had no power to constitute a Screening Committee for screening the officers of that municipality and as such the order forming such a committee was ultra vires the powers of the Deputy Commissioner.
Muhammad Zaman Khan v. M. B. Nishat P L D 1962 S C 22 ref.
----S. 4‑Punjab Municipal Act (III of 1911), S, 38‑Secretary of Municipal Committees ‑Not holder of civil post, thus could not claim safeguards provided for public servant‑Commissioner, held, was not appointing authority but enjoyed supervisory authority alone‑Constitution of Pakistan (1956), Art. 280‑Government of India Act, 1935, S. 240.
Muhammad Zaman Khan v. M. B. Nishat P L D 1962 S C 22 approved.
Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant,
M. B. Zaman, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.
This is a certified appeal from the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan at Lahore dismissing an application for a writ.
Mirza Muhammad Ali, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Kamoke, in the District of Gujranwala, was removed from his post for unsatisfactory service. The order was passed on the recommendation of the Screening Committee appointed under the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959, and after considering the appellant's appeal against findings of the Committee. He then moved the High Court for a writ or a direction to quash the various orders passed in connection with his removal from service on several grounds, but his application was dismissed by the High Court.
In order to appreciate the points raised in this appeal, it will be necessary to state the law and the relevant facts. A brief history of the legislation is given in the judgment of this Court in Muhammad Zaman Khan v. M. B. Nishat (PLD 1962 SC 22) in these words :‑
"Ordinance .III of r959 was promulgated by the President, in pursuan6e of the proclamation of the Seventh Day of October, 1958 and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf' on the 21st Januart,195'9 and it was published in the Gazette Extraordinary, dated the 24th of January, 1959. Originally, section 2 of the Ordinance provided that it would apply to persons in the service of Pakistan; within the meaning of Article 218 of the late Consti tution and to persons holding the office of Governor, Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court, Auditor and Comptroller General. Attorney‑General and Advocate‑General. On the 21st March, 1959 section 2 of the Ordinance was amended by the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959. The words holding the office of Governor, Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court, Auditor and Comptroller‑General, Attorney‑General, and Advocate‑General' occurring in section 2 were replaced, in pursuance of this amendment, by the words holding by appoint ment or nomination of the Central or a Provincial Government' an office or employment in a Public Statutory Corporation'. Till this amendment was effected, the Ordinance did not cover the case of any category of employees of a Public Statutory Corporation', like the Cantonment Board. Even this amendment confined the purview of the Ordinance to those employees of a 'Public Statutory Corporation' who had received their appointment or nomination at the hands of the Central or a Provincial Government. By Ordinance XL of 1959, promulgated on the 23rd of July, 1959, and published in the Gazette Extraordinary, dated the 24th July, 1959, further amendment was made in the Ordinance and its scope was enlarged by substituting the words by appointment or nomination of the Central or a Provincial Government an office' occurring in section 2 of the Ordinance, by the words 'a whole‑time paid office'.
Henceforth, therefore, a whole‑time paid officer under a Cantonment Board could be proceeded against, in pursuance of the provisions of the‑ Ordinance. On the same day, another enactment, Ordi nance XLI of 1959, came into force and section 2 thereof was expressed in the following terms :‑‑
'Nothing in any law, rule or instrument having the force of law shall prevent a person holding a whole time paid office or employment in a Public Statutory Corporation, whose conduct has been scrutinised by a committee constituted and empowered under the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959, from being:
(a) suspended, reduced in rank, removed or dismissed for being corrupt or for misconduct or for inefficiency, or
(b) retired for any cause mentioned in the preceding sub‑clause, or for having the reputation of being corrupt.
on such pension (if any), as may be admissible to him, proportionate or otherwise, by an order of the authority which appointed him, made not later than the thirtieth day of September. 1959'.
By an amendment effected by means of Ordinance LIV of 1959, promulgated on the 29th September, 1959, and published in the Gazette Extraordinary, dated the 30th of September, 1959, the terminal date, mentioned in section 2 of Ordinance XLI of 1959, was altered to the 30th day of November, 1959."
In the said judgment the general scheme of Ordinance III of 1959 has been set out as follows :‑
"The general scheme of Ordinance III of 1.959 may now be briefly surveyed. Section 3 of the Ordinance empowers the Central Government to constitute or direct to be constituted., one or more Committees, sole or corporate, to scrutinise the conduct of any person to whom this Ordinance applies and to record a finding thereon and to make a recommenda tion as to punishment or other action'. Section 4 enacts that 'every finding, recorded by a Committee under section 3 shall together, in the case of a finding against the person concerned, with the recommendation provided for in that section be submitted to the authority by which the person concerned was appointed, here inafter called the appointing authority, and that authority shall pass orders thereon according to law'. Sections 5, 6, 7 and 9 provide for procedural matters, in respect of the Committee's power to summon witnesses or to procure evidence for the purpose of the enquiry. Section 8 confers powers on the Central Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Ordinance, by notifica tion in the official Gazette. Section 10 enacts that no order, proceeding or finding of a Committee or of an appointing authority shall be questioned in any Court. Section 11 makes it clear that the Committee would be bound to follow any directions issued by the Central Government or authority nominated by it, as to policy or procedure. Section 12 shuts out any assistance to the person appearing before a Committee, by a friend, adviser or legal practitioner."
In pursuance of section 3 of the Ordinance, the Central Government by a notification, dated the 24th January, 1959 empowered the Provincial Government of the West Pakistan and the East Pakistan to constitute Screening Committees for certain class of officers. On the 25th July, 1959 Mr. J. D. Hardy of the Ministry of Interior addressed a letter to the Chief Secretary of West Pakistan, regarding screening of officers and staff employed in the public statutory corporations as follows :‑
"I am enclosing a copy of my D. O. letter No. 1/15/59‑SR, dated the 25th July, 1959, with enclosures issued to the Secretaries/Joint Secretaries in charge of Central Ministries; Divisions, which contains further instructions regarding the screening. of officers and staff employed in public statutory corporations. I shall be grateful if you would please take similar action in respect of the public statutory corporations under the Provincial Government."
Alongwith this letter Mr. Hardy forwarded a copy of the letter which had been sent to all the Secretaries and Joint Secretaries incharge of Ministries Divisions and Chairman, National Planning Commission. Paragraph 3 of the said enclosure which is relevant for the purposes of this case is as follows :‑
"You are now requested kindly to proceed with the screening of officers and staff holding whole‑time paid office in the public statutory corporations, if any under your Ministry. The powers to appoint screening committees for the purpose should be delegated to the Head of the Corporation concerned. The Establishment Divisions should, however, please be informed of the composition of the committees."
On the 1st August, 1959 the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan communicated the above instructions to all Secretaries of West Pakistan Government and Heads of attached departments. On the 11th August, 1959 the Chief Secretary again informed the Secretaries and Heads of Departments "that the procedure detailed in Government Circular Letter No. S. O. XII‑2‑19/58, dated the 4th December, 1958 and the subsequent instructions issued from time to time for screening Government servants should be observed mutatis mutandis in screening employees of the Public Statutory Corporations". On the 17th August, 1959 the Chief Secretary issued the following letter to the Secretaries and the Heads of Departments :‑
"In this Department circular No. S. O. XII‑2‑1959, dated the 1st August, 1959, it was stated that the powers to appoint screening committee to screen the officers and staff of Public Statutory Corporations should be delegated to the Heads of the Corporations concerned. This was done under the direction of the Central Government given under Article 3 of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 195). It has now been decided' that so far as smaller corporations such as town Committees, notified area Committees, market Committees, etc. are concerned, the power to appoint screening committees should be exercised by the Deputy Commis sioner of the district concerned. He may appoint one or more screening committees from the officers on the district staff to screen the staffs of such corporations in his district and to intimate the composition of the committees to this Department.
2. So far as public statutory corporations, other than those mentioned in para. 1 above are concerned, the heads of such institutions should be formally empowered by the administrative department concerned to appoint screening committees to screen the officers and staff of these institutions.
This may be done immediately. The administrative departments should intimate the composition of the committees to this depart ment.
3. The appellate authorities for the staff of such Corporations will be the same as under their normal service rule.
4. Immediate action should please be taken to ensure that all the screening operations in the Public Statutory Corporations under the Provincial Government are finalised before the 30th September, 1959 without fail."
Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Health, Welfare and Local Government by his letter, dated the 29th August, 1959 gave the following directions to all Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners :‑
Para. 3 : The Deputy Commissioners should appoint screening com mittees in respect of Municipal Committees of status lower than class I, Town Committees, Notified Area Committees and Market Committees. For this purpose more than one screening committees may be appointed if considered necessary, with a view to finalising action in the minimum of time.
Para. 5: The Chairman Improvement Trust, .Lahore, the Administrator, Corporation of the City of Lahore, the Administrators of District Boards and District Local Boards and Municipal Committees of the 1st Class viz., Peshawar, Abbottabad, Hoti Mardan, D. I. Khan, Kohat, Bannu, Rawalpindi, Murree, Sargodha, Sialkot, Multan. Lyallpur, Hyderabad and the Administrator of Municipal Committee, Quetta are hereby empowered to appoint screening committees to screen officers and staff under them and to take other necessary action in this behalf.
Para. 7: The Deputy Commissioners and the Heads of Local Bodies who have been empowered to constitute screening committees, should intimate the composition of the committees constituted by them to this Department within a week of the receipt of this communication. The information should please be furnished in duplicate."
On the 31st August, 1959 the Chief Secretary in clarification of the circular Letter No. S. O. XII‑I‑154/58 dated the 17th August, 1959 on the subject of screening wrote to the Secretaries, Commissioners, Deputy Commis sioners, and Heads of Departments as follows :‑
"(iii) In case of the smaller corporations, it may not be desirable to empower their heads to constitute the committees, as they may not be of sufficient status or seniority. In such cases, the Deputy Commissioner of the district concerned should exercise the powers to appoint the screening committees. In case of doubt, the case should be referred immediately to the Administrative Department concerned, which should take and communicate its decision promptly."
In pursuance of the above direction a Screening Committee with Captain Mahabat Khan, Additional District Magistrate, Gujranwala, as Chairman, was formed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, for screening the officers of Municipal Committee, Kamoke. The said Chairman served a notice on this appellant to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for unsatisfactory service. The appellant submitted the required explanation, but the Committee was not satisfied with it. Consequently the Chairman intimated the appellant that in their opinion he bad lost his "efficiency irretrievably" and his value was not commensurate with the pay he was drawing and that they had, therefore, recommended for his removal from service. The appellant was also asked to file an appeal, if he so desired, against the recommen dation of the Screening Committee to the appointing authority. The Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, by his memorandum, dated the 26th September, 1959 directed him to file his appeal to the Commissioner, Lahore Division. The appellant then filed an appeal before the Commissioner in accordance with the directions of the Deputy Commissioner. It may be mentioned here that in December, 1958 the Municipal Committee, Kamoke, was superseded and Mr. Minhas the Ilaqa Magistrate, was appointed as Administrator of that Committee. The appellant, therefore, also filed an appeal before him on the 29th September, 1959 and therein he pointed out that the Administrator was the proper authority to hear his appeal. The Administrator, however, gave the following reasons for returning his appeal :‑
"As regards the appeal of the Secretary (Mr. M. A. Mirza), since the Secretary has already preferred an appeal to the Commissioner under D.C.'s orders, I don't think I come into the picture, although according to the provisions contained in the Ordinance, it would seem that an appeal lies to myself as the appointing authority of the Secretary. The appeal of the Secretary is, therefore, returned to him."
On 29th September, 1959 the Commissioner, Lahore Division while rejecting his appeal ordered that final action in his case should be taken by 30th September, 1959.
On 30th September the Deputy Commissioner passed the following order :‑
"Mirza Muhammad Ali, Secretary should please be relieved forthwith and report compliance within 3 hours of the receipt of this communi cation through special messenger as an intimation to this effect is to be sent to the higher quarters."
On the same day the Administrator on receipt of a copy of the order of the Deputy Commissioner ordered the appellant to hand‑over the charge to the Head Clerk and this was done.
He then challenged the action of the relevant authorities by a petition for writ to the High Court of West Pakistan wherein he prayed that the order of his removal be quashed. 'The High Court, however, dismissed his petition. He then on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court filed an appeal to this Court.
The following two contentions were raised and forcibly argued by Dr. Naseem Hasan Shah, the learned counsel for the appellant:
(i) That the Screening Committee which dealt with the case of this appellant was not validly constituted ; and
(ii) That the appellant was not removed from service by the appointing authority as required under section 4 of Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance III of 1959)."
The learned counsel has argued that under the directions of the Central Government as contained w circular Letter No. 1/15, 59‑SR, dated 25th Jury, 1959, the power to appoint Screening Committees was delegated to the Heads of Corporations concerned and as such a Deputy Commissioner had no power to appoint a Committee for screening the officers of the Municipal Committee, Kamoke. From the letters of the Central Government to the Chief Secretary of West Pakistan extracts of which have been quoted in extenso in the earlier part of the judgment it is clear that in pursuance of the provisions of section 3 of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959 the Central Government delegated its powers of appointing Screening Committee to the Heads of the Corpora tion is concerned. It seems that at first the Provincial Government in accordance with the directions of the Central Government ordered the Heads of the Departments to constitute screening committees, but later i.e., on 17th August, 1959 they decided "that so far as smaller corporations such as town committee, notified area committee, market committee etc. are concerned the power to appoint screening committees should be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner, of the district concerned", and thereafter the Deputy Commissioner Gujranwala, was empowered to constitute screening committee to screen officers of the municipal committee of Kamoke.
Section 3 of the Ordinance of 1959 empowers the Central Government to "constitute or direct to be constituted, one or more committees, sole or corporate to scrutinize the conduct of any person to whom this Ordinance applies and record a finding thereon and to make a recommendation as to punishment or other action"
There is however nothing on the record to show that the Central Government in pursuance of the provisions of section 3 had at any stage delegated its power to appoint Screening Committee to the Deputy Commissioner. Mr. Zaman, the learned counsel for the Deputy Commis sioner, has been candid enough to say that he has also not been able to trace any such order or direction of the Central Government. Nor is there anything to show that this action of the Provincial Government was subsequently rectified by the Central Government. It may be that the intention of the Provincial Government, was to give greater security to the officers of smaller corporations. But the fact remains that no such mandate was given by the Central Government. The tenor of section of the Ordinance makes it plain that the Screening Committee is to be constituted in accordance with the directions of the Central Government. The Central Government entrusted the power of constituting the Screening Committees to the Heads of the Statutory Bodies. The Provincial Government, therefore, could not invest itself with powers beyond that conferred by the Central Government. The duty was clearly cast oil them to exercise the power conferred upon them in accordance with the direction of the Central Government. It is, therefore clear that the order of the Provincial Government empowering the Deputy Commissioner to constitute screening committees was beyond its power.
The learned Judges of the High Court seem to have taken the view that the Deputy Commissioners may be regarded as Heads of the Municipal Committees of the second class such as Municipal Committee, Kamoke, The learned Judges recorded their findings on this point in the following) words:‑
"The provisions of sections 231, 232 and 233 of the Punjab Municipal Act make it clear that a Deputy Commissioner has a good deal of control over the working of a Municipal Committee of the second class and if a person considers him to be the Head of that Municipal ity, his belief cannot be considered to be unjustified. The question in this case is what the expression Head of the Corpora tion' used in the directions of the Central Government contained in the letter issued by Mr. Hardy on the 25th of July. 1959, the material part of which has been reproduced in paragraph 15 was intended to mean. This is clearly a question of fact and as it may be safely presumed as is clear from the letters issued by the Chief Secretary to Government of West Pakistan from time to time in this behalf that the instructions issued by the Chief Secretary to Government of West Pakistan conformed to those issued by the Central Government, and because as I have indicated, Deputy Commissioner, is, for a vast majority of reasons, the Head of Municipal Committees in the district of which he is the administrative head and as there is nothing to show that the Central Government at any time indicated that they did not intend that Deputy Commissioners should appoint Screening Committees. to look into cases of servants of Public Statutory Corporations the contention of Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah that a person on whom the Central Government did not intend that the Provincial Government should confer the power to constitute Screening Committees had been given that power by the Provincial Government is clearly without substance."
This approach of the learned Judges to the question under considera tion is not correct. The question whether the Deputy Commissioner was the head of the Municipal Committee or will depend on the belief or disbelief of a person. Nor can he be regarded as such simply because the Chief Secretary had asked him to constitute the Screening Committee. From letter No. S. O. XII‑2/19/59, dated the 1st August, 19j9 on which Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah has relied it would appear that at first the Provin cial Government forwarded the directions of the Central Government for constituting Screening Committees to all the Administrators of Local Bodies. Later, the Government in their letter, dated 17th August, 1959 to all Heads of Attached Departments gave the following reasons for empowering Deputy Commissioners to form the Screening Committees :‑
"In this Department's Circular No. S. O. XII‑2‑19/59, dated the 1st August, 1959, it was stated that the powers to appoint screening committees to screen the officers and staff of Public Statutory Corporations should be delegated to the Heads of the Corporations concerned. This was done under the direction of the Central Government given under Article 3 of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959. It has now been decided that so far as smaller corporations such as town committees, notified area committees, market committees etc. are concerned the power to appoint screening committees should be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner of the district concerned. He may appoint one or more screening committees from the officers on the district staff to screen the staffs of such corporation in his district and to intimate the composition of the committees to this Department."
The above clearly indicates that the Deputy Commissioners were not regarded by the Government as heads of the smaller corporations.
It is also not possible to support the conclusion of the learned Judges that simply because under sections 231, 232 and 233 of the Punjab Municipal Act, a Deputy Commissioner exercises supervisory control over C the affairs of the Municipal Committee, he can be regarded as Head of the Municipal Committee. Section 11 of the Punjab Municipal Act provides that the Committee shall have "authority over the municipality" Section 233 lays down that when a Committee is superseded, "all powers and duties of the Committee may until the Committee is reconstituted be exercised and performed by such person as the Provincial Government may appoint in that behalf." In view of these provisions in the Act the learned counsel for the Deputy Commissioner has found it difficult to support the above finding of the High Court. The upshot of the above discussion is that the Deputy Commissioner not being the Head of the Municipal Committee, Kamoke, bad no power to constitute a Screening Committee for screening the officers of that municipality and as such the order forming such a committee was ultra vires the powers of the Deputy Commissioner.
The second contention of Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah is also not devoid of force. Section 38(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act provides that‑
"Every Committee from time to time at a special meeting, shall appoint subject to the approval of the (Provincial Government) in the case of a municipality of the first class and of the Commissioner in the case of a municipality of the second class, one of its members, or any other person, to be its Secretary, and may, at a like meeting, suspend, remove, dismiss or otherwise punish any person so appointed."
Mr. Zaman has contended that in view of the above provision the Commissioner in this case was the appointing authority. We are unable to accede to this contention as correct. Simply because the above provision gives a supervisory jurisdiction to the Commissioner it cannot be said that he is the appointing authority in this case. It cannot, in our opinion, be urged that a Secretary of the Municipal Committee holds a civil post under the State within the meaning of section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 180 of the late Constitution. He also cannot claim safeguards provided for public servants under the Government of India Act, 1935 or the late Constitution.
In the case of Sharif Hussain v. The Deputy Commissioner, Lahore (P L D 1957 Lah 1060). the High Court while dealing with the question whether an Executive Officer was an employee of the Municipal Committee observed :‑
"After considering the relevant provisions of the Act it seems to use that the Executive Officer is an employee of the Committee, although) in certain contingencies he may be appointed by the Provincial Government or suspended or removed from his office by them and is subject to their supervisory jurisdiction like the Committee itself. But this does not destroy the relationship of employer or employee, that obviously subsists between the Committee and the Executive Officer. Apparently the position is that even when Government appoints an Executive Officer they do so for the benefit of the Committee who is to be the paymaster. It is significant that if the Committee passes a resolution by the requisite majority mentioned in subjection (7) of section 3 asking for suspension or removal of the Executive Officer that has necessarily to be given effect to."
We think the above observations apply with greater force in the case of a Secretary who is much below the rank of the Executive Officer. Consequently it is a matter of considerable doubt whether the Commis sioner can be regarded as appointing authority of the Secretary.
In view of our finding that the Deputy Commissioner acted beyond his power in constituting the Screening Committee it is not necessary to enter into this question in this appeal.
The High Court seems inclined to think that in view of the provisions of sections 36 and 38 of the Act both the Commissioner and the Municipal Committee acting jointly could pass the order for removal of the Secretary. As in their opinion the order of removal was passed by the Commissioner with the concurrence of the Administrator of the municipality, no objection could be taken to the validity of the said order.
We may, however, point out that there is nothing in the record to show that the Administrator at any stage expressed his assent to the order passed by the Commissioner. On the contrary, the following remarks which he made on the 27th September. 1959 that is two days before the removal of the appellant, on his appeal to the Commissioner shows that he held high opinion about his work :‑
"Forwarded. I can say from my personal experience as Administra tor, Municipal Committee, Kamoke, that the Appellant knows his job very well. HE is fully conversant with Municipal Law and practice and is very efficient thorough and painstaking.
During my tenure nothing adverse came to my notice against him.
I am completely satisfied about his work".
In spite of the above remarks the Commissioner accepted the recommendation of the Screening Committee and passed order for his removal on the 29th September, 1959.
The Deputy Commissioner while forwarding copy of the order of the Commissioner to the Administrator for necessary action gave the following direction :‑‑
"Mirza Muhammad Ali, Secretary should please be relieved forthwith and report compliance within three hours of the receipt of this communication through special messenger as an intimation to this effect is to be sent to the higher quarters."
It is thus evident that the Administrator had no option but to carry out the direction of the Deputy Commissioner. 'there was thus no basis for an inference that the Administrator had concurred either explicitly or impliedly in the order of removal of the Secretary.
As a result of the above discussion, we have arrived at the conclusion that the order constituting the Screening Committee was ultra vires the powers of the Deputy Commissioner and as such the removal of the appellant on the recommendation of the said Committee was bad in law. The order of the appellant's removal must, therefore, be quashed. The appellant will be deemed to be in the service of the Municipal Committee, Kamoke. The appellant will be entitled to his costs of this Court as well as of the High Court.
M. B A. Appeal accepted.
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