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Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 750 of 1976, decided on 9th September, 1981.

(On petition against the judgment of the High Court, Lahore, dated 18‑5‑1976 in Writ Petition No. 718/R of 1970).

‑‑Art. 185(3)‑‑Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act (XLVII of 1958), S.2(3)(b)‑‑Declaration of agricultural land as potential building site‑ Appeal to Settlement Commissioner against implemention of declaration by Chief Settlement Commissioner not competent‑‑While giving effect to such order, no right of appeal could accrue muchless an appeal to a subordinate functionary having no statutory power to entertain and dispose of such an appeal‑‑High Court's order holding that Settlement Commissioner could not sit as appellate authority over final determination of matter by Chief Settlement Commissioner, maintained‑‑Leave to appeal refused.

Syed Iftikhar Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Abdul Karim, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.

The petitioner an allottee of urban agricultural land, seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 18‑5‑1976 whereby the allotment of Khasra No.73 measuring 4 Kanals 19 Marlas in the urban area of Multan ordered by the Settlement Commissioner on 28‑9‑1970, was held to be without lawful authority.

2. The petitioner received allotment of urban agricultural land measuring 30 Kanals on 29‑10‑1957. The land in dispute formed a part of that allotment. It was proposed to him under Settlement Scheme No.11 on 10‑2‑1960. However, it was not confirmed to him on the ground that in the meantime a declaration under section 2(3), clause (b) of it being potential building site was made, under Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The petitioner went in appeal to the Chief Settlement Commissioner against such a declaration but the Chief Settlement Commissioner maintained the declaration by his order, dated 19‑7‑1963. Consequently effect was given to the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, dated 19‑7‑1963 by striking off the proposal of this land made in favour of the petitioner. This happened on 4th November, 1969. The petitioner felt aggrieved by it and filed an appeal to the Settlement Commissioner who accepted it and allowed the necessary exemption from the declaration of it as a potential building site, directing that it be confirmed to him as agricultural land in spite of the fact that it had been built upon by them. The respondents claimed the transfer of the same property on the ground of their having built upon the land in accordance with the Settlement Scheme No. VI. They claimed to have obtained Provisional Transfer Orders and Permanent Transfer Deed in respect of the same land in 1963 or near about. They sought review of the order of the Settlement Commissioner whereby the land was directed to be confirmed to the petitioner as agricultural land. The Settlement Commissioner dismissed the review petition on the ground that it was not competent at all. They thereafter invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. The petitioner challenged the very existence of the respondents and their entitlement and the transfer deed claimed by them. Certified copies of the orders were placed on the record of the High Court. The. High Court held that the Settlement Commissioner could not sit as an appellate authority over the final determination of the matter by the Chief Settlement Commissioner: The constitutional petition of the respondent was allowed and the confirmation ordered by the Settlement Commissioner was declared to be without lawful authority. Pence this petition.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before us that the power to declare agricultural land as 'potential building site vested in the Chief Settlement Commissioner and he could delegate i1 to' any of his subordinates. He had delegated that power and it was available to the Settlement Commissioner for towns having the population of Multan. This power was under the provision of the General Clauses Act (section 6) exercisable time and again according to the requirements of the case and the power did not get exhausted after it had been exercised once. If the Chief Settlement Commissioner could, at a subsequent stage notwithstanding his earlier order, reverse it, the same power could be exercised by the Settlement Commissioner as a delegate.

4. The fact remains that the appeal of the petitioner was directed against the implementation of the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner determining at the apex the controversy now brought to this Court. While giving effect to such an order no right of appeal could accrue muchless an appeal to a subordinate functionary like the Settlement Commissioner. It was not as a delegatee of the Chief Settlement Commissioner that he was hearing the appeal against the implementation of that order. He had no statutory power to entertain and dispose of such an appeal. It is, therefore, clear that the order of the Settlement Commissioner cannot be saved on any grounds available to the learned counsel for the petitioner.

5. As regards the locus standi of the respondents, the genuineness of the transfer deed and their interest in the property, these are questions with which we are not concerned at this stage. It is for the appropriate authority to guard against the evils alleged by the petitioner and to ensure the correctness and genuineness of the documents attributed to them. Leave to appeal is, therefore, refused.

M.I. Petition dismissed.

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