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Constitutional Petitions No&. 33 and 40 of 1986, decided on 2nd June, 1986.
‑‑Ss. 6 & 16‑‑Bail‑‑'Tribunal'‑‑Tribunal includes its President but word 'President' would not include members of Tribunal‑‑Power to grant bail in a case referred to Tribunal for its decision, held, conferred on President of Tribunal by designation and not on Tribunal‑‑Neither incumbent upon President of Tribunal nor warranted, by S.16(2) of Ordinance to refer bail application to members of Tribunal for their view.
-‑‑‑Ss. 6 & 16‑‑Bail‑‑Where President of Tribunal referred bail application to members of. Tribunal and on their recommendation to grant bail merely endorsed their views and had not applied his own mind, bail granting order passed by President, held, was not in consonance with law‑‑When President applied his own mind to facts of case after receipt of recommendations of members of Tribunal, bail order could not be cancelled on ground that President of Tribunal was not entitled to refer bail application to Tribunal.
‑‑Ss. 6 & 16‑‑Bail‑‑Scheduled offence committed in area falling within compass where provisions of Ordinance applicable‑‑Stages in respect of bail in such offence, stated.
‑‑‑S. 16‑‑Bail‑‑Bail application moved when case had already been referred to Tribunal‑‑Competent authority to grant bail; held, was President of the Tribunal.
‑‑‑Definition‑‑Words in a statute‑‑Words 'Include' and 'means'‑ Meaning‑‑When word 'include' is used in a definition clause in absence of anything contrary in relevant clause, it means that definition is not exhaustive, but where word 'means' is used it implies that definition is generally exhaustive in absence of anything contrary.
Messrs Dawood Yahama Limited v. Government of Baluchistan and 3 others P L D 1986 Quetta 148 rel.
‑‑‑S. 2(d)‑‑Word 'party' in S.2(d), held, includes a 'complainant.
‑‑‑'Complainant'‑‑Complainant is .a person or persons primarily interested in prosecution of case.
‑‑‑Ss. 9 & 16‑‑Bail application‑‑Bail applications under Ordinance to be treated at par with bail application in Criminal Courts.
Muhammad Bakhsh v. Assistant Commissioner Mastung and 3 Others P L D 1985 Quetta 255 rel.
‑‑‑Ss. 16 & 23 Bail application‑‑Notice‑‑Notice of bail application to complainant party was no requirement of law provided in S. 16 of Ordinance‑‑Deputy Commissioner or President of Tribunal if grants hearing to a complainant party in respect of a bail application it would, held, not be illegal or contrary to law‑‑Mere fact, that a complainant party was entitled to file an appeal, under S.23 of Ordinance, would not entitle him to have a notice of bail application, if not provided for under relevant provisions of Ordinance, either expressly or by necessary implication.
‑‑‑Ss. 16 & 23‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199‑‑Bail‑ Cancellation‑‑Constitutional petitions‑‑Bail granted to accused by Assistant Commissioner/President Tribunal cancelled by Additional Commissioner on grounds not sustainable in law‑‑Additional Commissioner exercising jurisdiction illegally in a manner not warranted by law‑ Constitutional petition, held, competent against order of cancellation.
Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others PLD 1974 SC 139; Sharbat Khan and others v. Haji Lal Gul and others 1984 S C M R 616; Raza Muhammad and 5 others v. Member, Board of Revenue Baluchistan, Quetta and another P L D 1979 Quetta 106; Mir Dost Muhammad v. Government of Baluchistan and 3 others P.L. D 1980 Quetta 1 and Nek Muhammad and another v. The Member, Board of Revenue (Judicial), Quetta and 3 others P L D 1985 Quetta 63 ref.
‑‑‑S. 497(1) third, proviso‑‑Bail‑‑Custody‑‑Question of accused being in custody for more than two years, held, would be a relevant factor for deciding a bail application, though accused might not be entitled to bail as a matter of right in terms of third proviso to S.497(1), Criminal Procedure Code, even if he was not hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal.
----‑‑S. 16‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199‑‑Bail‑‑Constitutional petition‑‑Impugned orders passed on grounds not sustainable in law‑‑High Court without touching merits of case remanding same for decision on merits and in accordance With law.
Dr. Behram Khan v. Naseer Ahmad alias Bacha Khan P L D 1986 Quetta 72 ref.
Muhammad Riaz Ahmed and Basharatullah for Petitioners.
Yaqub Khan Yousufzai, A.‑G., for official. Respondents
Nazir Ahmed for Private Respondents.
Date of hearing: 26th May, 1986:
By this common judgment we intend to dispose of the above two petitions as they are directed against the common order and involve common questions of law. The brief facts leading to the filing of the above petitions are that on 24th July, 1982 at 12‑45 p.m. the complainant Bahar Khan lodged F.I.R. under sections 307, 326 and 324, P.P.C. in respect of injuries inflicted by the accused at 10‑11 a.m. to Wali Muhammad and Habibullah without mentioning the name of any accused. The above injured were admitted in the hospital but Habibullah expired on 25th July, 1982. Consequently, 302, P.P.C. was added. The challan was submitted to the Assistant Commissioner, Sibi exercising the powers of Deputy Commissioner under the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter, referred to as the 'Ordinance') on 7th February, 1983 against nine accused, out of which, three were shown as absconder and six in custody. It was alleged that certain recoveries were made from the five accused. No recovery was attributed to Mizar Khan the petitioner in Constitutional Petition No. 40 of 1986 whereas from the petitioner in Constitutional Petition No. 33 of 1986 Sanaullah, recovery of a Lathi was attributed. It appears that on 2nd December, 1984 a bail application was moved, inter alia by the present petitioners before the Assistant Commissioner who referred the same to the 'tribunal, which recommended on 5th January, 1985, the grant of bail. The Assistant Commissioner and the Chairman of the Tribunal granted bail to five accused on 5th January, 1985. The private respondent filed an appeal which was taken up by the learned Additional Commissioner, Sibi Division, who accepted the same by his order, dated 2nd June, 1985. The operative portion of the order is as follows:‑
The petitioners went in revision, but the same was dismissed by the learned Member of the Board of Revenue by his order, dated 18th February, 1986. The above two petitioners being aggrieved by the above orders have filed the above two separate constitutional petitions.
2. Mr. Muhammad Riaz Ahmed, Advocate ‑in support of his Constitutional Petition No. 40 of 1986 has urged as follows:‑
(i) That the President of the Tribunal was competent to grant bail and his order was according to law and hence there was no justification for cancellation of bail;
(ii) That there was no evidence against the petitioner Mizar Khan on record;
(iii) That even if the prosecution case is treated as proved, the above petitioner's bail was not liable to be cancelled;
(iv) That the exact contribution and liability of each of the accused is not known from the material on record;
(v) That the petitioner has been in custody for more than two years; and
(vi) That the learned Additional Commissioner and the learned Member of the Board of Revenue have misread the evidence and failed to apply their mind.
Mr. Basharatullah, learned counsel for the petitioner in Constitutional Petition No. 33 of 1986 has contended as under:
(i) that the learned Additional Commissioner has cancelled the bail, inter alia, on the following grounds:‑
(i) That the bail 'application could not have been referred to the Tribunal;
(ii) that even if it was referred to the Tribunal, the only 'person competent to pass order was the Deputy Commissioner;
(iii) that no notice was given to the complainant party in respect of the bail application.
It has been urged by him that all the above grounds are not sustainable in law; and
(ii) That the appellate authority could not have cancelled the bail without perusing the material on record and without holding that the case was not of further inquiry warranting the grant of bail.
Mr. Nazeer Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for, the private respondent has contended as under:‑
(i) That one of the accused Muhammad Amin by filing the bail application and taking up the matter in appeal and revision has obstructed the progress of the case and., therefore, the petitioners were not entitled to take benefit of the delay in the progress;
(ii) That the conduct of the accused has not been above the board, inasmuch as, they manipulated the procurement of bail from the President of the Tribunal;
(iii) That since no notice was issued to the complainant party of the above bail application, the learned Additional Commissioner was justified‑ in cancelling the bail;
(iv) That the President of the Tribunal was not entitled to refer the bail application to the Tribunal and by doing so, he acted illegally and factually had not applied his mind;
(v) That the order of the learned Additional Commissioner and the learned Member of the Board of Revenue cannot be said to be without lawful authority warranting interference by this Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction; and
(vi) That even otherwise, the petitioners had alternate remedy as they could have filed fresh bail application before the Assistant Commissioner.
Mr. Yaqub Khan, learned Advocate‑General appearing for the State submitted that the bail could not have been granted on the ground that more than two, years had expired, as the 3rd proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. is not applicable to the proceedings under the Ordinance. He has further submitted that the case may be remanded to the President of the Tribunal for fresh appraisal of the matter.
3. In order to appreciate the above respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it may be advantageous: to reproduce section 16 of the Ordinance, which reads as follows:‑
"16. Bail.‑‑ (1) A scheduled offence shall be bailable or non‑bailable according as the same is bailable or non‑bailable under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898), and the Deputy Commissioner shall have the same powers of granting bail to a person or persons accused of an offence as a Court has under that Code.
(2) The President of a tribunal may in regard to a case referred to the tribunal‑ for decision tinder section 5, exercise the powers of the Deputy Commissioner under this section."
A perusal of the above‑quoted section indicates that under subsection (1), a scheduled offence shall be bailable or non‑bailable according as the same is bailable or non‑bailable under the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the Deputy Commissioner has been empowered to grant bail to a person or person accused of an offence, as a Court has under the Code of Criminal. Procedure, whereas under subsection (2) of section 16, the President of a tribunal has been empowered in regard to a case referred to the tribunal for decision under section 5 to exercise the powers of the Deputy Commissioner under the above- quoted section in relation to the grant of bail.
4. Having analysed the above section 16, we may take up the question, whether the President of the tribunal was competent to refer the bail application to the tribunal. In this regard, it may be pertinent to observe that under clause (f) of section 2 of the Ordinance, 'tribunal' has been defined as means a tribunal constituted' under section 6. It may also be observed that under subsection (1) of section 6, it has been provided that a tribunal constituted for the purpose of section 5 shall consist of a Government official, not below the rank of Naib Tehsildar, who shall be its President, and four other members, all to be appointed by the Deputy Commissioner, whereas, section 8 provides that the tribunal shall not conduct any proceeding unless the President and at least two other members of the Tribunal are present. It is, therefore, evident that the tribunal comprises of its President and four members. In other words, 'tribunal' will include its 'President', but the word 'President' would not include the members of 'tribunal'. In this view of the matter, it is apparent that under subsection (2) of section 16 of the Ordinance, the power to grant bail in a case referred to the tribunal for its decision under section 5 has been conferred, the President of the Tribunal by designation and not on the tribunal We are, therefore, inclined to hold that it was not incumbent upon President of the tribunal to have referred the bail application to the members of the tribunal for their view, as it is not warranted by the above subsection (2) of section. 16.
Further question for consideration, therefore, arises that, whether the bail order in question passed by the President of the tribunal was vitiated for the reason that the bail application was referred to the members of the tribunal and whose view was in favour of grant of bail. In our view, the answer of the above question will depend on the fact, whether the President has applied his mind to the facts of the case or has merely endorsed what was recommended by the members of the tribunal. If the President has not applied his mind, it would follow that the bail order was not in consonance with law. In this behalf, it may be pertinent to reproduce the bail order, dated 5th January, 1985; which reads as follows:‑
5. A perusal of the above‑quoted order indicates that through the President of the Tribunal has referred to the recommendations of the two members of the tribunal, but at the same time, he has applied his mind to the facts of the case. In this view of the matter, the bail order could not have been cancelled on the above ground by the learned Additional Commissioner.
6. We may observe that in a bail matter in respect of a scheduled offence committed in the area falling within the compass where the provisions of the Ordinance are applicable, there may be four stages for the grant of bail, namely, (i) before the Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner exercising the powers of the Deputy Commissioner takes cognizance of the offence under the Ordinance in terms of‑ section 4, bail can be granted by the normal criminal Courts; (ii) after the taking of cognizance by the Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner exercising the power of Deputy Commissioner, D but before referring the case to the tribunal, bail can be granted by the Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner exercising the powers of Deputy Commissioner in terms of the above‑quoted subsection (1) of section 16; (iii) after the case is referred to a tribunal in terms of section 5 on the question of guilt or innocence of the accused, the President of the tribunal is competent authority to grant or refuse the bail in terms of the above‑quoted subsection (2) of section 16: and (iv) once the recommendations of q‑he members of the tribunal and its President are received by the Deputy Commissioner he again becomes empowered to grant bail.
The above discussion also covers the second ground on which, the learned Additional Commissioner had cancelled the bail, namely, that only the Deputy Commissioner could have granted the bail Since the bail application was moved at the stage when the case was already referred to the tribunal, the competent authority to grant or to refuse the bail, was the President of the tribunal, as pointed out hereinabove and not the Deputy Commissioner, as concluded by the learned Additional Commissioner.
7. This lead us to the third ground, namely, whether the bail could have been granted without any notice of the bail application to the complainant party. In this regard, learned counsel for the parties have referred to the definition of word 'party' as given in clause (d) of section 2 of the Ordinance, which provides that 'party means the accused and the person or persons primarily interested in the prosecution of the case, including the prosecutor, if any. It was urged by Mr. Basharatullah, learned counsel for the petitioner in Constitutional Petition No. 33 of 1986 that though the word 'including' has been employed in the above definition but narrow construction should be placed on it and it should be, treated as if the word 'means' has been used. We are unable to subscribe to the above submission, as there is nothing in the above clause or in any other provision of the Ordinance as to indicate that the word 'including used in the above clause, should not be given its normal literal meaning. It is a well‑settled principle of interpretation of law that when the word include is used in a definition clause, in the absence of anything contrary in the relevant clause, it means that the definition is not exhaustive, but where the word 'means' is used it implies that the definition is generally exhaustive in the absence of anything contrary. In this behalf, reference may be made to a latest judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Messrs Dawood Yamaha Limited v. Government of Baluchistan and 3 others reported in P L D 1986 Quetta 148, in which, the above' view was taken which we are inclined to take in the present case. On the basis of the above definition, it can be urged that a complainant is a person or persons primarily interested in the prosecution of the case. In other words, the above definition of the term 'party' includes al complainant. It is, therefore, necessary to examine, whether any notice of the bail application was required to be served on the complainant party in the instant case before the grant of the same by the President of the tribunal. In this regard, it may be pertinent to point out that whenever it was intended that the notice is to be given to any of the persons covered by the definition of the word 'party', it has been expressly provided for in the Ordinance. In this regard, reference may be made to subsection (2) of section 4 which provides that when the Deputy Commissioner takes cognizance of a scheduled offence under clause (c) of subsection (1), he shall before constituting a tribunal under section 5, inform the accused that he is‑ entitled to have the case decided by another Deputy Commissioner. It further provides that if the accused or any of the accused objects to the case being decided by the Deputy Commissioner who has so taken cognizance of the offence, the matter shall be reported to the Commissioner for transfer, of the case. It may also be pertinent to refer to subsection (3) of section 6 which provides that no person shall be appointed as a member of the tribunal other than the President, except after giving the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard and considering objections, if any, to the appointment of such person. Reference may also be made to subsection (1) of section 9 which enjoins, that for the purpose of coming to a finding on a question referred to it, the tribunal shall give opportunity to the parties to appear before it and proceed to hear the complainant, if any, and record in such 'manner as it may think fit, such evidence as may be adduced in respect of the accusation or on behalf of the accused or as may be called for by the tribunal. Further reference may be made to subsection (2) of the above section 9, which provides that the tribunal shall give parties en opportunity H' of cross‑examining the witnesses deposing against them. There is no such requirement provided in section 16. The bail applications under the Ordinance are to be treated at par with the bail applications in a criminal Court. In this regard, reference may be made to the case of Muhammad Bakhsh v. Assistant Commissioner, Mastung and 3 others, reported in P L D 1985 Quetta 255 in which a D.B. of this Court, to which one of us (Mr. justice Ajmal Mian, Actg. C.J.) was a party, while construing subsection (2) of section 3 and section 16 of, the Ordinance held that exclusion of the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance, is not absolute but is subject to otherwise provided in the Ordinance and that section 16 of the Ordinance has in fact provided otherwise by providing that a scheduled offence shall according as the same is bailable or non‑bailable, would be bailable or non‑bailable under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the Deputy Commissioner shall have the same powers of granting bail to a person or persons accused of an offence, as the Court under the said Code It was further held that since the same powers had been conferred upon the Deputy Commissioner in the matter of grant of bail for a scheduled .offence, as are enjoined by a Court 'under the Criminal Procedure Code, by necessary implication, the provision relating to, enforcement of bail bond contained under the Criminal Procedure Code, have also been made applicable. The ratio of the above case is that for all contents and purposes, the Deputy Commissioner, and the resident of the tribunal, in case, the case has already been referred to a tribunal under section 5, are to act as normal criminal Courts in relation to grant of bail by virtue of above section 16 of the Ordinance. In a murder case, the notice for bail application is not issued to the complainant party, but it is issued to the State Prosecutor by a normal Court under the Criminal Procedure Code. In the present case also, notice of the bail application was issued to the Public Prosecutor. If we ace to treat the Deputy Commissioner or the President of the tribunal as if they were the criminal Courts for the purpose of exercising the powers to, grant bail in terms of section 16 of the Ordinance, it must follow that since there is no requirement to issue a notice of a bail application to a complainant party in a case tried by normal criminal Court, there cannot be any such requirement under section 16 of the Ordinance, particularly, when there is no such express provision. However, we may observed that if the Deputy Commissioner or the President of the 'tribunal grants hearing to a complainant party in respect of a bail application, it will not be illegal or contrary to law. It was vehemently urged by Mr. Nazeer Ahmed, learned counsel for the private respondent that unless a complainant party is issued a notice. of the bail application, the provisions of section 23 providing right of appeal and of section,. 24 providing right of revision, would become redundant, as the complainant party in the "absence of any notice, cannot exercise his right to file an appeal or revision. It is true that under subsection (1) of section 23, any party aggrieved by any decision given', sentence passed or order made by the Deputy Commissioner under the Ordinance, may within 30 days of such decision, sentence or order prefer an appeal to the Commissioner. It may be observed that the words 'any party' used in the above subsection will include a complainant party. However, in bur view, merely the fact that a complainant party is entitled to file, an appeal under section 23 of the Ordinance will not entitle him to have a notice of bail application, if not provided for under the relevant provision of the Ordinance, either expressly or by necessary implication. As pointed out hereinabove, whenever the Legislature wanted to provide notice to any of the parties, or all the parties, this has been so expressly provided in the various provisions of the Ordinance, but where it was not intended to provide notice, the same has been omitted.
8. Adverting to Mr. Nazir Ahmed's submission that the orders of the learned Additional Commissioner and of the learned Member of the Board of Revenue cannot be said to the without lawful authority, it may be observed that he has referred to the case of Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v: Sikandar and others, reported in P L D 1974 S 139, in which the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan while constrains paragraph (ii) of sub‑clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 98 of lab Constitution of 1962, held that the expressions 'without lawful authority and of no legal effect' are terms of art and refer to jurisdictions, defects as distinguished from a mere erroneous decision whether on e question of fact or even of law. It was further held that it is well‑settled that where a Court or a tribunal has jurisdiction and‑ it determines that question, it cannot be said that it acted illegally or with material irregularity merely because it came to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law.
On the other hind, Messrs Basharatullah and Riaz Ahmed, Advocates have referred to the case of Sharbat Khan and others v. Haji Lal Gul and others, reported in 1984 .S C M R 616, in which, the bail granted by the Assistant Commissioner was cancelled upon an appeal by the Additional Commissioner by his order dated 5th August, 1982. Revision against the above order was also dismissed; so also a Constitutional writ petition filed in this Court. The accused filed petition for leave, against the above orders/ judgment, which was converted into an appeal and the accused were admitted to bail by the Honourable Supreme Court. It may be advantageous to reproduce para. 6 of the above judgment, which reads as follows:‑
"(6) After hearing the learned counsel at some length we are of the opinion that in ignoring material considerations on record the learned Additional Commissioner had exercised his jurisdiction illegally and, therefore, his order is not sustainable. The petitioners were rightly released on bail on a tentative assessment of the evidence and in any case there complicity in the crime requires to be further enquired into at the trial. Additionally the punishment provided for the offence is neither death nor the transportation for life."
In the present case, the learned Additional Commissioner has cancelled the bail on the grounds which are not sustainable in law, as pointed out hereinabove, and he has not even touched upon the merits of the case. According to the above judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court, writ petition is competent in case, the Additional Commissioner exercises jurisdiction illegally, in a. manner not warranted by law. The above Supreme Court case of 1984 is on all fours applicable to the present case and not the case cited by Mr. Nazeer Ahmed which is in a different context.
Mr. Nazeer Ahmed learned counsel for the private respondent has also referred to the following cases:---
(i) Raza Muhammad and 5 others v. Member, Board of Revenue Baluchistan, Quetta and another, reported in P L D 1979 Quetta 106, in which, a Division Bench while construing sections 16 and 23 of the ordinance, held that grant or refusal of bail is within descretion of the relevant authority, which may do it rightly or wrongly and that mere , fact that discretion has not been properly or even wrongly exercised, cannot provide a foundation as to warrant interference by the High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction.
The above case is directly not in consonance with the above latest view of the Honourable Supreme Court: Furthermore, the facts of the above case are, distinguishable, inasmuch as, the Assistant Commissioner had cancelled the bail on merits, whereas, in the present case, the learned Additional Commissioner has not touched upon the merits of the case.
(ii) Mir Dost Muhammad v . Government of Baluchistan‑ and 3 others, reported in P L, D 1980 Quetta 1. In the above case; it was held that since the Assistant Commissioner neglected to follow the mandatory provisions of section. 5 of not hearing the accused at the time of nominating the tribunal members, proceeding taken before the tribunal, or order passed by it or in appeal or revision, would be deemed to be coram non‑judice, and therefore, a Constitutional petition would be competent.
The above case does not support the private respondent but on the contrary, it indicates that in a fit, case, Constitutional jurisdiction can be pressed into service.
(iii) Nek Muhammad and another v. The Member, Board of Revenue (Judicial), Quetta and 3 others reported in P L D. 1985 Quetta 63, in which, it was held that proviso (iii) to subsection (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C. relating to grant of bail, if the accused has been in custody for more than two years, is not applicable to a bail application under section 16 of the Ordinance.
Without going into the correctness of the above view, it may be observed that even prior to the enactment of the above proviso (iii) to subsection (1) of section 497, Cr. P. C., the factum that since how long the accused had been in custody, was a material factor in deciding a bail application. Even if, we were to hold that the above‑proviso (iii) to subsection (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C, has not been made applicable to the bail proceedings under section 16 of the Ordinance, we are inclined to take the view that even then the question whether the accused have been in custody for more than two years, will be a relevant factor for deciding a bail application, though the accused may not be entitled to bail as .a matter of right in, terms of the above proviso even if he is not hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal.
9. We are not inclined to touch upon the merits of the bail application, as we intend to remand the case to the learned Additional Commissioner with the direct4on to rehear the appeal after giving notice to the parties and to decide the same on merits in accordance with law.
Mr. Basheratullah, Advocate has invited our attention to the case of Dr. Behram Khan v. Naseer Ahmad alias Bacha Khan, reported in P L D 1986 Quetta, 72, in which, one of us (Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian, Actg. C.J.) while dealing with an application for cancellation of bail after referring the case‑law including the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, held that even at bail stage, the Court is to sift evidence on record tentatively in order to arrive at a tentative finding, whether the case fell under subsection (1) of section 497., Cr.P.C. or under subsection (2).
10. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the above two petitions and declare. the impugned orders as being without lawful authority and of no legal effect and remand the case to the learned Additional Commissioner with the direction‑to rehear the appeal and to decide the same on merits in accordance with law. In the meantime, the present two petitioners shall by released on bail on the same terms and conditions, on which, they were admitted to bail by the President of the tribunal by his order, dated 5fh January, 1985. If the bail bonds already furnished to the Assistant Commissioner are no longer valid, the petitioners shall furnish fresh bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner, within one week.
The petitions stand disposed of in. the above terms with no orders as to cost.
M. Y. H. Case remanded.
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