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Constitutional Petition No. 26 of 1985, decided on 25th August, 1985.

‑‑‑S. 18(2)‑‑Provincial Government has right to make a reference to Court within a period of six months from date of announcement of order‑‑Court is empowered to decline such reference in case Court was of opinion that prima facie there was no case for inquiry into and determination of objection against award.

‑ ‑Ss. 20(c). 18 & 22‑A ‑Court is enjoined to serve notice of a reference under S. 18 on department of Government, a local authority or a Cement company, for whose benefit land was being acquired to lodge a cross objection to objections made by any person interested in award‑‑Court is empowered to reduce amount of compensation upon such cross objection.

‑‑‑Ss 18, 9(5), 11, 20(c), 50(2) & 53 ‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. XLI,rr.10&22 arid Ss. 96 & 104‑‑Reference‑‑Local authority or a company for whose benefit land was acquired, held, was entitled to become a party to a reference under S. 18‑‑Right to file cross objection. By virtue of newly‑added subsection (5) of section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, a Government department, a local authority or a company, has been made a party to the acquisition proceedings. Prior to the amendment, it was not such. Furthermore, addition of the words 'and a department of Government, a local authority or a company', in section 11 of the Act entitles any of them for whose benefit the land has been acquired, to file objections and to be heard in inquiry to be conducted by a Collector for determining the amount of compensation, whereas, the addition of the words 'and a department of Government, a local authority or company' in clause (c) of section 20 of the Act, enjoins a Court to serve a notice of the reference proceedings under section 18 of the Act on any of above parties for whose benefit the land has been acquired. Newly added section 22‑A confers a right on the Provincial Government or a local authority or a company for whose benefit land is being acquired, to lodge cross‑objection to a reference under section 18 of the Act and the Court has been given power to reduce the amount of compensation in pursuance of such cross‑objection.

The addition of the above new section 22‑A' has far‑reaching consequences. Though in view of the clear prohibition contained in the proviso of subsection (2) of section 50 of the Act, a Government department, or a local authority or a company, for whose benefit the land has been acquired, cannot seek a reference under section 18 of the Act to a District Judge, but once a reference is filed at the behest of the owner of the land (i.e. by the interested person), a Government department, or a local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land has been acquired, becomes entitled to file cross‑objection to the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector. Such cross objection can be equated with a reference under section 18 of the Act.

Even if a civil appeal against a decree is withdrawn, the cross objection to the decree are to be decided as an appeal.

The right to file cross‑objection is a substantive right which cannot be exercised by a local authority or a company, for whose benefit the land has been acquired, without being a party to the reference. It is true that there is no amendment made in section 50 of the Act, subsection (2) of which provides that in any proceeding before a Collector or Court, a local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation Proviso to the above subsection, prohibits a reference under section 18 of the Act at the behest of a local authority or a company. The omission to make amendment in the above section 50 of the Act, cannot nullify the other ame4idments. One has to read the above amendments in conjunction with the above section 50 of the Act and are to construe in a manner which may advance the object for which the above amendments were apparently made. From section 50 of the Act, no prohibition to the effect that a Government department or a local authority or a company, for whose benefit the land has been acquired, cannot become a party to a reference, can be inferred, particularly, in presence of the right to receive notice of a reference conferred by the amendment in clause (c) of section 20 of the Act and ‑the right to file cross‑objection to the reference conferred by section 22‑A.

A stranger to a suit or a proceeding is not prohibited by the Code of Civil Procedure from filing an appeal from an order passed therein. It is true that there is no express provision permitting such party to prefer an appeal against such an order. This omission, however, cannot be understood to amount to prohibition. The Court ought not to act on the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for. To give such a meaning to the omission would result in grave injustice. The Court should proceed on the principle that every procedure which furthers administration of justice is permissible even if there is no express provision permitting the same. Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with appeals from decrees and section 104 deals with appeals from orders. These provisions do not in terms say who is entitled to prefer an appeal. The Code, however, lays down that it is the decree or the order that has to be appealed against. If the decree or order appealed from adversely affects a person he should be' permitted to challenge the same in appeal even if he was not made a party to the original suit or proceeding. There is no inconsistent provision in the Act of 1894 as to exclude the application of Order I, rule 10, C . P. C .

Court ought no to act on the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for. In the absence of any express prohibition and in presence of the aforesaid amendments brought about by the Ordinance, particularly, the right to file cross‑objection under section 22‑A, application under Order 1, rule 10, C.P.C. was competent.

Municipal Corporation of Pabna v. Jogendra Narain Baikut 41 C 382; Faqir Chand v Municipal Committee Hazara (1913) 47 P R 225; Collector and Chairman, District Board, Gujranwala v. Hira Nand AIR 1929 Lah. 10; Nihal Chand and others v. District Board Mianwali AIR 1936 Lah. 564; The Pabna Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Kaliprashad Bhattacharyya and another P L D 1960 Dacca 461; Municipal Corporation of Pabna v. Jogendra Narain Baikut and others 13 C W N 116; Sind Industrial Trading Estates Lid. v First Assistant Judge, Hyderabad West Pakistan and 4 others P L D 1960 (W.P.) Kar. 826; Kasimbhai and another v . The Deputy Commissioner Dadu and others P I. D 1968 Kar. 126; WAPDA through its Chairman, Lahore v. Aurangzeb Khan and 17 others P L D 1975 Pesh. 1; Brigade No. 1 Chattar Domel and Garhi Dopatta through Military Estate Hazara v. Custodian Evacuee Property and 7 others P L J 1982 Azad J & K 55; Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited, Karachi v. Moulvi Muhammad Saleh and 3 other 1979 C L C 7; H.M. Saya and Karachi and another P L D 1969 S C 65 and Khurshed Bagh Co‑operative Housing Society Ltd. Lucknow v. Smt. Satya Devi and others A I R 1971 All. 426 ref. Sree Mullapudi Vankatarayudu, Memorial Medical Trust, Tanuku v. Chirapu Varada Raju A I R 1972 Andh. Pra. 362 dissented from.

‑ ‑0. XLI, r. 22‑‑Cross‑objection‑‑Concept‑‑.When civil appeal against a decree is withdrawn, cross‑objection to decree, held, would be decided as an appeal.

‑‑‑ Audi aiteram partem, held, was applicable to judicial as well as administrative bodies and to the absence of any express prohibition, right given by maxim was to be read into relevant provision of relevant Act. Chief Commissioner, Karachi and another v . Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak P L D 1959 S C (Pak .) 45 ref.

Shahenshah Hussain for Petitioner.

Amirul Mulk Mengal, A.‑‑G. and Tahir Muhammad Khan for Respondents Nos. 3 to 7.

Date of hearing: 18th August, 1985.

This petition is directed against the order, dated 8th November, 1984 passed by the learned District Judge, Khuzdar (respondent No.l) dismissing the petitioner's application under Order I, rule 10 read with section 151, C.P C. for becoming a party to a reference proceeding pending before him under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The brief facts leading to the filing of the above petition are that the petitioner, which is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, approached the respondent No.2 with the request to acquire 885‑3‑32 Acres of land under the Act for the installation of a Cement Factory in Mouza Pathara Tehsil Hub, District Lasbella. Upon the above request, the land acquisition proceedings under the Act were initiated culminating in giving of an award, dated 9th April, 1981, awarding compensation to the owners of the land including to the respondents Nos. 3 to 7 at the rate of Rs.5,000 per Acre in respect of the land falling within one mile of R.C.D. Highway and Rs.4,000 per Acre for the land falling beyond one mile from the R.C.D. Highway. The respondents Nos. 3 to 7 accepted the payment under protest and requested the respondent No. 2 i.e ; the Collector Lasbella District to make a reference (hereinafter referred to as the 'Reference) to the learned District Judge under section 18 of the Act, which request was acceded to by the respondent No. 2 and consequently, a reference was made under the above provision of the Act to the learned District Judge, Khuzdar.

2. It is the case of the petitioners that they were neither made a party to the above proceedings, nor they were sent any notice. However, they made an application under Order 1, rule 10 read with section 151, C . P. C . to become a party to the above reference, which application has been declined by the learned District Judge, Khuzdar, through the impugned order. The petitioners being aggrieved by the above order have filed the present petition.

3. In support of the above petition, Mr. Shahenshah Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioners has urged as follows:‑

(i) That in view of the various amendments in the relevant sections brought about by the West Pakistan Ordinance No. 49 of 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ordinance') in the Act, the petitioners were entitled to be made a party to the above reference under section 18 of the Act; and

(11) That since the land was acquired for the benefit of the petitioners and as the petitioners would have to pay the amount of enhanced compensation, if any to be awarded by the learned District Judge, they were even otherwise necessary and proper party. Mr. Amirul Mulk Mengal, learned Advocate‑General appearing for the official respondent has supported the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and has contended that the petitioners should have been made a party to the above reference.

4. Mr. Tahir Muhammad Khan, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents has vehemently contended as under:‑

(i) That the effect of the amendments brought about by the Ordinance is to give to a Government department, a local authority and to a company a right to be a party upto the stage from section 4 to section 1 of the Act, but the said amendments do not confer any right upon a local authority or a company, for whose benefit the land has been acquired to become a party to the reference under section 18 of the Act;

(ii) That the provisions of Order 1, rule 10, C.P.C. were not applicable to a reference under section 18 of the Act and that the petitioners were neither a necessary nor proper party and, therefore, their application under Order I, rule 10, C.P.C. was rightly dismissed by the learned District Judge.

5 Before dealing with the above contentions, it may be advantageous to reproduce herein below some of the relevant amendments brought about by the Ordinance, namely, the newly‑added subsection (5) of section 9, addition in section 11, proviso to subsection (2) of section 18, the amendment in clause (c) of section 20 and addition of new section 22‑A, which read as follows:‑

"Subsection (5) of Section 9.‑‑(5) The Collector shall also serve notice of the enquiry to be held under section 11 (such notice not being less than fifteen days prior to the date fixed under subsection (2) for determination of claims and objections) on the Department of Government, local authority or company as the case may be, for which land is being acquired, and require it to depute a duly authorised representative to attend the inquiry on its behalf for the purpose of shaking objections (if any) to the measurement of the land, claims to any interest in the land or the amount of any compensation. Such authorised representative shall be party to the proceedings."

"Addition in section 11‑Between the words 'any person interested' and the words has stated the words and commas 'and a Department of Government, a local authority, or a Company, as the case may be shall be inserted.

" Provision To Subsection (2) of section 18. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained section 21, the Provincial Government may, if it has not accepted the award, refer the matter to the Court within a period of six months from the date of announcement of the award; provided that the Court shall not entertain the reference unless in its opinion there is prima facie case for inquiry into and determination of the objection against the award."

"Amendment in clause (c) of section 20.‑‑ In caluse (c) between the word 'Collector and the a stop at the end, the words and commas 'and the Department of Government, local authority or company, as the case may be, for which land is being acquired shall be inserted."

"Section 22‑A.‑‑ The Provincial Government, or a local authority or a company for which land is being acquired, may lodge a cross‑objection to the objection made by any person interested and the Court may reduce the amount awarded by the Collector if it considers it just and proper."

It may be noticed that newly‑added subsection (5) of section 9 enjoins the Collector to serve a notice of the enquiry for determination of the amount of compensation, inter alia, on the Department of Government, local authority or company, as the case may be, for which, the land is being acquired and require it to depute a duly authorised representative to attend the enquiry. It further provides that such authorised representative shall be party to. the proceedings, where as the effect of addition of the words "and a department of Government, a local authority or a Company" in section 11 is that the Collector is obliged to consider the objections, if any, filed by any of the above parties in addition to the land‑owner.

It may further be noticed that proviso to subsection (2) of section 18 confers a right upon the Provincial Government to make a reference to the Court under section 18 within a period of six month from the date of announcement of the order. It also empowers the Court to decline such a reference in case the Court is of the opinion that, prima facie, there is no case for inquiry into and determination of the objection against the award, whereas, the purpose of addition in clause (c) to section 20 seems to be to enjoin the Court to serve notice of a reference under section 18 on a department of the Government, a local authority or a company. It may also be noticed that newly‑added section 22‑A confers a right on the Provincial Government or a local authority or a company, for whose benefit the land is being acquired to lodge a cross‑objection to the objections made by any person interested in the award and the Court has been. empowered to reduce the amount of compensation upon such cross‑objection.

6. It seems that there has been controversy on the question, whether a Government Department or a local authority or a company can participate in a reference under section 18 of the Act as a party or can it file an appeal against an award/decision given by a District Judge in such reference. The predominant view obtaining in the various Courts during pre and post‑independence period has been that of them can become a party to such a reference nor they can an appeal against an award/decision given therein. In this regard, reference may be made to some of the decided cases pertaining to the period prior to the independence of Indo‑Pak, namely;

(i) Municipal Corporation of Pabna v . Jogendra Narain Baikut reported in 41 C 382, in which, the Calcutta High Court held that under section 50 of the Act, a company or a local authority for whose benefit the land has been acquired, may appear and watch the proceedings or it may assist the Secretary of State, but it has no right to ask for a reference under section 18 of the Act or to file an appeal against the award passed by the District Judge in such a reference.

(ii) Faqir Chand Municipal Committee, Hazara reported in (1913) 47 P R 225. In the above case, the question was, whether an appeal filed by the owner of the land against the award given by the District Judge under section 18 of the Act without impleading the Secretary of State of India, was competent, though the Municipal Committee, Hazara for whose benefit the land was acquired was made a party. While holding that the appeal was not competent, it was also held by the erstwhile Chief Court of Punjab that the Municipal Committee was a stranger to the proceedings under section 18 of the Act.

(iii) Collector and Chairman, District Board, Gujranwala v. Hira Nand reported in A I R 1929 Lah 10, in which the counsel appearing for the Chairman, District Board, Gujran.wala for whose benefit the land was acquired conceded that the Board was not competent to file an appeal against an award given by the District Judge under section 18 of the Act.

(iv) Nihal Chand and others v. District. Board Mianwali reported in A I R 1936 Lah. 564, in which case also, the view found favour with the Lahore High Court was that an appeal by a local authority against an award given by the District Judge under section 18 of the Act was not competent.

7. It may now be pertinent to refer to some of the cases of the post‑independence period:‑

(i) The Pabna Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Kaliprashad Bhattacharyya and another reporteo in P L D 1960 Dacca 461, in which, a D.B. of the Dacca High Court held that the appellant Company for whose benefit the land was acquired had no right to ask for a reference under section 18 of the Act, or to file an appeal against a decision of the District Judge made upon such reference. The reliance was placed on the case of Municipal Corporation of Pabna v. Jogendra Marain Baikut and others reported in 13 C W N 116 and on the case of the Comilla Electrict Supply Ltd. v. Messrs East Bengal Bank Ltd. and others reported in 43 C W N 973.

(ii) Sind Industrial Trading Estates Ltd. v. First Assistant Judge, Hyderabad, West Pakistan and 4 others reported in P L D 1960 (W.P.) Kar. 826. In the above case, the question before the Court was, whether the award or any order passed under the Act can be challenged through a constitutional petition. While holding that the petitions were not competent, it was also held that under section 50(2) of the Act, the Court was not bound to issue notice to company or local authority concerned. It was also held that the non‑hearing of a party who is not required by law, to be served with the notice of proceedings, does not amount to breach of natural justice.

(iii) Kasimbhai and another v. The Deputy Commissioner, Dadu and others reported in P L D 1968 Kar. 126. In the above case, a learned Single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan at Karachi dismissed an application filed by WA PDA under section 151, C . P. C . for becoming a party to a first appeal arising out of an award given by the District Judge under section 18 of the Act. It was held that the local authority for whose benefit the proceedings were initiated under the Act, had no privity with the owner of the land and, therefore, could not claim to be impleaded as a party.

(iv) WAPDA through its Chairman, Lahore v. Aurangzeb Khan and 17 others reported in P L D 1975 Pesh. 1. in the above case, a D.B. after reviewing the case‑law and the amendments brought about in 1969 by the Ordinance referred to hereinabove, held that the appeal filed by the WAPDA against the award given by the District Judge under section 18 of the Act, was not competent in spite of the above amendment of 1969.

(v) Brigade No. 1 Chattar Domel and Garhi Dopatta through Military Estate Hazara v. Custodian Evacuee Property and 7 others reported in P L J 1982 Azad J & K 55, in which a D. B of Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that an appeal against the judgment of District Judge passed in a reference under section 18 of the Act filed by the appellant for whose benefit the land was acquired, was not competent. It was further held that a local authority or company concerned, for whose benefit the land was to be acquired, was competent to appear and adduce the evidence before the District Judge for the purpose of determination of the amount of compensation but had no right to tile an appeal.

8. However, there seems to be a D.B. case of the Sind High Court, in which, apparently a contrary view has been taken, namely, in the case of Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited, Karachi v . Moulvi Muhammad Saleh and 3 others reported in 1979 C L C 7. In the above, case the question was, whether an appeal filed by the appellant, a company, for whose benefit the land was acquired under the Act, was competent. After referring to the amendments made in sections 9, 11, 20 and 50 by the Ordinance, it was held that the appeal was competent particularly on account of the fact that the appellant had become a party before the District Judge in the reference under section 18 of the Act. It will be instructive to reproduce herein below para. 9 of the judgment, which reads as follows:‑

"9. There is no dispute on the point that acquisition proceedings were instituted for the benefit of the appellants and it is also not disputed that they will be affected by the payment of compensation. The appellants had made an application before the District Judge under Order 1, rule 10, C.P.C. for being joined as a party and such application was granted. The order joining the appellants was not challenged and in fact the appellants were permitted to produce evidence. The only question for consideration is whether the present appeal is maintainable at their instance. By insertion of subsection (5) in section 9 of the Act (reproduced above) the Collector has to serve a notice of an inquiry under ,section 11 of the Act on the local authority or the company for whom the land is being acquired and he has to require such local authority or company to depute a duly authorised representative to attend the inquiry. Such authorised representative can again file objections be those in regard to the measurement of the land or claims to interest in the land or the amount of any compensation. Such authorised representative by operation of law becomes party to the proceedings. Section. 11 also carries a consequential amendment to provide for insertion of the words 'as' department of the Government or local authority or company'. After the words 'any person interested'. It would thus seem that a local authority for whose benefit the land is acquired is not merely a person interested but becomes a party to the proceedings to whom the statute 'requires a notice to be given. The amendment in section 20 which deals with the initiation of proceedings before the Court on obtaining a reference clearly provided that the Department of the Government or local authority or a company for whose benefit the acquisition proceedings had started was to be given a notice by the Court directing their appearance. Again by insertion of subsection (1‑A) in section 50 of the Act any charges which are to be defrayed from the funds of the local authority or company could be recovered from such local authority or company. It would thus seem that the law was amended by Ordinance XLIX of 1969 to enhance the status and recognize the interest of the local authority or company or a department of the Government vis‑a‑vis‑ acquisition proceedings instituted at their behest or for their benefit."

9. It may be observed that the question in issue before us is not, whether a local authority or a company for, whose benefit the land may have been acquired under the Act, is entitled to file an appeal against arr award/decision given by a District Judge in a reference under section 18 of the Act, but the point in issue is whether a local authority or a company for whose benefit the land has been acquired, is entitled to become a party to a. reference under section 18 of the Act. It .has been already pointed out hereinabove that by virtue of newly‑added subsection (5) of section 9 of the Act, a Government department, a local authority or a company, has been made a party to the acquisition proceedings. Prior to the amendment, it was not such. Furthermore, addition of the words "and a department of Government, a local authority or a company" in section 11 of the Act, entitles any of them for whose benefit the land has been acquired to file objections and to be heard in the inquiry to be conducted by a Collector for determining the amount of compensation, whereas, the addition of the words "and a department of Government, a local authority or company" in clause (c) of section 20 of the Act, enjoins a Court to serve a notice of the reference proceedings under section 18 of the Act on any of the above parties for whose benefit the land has been acquired. It may also be observed that newly‑added section 22‑A confers a right on the Provincial Government or a local authority or a company for whose benefit the land is being acquired, to lodge cross‑objection to a reference under section 18 of the Act and the Court has been given power to reduce the amount of compensation in pursuance of such cross‑objection. In our view, the addition of the above new section 22‑A has far‑reaching consequences though in view of the clear prohibition contained in the proviso of subsection (2) of section 50 of the Act, a Government department, or a local authority or a company, for whose benefit the land has been acquired, cannot seek a reference under section 18 of the Act to a District Judge, but once a reference is filed at the behest of the owner of the land (i.e. by the interested person), a Government department, or a local authority, or a company, for whose benefit the land has been acquired, becomes entitled to tile cross‑objection to the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector. ‑In our view, such cross objection can be equated with a reference under section 18 of the Act. The concept of cross‑objection is not a new phenomenon, but we find the same in rule 22 of Order XLI, C.P.C. It is by now a well‑settled principle of law that even if a civil appeal against a decree is withdrawn the cross‑objection to the decree are to be decided as an appeal. It may also be pointed out that newly added proviso to subsection (2) of section 18 referred to hereinabove has modified the above subsection (2) of section 50 by providing that the Provincial Government can refer the matter to the Court within six months from the date of award.

10. We are inclined to hold that the right to file cross‑objection is a substantive right which cannot be exercised by a local authority or a company, for whose benefit the land has been acquired, without being a party to the reference. It is true that there is no amendment made in section 50 of the Act, subsection (2) of which provides that in any proceeding before a Collector or Court, a local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. Proviso to the above subsection, as pointed out hereinabove, prohibits a reference under section 18 of the Act at the behest of a local authority or a company. The omission to make amendment in the above section 50 of the Act, in our view, cannot nullify the other amendments referred to hereinabove. We have to read the above amendments in conjunction with the above section 50 of the Act and are to construe in a manner which may advance the object for which the above amendments were apparently made.

In our view, from section 50 of the Act, no prohibition to the effect that a Government department or a local authority or a company, for whose benefit the land has been acquired, cannot become a party to a reference, can be inferred, particularly, in presence of the right to receive notice of a reference conferred by the amendment in clause (c) of section 20 of the Act and the right to file cross‑objection to the reference conferred by section 22 A .

11. In the above Peshawar case, the effect of above section 22‑A was not taken into consideration but it was observed that sections 11, 22‑A and subsection (2) of section 31 are in the nature of consequential amendments introduced in the Act in view of addition of subsection (5) of section 9 and clause (c) of section 20 of the Act and, therefore, they did not need any discussion.

The above Karachi case seems to be more in consonance with the spirit of the amendments brought about by the Ordinance in 1969.

12. It will not be out of context to point out that in the instant case, the Collector has awarded Rs.4,000 and 5,000 per Acre, whereas the private respondents are claiming compensation in the pending reference at the rate of Rs.1 lac per Acre. In addition to that some of the private respondents are also claiming Rs.1,25,000 per Acre as the compensation for injuriously affecting their served land. In other words, against the amount of Rs.4 000 and 5,000 per Acre, they are claiming at the rate of Rs.2,25,000 per Acre. The dispute relates to 651‑1‑13 Acres and, therefore, the total amount in controversy is about Rs.141 crores 65 lacs and 75 thousand. It will be unfair and unreasonable to say that the petitioners are not a necessary or proper party though eventually they will have to bear the burden of the additional amount which they may become liable to pay on account of acceptance of reference to certain extent by the learned District Judge.

The concept of principle of natural justice and the right of a person to file an appeal against an order by a Court though not a party to the proceedings, have been accorded recognition after the partition of India. In this regard, reference may be made to the celebrated case, namely, Chief Commissioner, Karachi and another v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak reported in P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 45, in which, the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the maxim audi alteram partem (No man shall be condemned unheard) applies to judicial as well as administrative bodies and in the absence of any express prohibition, this right is to be read into the relevant provision of the relevant Act. In the above case, the respondent had filed a constitutional petition against the order of the Commissioner passed in an appeal filed by her against the acquisition of her property under the Sind (Requisition of Land) Act, 1947 on the ground that she was not heard by the Commissioner. The High Court had allowed the above petition, which judgment was maintained by the Honourable Supreme Court in the above case. It was held by the Honourable Supreme Court that when a statute gives a right of appeal, it should be understood as silently implying when it does not expressly provide that the appellant shall have the right of being heard.

Reference may also be made to the case of H.M. Says and Company, Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Limited, Karachi and another reported in P L D 1969 S C 65, in which, the facts were that the appellants filed a suit for restraining Messrs Habib Bank Limited from encashing a Bank Guarantee of Rs.3 Ise furnished by them to Messrs Wazir Ali Industries Limited without impleading the latter company. They obtained an interlocutory injunction from a learned Civil Judge, against which Messrs Wazir Ali Industries Limited preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge and obtained stay of the operation of the above interlocutory order. Against the above stay order granted by the learned District Judge, the appellants filed a revision in the High Court on the ground that the appeal filed‑by Messrs Wazir Ali Industries Limited was not competent as they were not party to the suits, but a learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the revision. Against the above judgment of the High Court, the appellant filed an appeal before the Honourable Supreme Court, which was dismissed. It will be pertinent to quote hereinbelow the observation of the Honourable Supreme Court which has also been relied upon by the learned Judges in the above Karachi case and which will provide the guideline even in the instant case:‑

"A stranger to a suit or a proceeding is not prohibited by the Code of Civil Procedure from filing an appeal from an order passed therein. It is true that there is no express provision permitting such party to prefer an appeal against such an order. This omission, however, cannot be understood to amount to prohibition. The Court ought not to act on the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for. To give such a meaning to the omission would result in grave injustice. The facts of this case are clear example in point. The Court should proceed on the principle that every procedure which furthers administration of justice is permissible even if there is no express provision permitting the same. Section . 96 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with appeals from decrees and section 104 deals with appeals from orders. These provisions do not in terms say who is entitled to prefer an appeal. The Code, however, lays down that it is the decree or the order that has to be appealed against. If the decree or order appealed from adversely affects a person he should be permitted to challenge the same in appeal even if he was not made a party to the original suit or proceeding."

13. Adverting to the question whether the petitioner's application under Order I, rule 10, C.P.C. was competent or not, it may be pertinent to observe that section 53 of the Act provides that "save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act".

14. Having held that from section 50(2) read with the amendments made by the Ordinance, no prohibition against a Government department, or a local authority or a company, for whose benefit the land is acquired, to become a party to proceedings under section 18 of the Act can be inferred; it must follow that there is no inconsistent provision in the Act of 1894 as to exclude the application of Order 1, rule 10, C.P.C. 1 The learned District Judge as well as Mr. Tahir Muhammad Khan, l learned counsel for the private respondents have relied upon a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Sree Mullapudi Venkatarayudu, Memorial Medical Trust, Tanuku v. Chirapu Varada Raju reported in A I R 1972 A.P. 362, in which, it was held that the provisions of Order 1. rule 10 read with section 151, C.P.C are not attracted to a proceeding under the Act.

However, Mr. Amirul Mulk Mengal, learned Advocate‑General has cited a judgment of the Allahabad High Court namely, Khurshed Bagh Co‑operative Housing Society Ltd., Lucknow v . Smt. Satya Devi and others reported in A I R 1971 All. 426, in which, a contrary view was taken by a D . B . of the Allahabad High Court in an appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge disallowing the appellant to become a party to a writ petition, in which, the land acquisition proceedings were challenged by the respondent.

15. We are inclined to follow the above‑cited dictum of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of H.M. Saya and Company, Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Limited, Karachi and another P L D 1969 S C 65 that the Court ought not to act on the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for. In our view, in the absence of any express prohibition and in presence of the aforesaid amendments brought about by the j Ordinance, particularly, the right to file cross‑objection under section 22‑A, the petitioner's application under Order I, rule 10, C.P.C. was competent and the learned District Judge has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him. We, therefore, allow the above petition and declare the impugned order as being without lawful authority and direct the learned District Judge, Khuzdar to implead the petitioner as a party to the pending reference. However, there shall be no orders as to cost.

M . B . A Petition allowed.

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