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Civil Revision No. 23 of 1982, decided on 16th March, 1983.

‑‑‑S. 6‑B ‑Termination of lease‑‑Requirement‑‑Lessee or tenant of immovable Waqf property committing breach of conditions of lease or tenancy‑‑Administrator, held, would be competent in case of violation of conditions of lease or tenancy to terminate lease or resume tenancy after giving opportunity of being heard to such tenant or lessee.

‑‑‑S. 17‑‑Bar of jurisdiction‑‑Administrator of Auqaf putting plots to auction‑‑Tenants of plots challenging order of auction‑‑No allegation of mala fide or lack of jurisdiction alleged in plaint‑‑Jurisdiction of civil Courts, being ousted, legality of order putting plots to auction held, could not be challenged‑‑Tenants had no right to continue in possession after expiry of period of tenancy‑‑No vested right was acquired by tenants in circumstances.

‑‑‑S. 115‑‑Revisional jurisdiction, exercise of‑‑Concurrent findings of fact of Courts below on question of jurisdiction being well‑founded and in accordance with law. High Court refused to interfere in revisional jurisdiction.‑‑[Jurisdiction).

Muhammad Aman Khan for Petitioners.

S. Akhtar Ali for Respondent No. 1.

Date of hearing: 5th March, 1983.

Muhammad Ali and others sued the Government of N.‑W.F.P. and others for a declaration and permanent injunction. The suit was contested by the Administrator of Auqaf, N.‑W.F..P. (defendant 3) inter alia on the ground that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try it. His plea prevailed and the learned Senior Civil Judge, Peshawar per his order, dated 7‑10‑1980 dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs took an appeal but the same was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge I, Peshawar on 19‑11‑1981. They have now come in revision to this Court.

2. The plaintiff‑petitioners had alleged in the plaint that they were in possession of the disputed plots as tenants on behalf of defendant 3 since more than 30 years and had been paying the monthly rent regularly. They had with his consent raised construction on the plots. He, however, per his order, dated 19‑6‑1971 purported to put the lease of the said plots to auction. His order passed under section 6‑B of Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961 was illegal inasmuch as he had not served them with a notice and they could not be deprived of their rights vested in them by section 6‑B (ibid). It is manifest that the entire claim of the petitioners hinges on the provisions of section 6‑B of Waqf Property Ordinance, 1961 which reads as under:‑

If the Administrator is satisfied that a lessee or tenant of any immovable Waqf Property has committed a breach of the conditions of the lease or tenancy, the Administrator may, after giving such lessee or tenant an opportunity to appear and state his objections, order the termination of lease or resumption of tenancy: Provided that if the breach is capable of rectification the Administrator shall not order the termination of the lease or resumption of the tenancy unless he has issued a written notice requiring the lessee or tenant to rectify the breach within a reasonable time, not being less than thirty days, to be stated in the notice, and the lessee or tenant has failed to comply with such order.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended that it was incumbent 'on the Administrator of Auqaf, respondent 3, to have afforded them an opportunity to appear and state their objections ore termination of their lease. His contention appears to be without force and substance. It escaped his notice that the provisions of section 6‑B would be applicable where the commission of a breach of the conditions of the lease or tenancy takes place. If a lessee or tenant of any immovable Waqf property committed a breach of the conditions of the lease or tenancy the Administrator would be competent to order the termination of lease or resumption of tenancy but before doing so he A would give such lessee or tenant an opportunity of being heard. The facts of the instant case are distinguishable inasmuch as the Administrator had not complained of the breach of the conditions of the lease or tenancy by the petitioners and, as such, no question of giving them an opportunity of being heard arose. It is pertinent to note that the Administrator has passed no order with regard to termination of lease or resumption of tenancy of the petitioners. It follows that the provisions of section 6‑B on which the entire structure of the petitioners' case has been built are not attracted to the facts of the instant case at all. Their grievance that they had not been served with a notice would not, in the circumstances, prevail.

4. Section 17 of Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961 pertains to the bar of jurisdiction and is as follows:‑

Save as expressly provided in this Ordinance, no civil or revenue Court or any other authority, shall have jurisdiction‑.‑

(a) to question the legality of anything done under this Ordinance by or at the instance of the Chief Administrator, or

(b) in respect of any matter which the Chief Administrator is empowered by or under the Ordinance to determine or settle. or

(c) to grant an injunction or other order in relation to any proceed ings before the Chief Administrator under this Ordinance or anything done or intended to be done by or at the instance of the Chief Administrator under this Ordinance.

Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961, was repealed by Auqaf (Federal Control) Act, 1976 and the latter was substituted by North‑West Frontier Province Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 The provisions of section 17 reproduced above mutatis mutandis correspond to section 21 of both the latter enactments which pertain to bar of jurisdiction of civil or revenue Court or any other authority vis‑a vis the orders passed by the Administrator of Auqaf. The petitioners have challenged the order, dated 16‑9‑1971 passed by the Administrator whereby the disputed plots were intended to be put to auction. No allegation of mala fides has been made in the plaint nor it is alleged that he had acted without jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the civil Court was clearly ousted and the legality of the impugned order of the Administrator could not be challenged in the civil Court. The petitioners had no right to continue in possession after the expiry of the period of their tenancy and their claim that they had a vested right in the disputed plots is not warranted by law. It was brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioners had not been paying rent since long and have been in possession without payment of rent in violation of the terms and conditions of the tenancy. The petitioners were inducted into the disputed plots as tenants for a particular period and on the expiry of the said period their tenancy stood determined. The concurrent) finding of both the learned Courts below with regard to the question of jurisdiction is well‑founded and merits no interference.

In the result the revision fails and is dismissed with costs

A.A Revision dismissed.

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