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---S.25-A--Scope--Retirement on attaining supurannuation age--- Temporary injunction against--Application against apprehended retirement--Not maintainable and application for injunction against apprehended retirement not legally conceived under S.25-A as an interim measure to restrain employer from implementing his decision.

National Construction Company Employees' Union v. National Construction Company 1984 P L C 1383 and Ashfaq Ahmed v. Punjab Urban Transport Corporation 1983 P L C 535 distinguished.

Malik Noor Khan for Applicant.

Muhammad Humayun for Respondent.

Mr. Ahmed Khan has filed this application, to seek the continuation of his employment in the Messrs Pakistan Machine Tool Factory Limited apprehending his premature retirement before reaching the age of 60 years.

2. In this context, he has referred to certain documents showing the date of birth, medical fitness and to emphasize that he has to continue in service till the year 1995.

3. Alongwith this application, seeking the main relief he has also prayed for restraint against Pakistan Machine Tool Factory in the form of injunction to implement that action.

4. In the first place no letter has been produced to show the apprehension that his services are being terminated except one letter sent by Muhammad Ashraf Khan the Manager Establishment that he has been given the caution that he will be retired with effect from 19-7-1985.

5. In other words, he is nearing the date in the month of July with an apprehension that his services are being ended on the completion of his superannuation.

6. Two questions have been raised before this Court, whether the application for injunction can be legally conceived under section 25-A, I.R.O. as an interim measure to issue restraint on the employer to implement his decision. Secondly whether the provision of retirement is A in the Industrial Relations Ordinance justifying the application under section 25-A for the relief he has asked for, and in consequence of interim prayer made in the matter of an injunction.

7. The counsel for the applicant has referred case of National Construction Company Employees Union v. National Construction Company 1984 P L C 1383 where he has referred the observation of his Lordship of the Tribunal which I respectfully read:-

"Labour Court may have no power to pass an interim order restraining employer from terminating services of his employee in an individual grievance petition but would have to pass an interim order to maintain status quo in a case under section 34, I.R.O. where there is a question of enforcement of pre-existing right under law, award or settlement and by action of opposite party, such right threatened to be violated and if succeed, there would be nothing left to adjudicate upon finally."

8. There is also another reference of the decision of Ashfaq Ahmed v. Punjab Urban Transport Corporation 1983 P L C 535. In this case also Labour Court refused to grant temporary injunction but the reversion was suspended till the decision of grievance petition.

9. Mr. Humayun has referred the case of Habib Bank Limited v. Anwarul Haq Qureshi which is the latest decision of Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal wherein it was held by his Lordship that no relief can be granted under section 25-A by way of temporary injunction when such relief decides application. It was further observed that the Labour Court cannot pass order restraining the employer from removing worker. As such interim order is not contemplated. In this decision also his Lordship has made reference to the case of Brooke Bond v. Second Sind Labour Court Employees Union v. Pakistan Insurance Corportion and held that the Labour Court had no authority to pass order in the nature of interim injunction.

10. The Court also recalls the case of Brooke Bond where also his Lordship the Chief Justice had observed that all the provisions of C.P.C. are not applicable to the Labour matters and this case was an important case which was also cited in this decision. The argument of Mr. Humayun in that decision was also not upheld that the Labour Court has power to pass interim order.

11. Besides this contention raised of the learned counsel for the applicant this Court is also of the view that the provisions of retirement is not found in the I.R.O. Applicant can come only under Standing Order 12 if his services have been terminated or if he is dismissed or E removed under the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance. Mr. Ahmed Khan has not been retired yet. The Court at this stage will not express the merits and the de-merits of his documents on the basis of which he claims to be in- continuation of his employment reaching the 60 years of age in 1995. But the question is that the main application remains to be adjudicated as the preliminary issue whether the application under section 25-A is maintainable at this stage or after he has been retired or removed or services terminated to question the propriety of the decision of the employer who has wrongly retired him prematurely.

12. The Court also further adds that an application under section 25-A has certain set of procedure where the serving of grievance notice becomes the important requirement on the question of limitation. So this application in the nature of prayer he has sought for remains to be decided as a preliminary issue whether the prayer sought for is maintainable for the relief under section 25-A with whatever good case he may have at present of retirement.

13. Relief in the nature of restraint is not called for. Application is dismissed. The rulings presented by the counsel for the applicant are distinguishable, as those were applicable when the petitions were filed under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. Reliance is also placed by the applicant counsel on the order of the Sind Labour Appellate C Tribunal in Appeal No. 127 of 1984, where the application was pending under section 25-A. The Court is of the view that the facts are distinguishable. Here this Labour Court has still the issue for adjudication not only regarding maintainability but yet to satisfy whether the proviso of retirement is in the I.R.O. In the order presented by the counsel the application was filed under Standing Order 16 whereas there is no specific provisions of questioning the retirement in I.R.O. except Standing Order 12 under which if the termination takes place the impugned order becomes questionable to examine its propriety. In other words the application under Standing Order 16 was filed on the basis of legal rights to show to the Court whether he had a fair question to raise as to the existence of right which he claimed, the infringement of which had given the rise of the restraint.

A.E. Application dismissed.