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This is an appeal against the order of the 44ind Labour Court No. VII, Sukkur, dated 18‑6‑1983.

2. The facts are that the appellant was appointed on 10‑2‑1976 as Messenger in Muslim Commercial Bank Limited. He was charge‑sheeted on 13‑9‑1981. The allegations made in the charge‑sheet on .13‑9‑1981 were that the appellant obtained house building loan but had not utilized it for purchasing plot or raising construction thereon and had not executed mortgage‑deed in favour of the Bank. He had fraudulently obtained an amount of Rs.31,000 from the Bank. However, the appellant replied to this charge‑sheet and his reply letter is dated 14‑9‑1981. He admits that house building loan was sanctioned to the extent of Rs.40,000 on 8‑2‑1981. Rs.2,000 were paid to Mat. Hidayat Afroze in advance out of Rs.8,000 for purchase of the plot. Such an agreement was executed between Mat. Hidayat Afroze and the appellant, and further, an amount of Rs.20,V00 was released to the appellant by the Bank without request from him, but Mat. Afroze being a relative picked up a domestic quarrel with the appellant and after receiving an advance refused to hand over the plot to the appellant. Hence, civil suit was filed which was pending in the civil Court, then. He admits that outstanding amount of Rs.31,000 are to be paid by him and he denies the fact of misrepresentation and fraud by him. At para. 11 of the reply to the charge‑sheet, he makes a significant disclosure. He states that already in the Labour Court a petition was filed by him which was pending and the grievance therein was with regard to non‑payment of wages of overtime. This petition was against the high ups of the Bank. An enquiry against him was conducted despite his objection.

3. The reply statement of the Bank is that the appellant did not protest against the Enquiry Officer but left the enquiry without evidence and the material evidence had already come on record. The Bank raised a legal plea that the Labour Courts have no jurisdiction as Wage Commission Award regulates the terms and conditions of the employees of the Bank.

4. The appellant filed his affidavit Exh.3 and the respondent in support of his contentions filed affidavits Exhs.4 and 5.

5. The learned counsel, Mr. Abdul Hameed was heard on behalf of the appellant, while, Mr. Bashir Awan, Advocate for the respondents was not present and his application for adjournment was rejected. The impugned order was also perused.

6. The learned Labour Court framed three issues as under:‑

(i) Whether the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance are not applicable in case of the application

(ii) Whether the notice of the alleged misconduct has been given by the respondent to the applicant within time as required by law

(iii) Whether the applicant has been illegally dismissed from service

6. In respect of the first issue that Standing Orders Ordinance is not applicable by virtue of its section 1, subsection (4). The section 1, subsection (4) provides that where there are statutory rules in conducting an enquiry or taking disciplinary action, the Standing Orders Ordinance would not apply. The point is that the Wage Commission Award is only an award and the rules framed under such an award are not statutory rules. In this respect, an authority exist, namely, 1980 P L C 868. The relevant arguments as advanced by Mr. Justice (Rtd.) Z.A. Channa in this judgment are as follows:‑

"No doubt, section 38‑C provides that the decision of the Wage Commission is to be binding on all employers concerned with the decision in relating to their workers and every such worker is to be entitled to be paid the wages and governed by the terms and conditions determined by the Wage Commission, but there is no provision to the effect that the protection afforded to workers under any law will be eroded or eliminated by reason of the award of the Wage Commission. The Industrial Relations Ordinance is a beneficial piece of legislation made in the interest of workers and unless a specific provision is made curtailing the right or the remedy available to a worker under the said Ordinance, it would not be correct, in my opinion, to construe the provisions in the Ordinance relating to the Wage Commission as doing away with the rights of and the reliefs available to the workers under other laws or under other provisions of I.R.O. Even if it were assumed for arguments sake that such contention is correct then also the right of a worker to approach the Labour Court under section 25‑A, I.R.O. for enforcement of a right guaranteed to him under the award of the Wage Commission itself cannot be denied."

Reference may be had to the authorities reported in 1983 P L C 468 and 1982 P L C 683. These authorities categorically establish that the Wage Commission Awards and the Rules framed under such awards are not statutory rules. Therefore, this issue is rightly answered by the learned Labour Court. The Standing Orders Ordinance of 1968 does apply in this case.

7. As regards issue No. 2, the learned Advocate Mr. Abdul Hameed urged to the effect that the notice of the alleged misconduct was given by the respondents to the appellant much later on, whereas according to the Standing Order 15(4), the charge‑sheet is to be given within one month from the date of alleged misconduct. The witnesses of respondents, namely, Muhammad Iqbal, Exh. 4 and Noor Hussain, Exh. 5 have admitted in their knowledge in June, 1981, whereas the charge sheet was given to the appellant in September, 1981. The plea of the respondents was that the bank management referred this matter to the Circle Office at Hyderabad and had received instructions from the Circle Office at Hyderabad on or about 13‑9‑1981. What was examined by the Circle Office was exactly the previous grievance petition filed by the appellant which was pending in the Labour Court and it pertained to the overtime wages not given to the appellant. The overtime wages for which a petition was already pending considered by the Circle Office and the charge‑sheet was given on 13‑9‑1981 which was by and large late by 2/3 months. It should have been given immediately after they came to know about the misconduct in the month of June, 1981. This fact establishes that the charge‑sheet of alleged misconduct was badly time‑barred. The Labour Court has tried to bring the issue of Circle B Office opinion into consideration and I feel that it is not correct. The issues should have been answered that the charge‑sheet under section 15(4) was time‑barred.

8. Reverting to the third issue, it has been argued that the misconduct is with regard to the advance of house building loan. The house building loan was granted by the bank and further action was taken by the bank in respect of delivery of amounts. Now, it is to be seen that whether fraud of the appellant is involved in seeking for the loan for house building. The appellant states that plot was purchased from one Mst. Afroze his relative under an agreement. Due to the domestic dispute, Mst. Afroze did not give possession of the plot to the appellant although Rs.8,000 were given to Mst. Afroze. When Mst. Afroze did not deliver the possession of the plot he went into civil litigation and the evidence of civil litigation is produced in the record of the present case. This evidence is sufficient as regards the bona fide of the appellant and they need not be capitalized as misrepresentation or dishonesty on the part of the appellant. The appellant admits that the loan of Rs.31,000 was advanced to him and the recovery of this amount could be done by the bank in the normal course of its procedure either by attaching the property or filing a case in a civil Court or deducting certain amount from his pay. This was the normal way the bank should have or ought to have taken. There could not be a disciplinary action against its employee in respect of the loan advanced to him. As regards the certain applications given by the appellant which are calculated to be fraud by the Enquiry Officer are answered by him in the explanation that he gave to the charge‑sheet. It is stated by the appellant in his explanation that he is semi‑literate and certain applications have been written by the employees of the bank and he did not know what has been written. For instance, they had written that the work of construction is going on and on this plea certain amount was taken by him from the bank. But, he said that he did not know as to what was written in that application. This at most could be a misstatement as a result of his being semi‑illiterate. Actually pare. 11 of his explanation takes the lid off and it appears that his previous grievance petition for overtime wages was the cause or the motive for the domestic enquiry and his subsequent dismissal. The Circle Office at Hyderabad has considered his previous grievance petition which was pending before the Labour Court and due to this, and due to the grudge the domestic enquiry was initiated against the appellant. The domestic enquiry being badly time‑barred resulted in his dismissal. I have considered the pros and cons of this enquiry and have come to the conclusion that the enquiry was badly timed and it reflects the previous annoyance of the Circle Office. Getting a loan from the bank is not an offence and the amount is admitted by the appellant which could be recovered by other legal methods which are available to the H bank. But this enquiry of fraud initiated against the appellant is not just and is singularly unfair.

9. The result is that after considering the factual and legal aspects of the case, I set aside the order of the Labour Court and hereby order that the appellant be reinstated in service with full back benefits.

A.E Appeal accepted.