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Appeal No. GA‑548 of 1983, decided on 17th November, 1984.

(a) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑‑

‑‑‑S.O. 15(3)‑‑"Misconduct"‑‑Refusal to receive notice of termination of services‑‑Does not amount to misconduct.

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Grievance petition against termination of service‑‑Receipt of dues which cannot be paid during subsistence of service‑‑Debars workman to challenge order of removal‑‑Document not indicating details of dues‑‑Payment, in circumstances, held, does not operate as estoppel and grievance petition against terming n order would be maintainable.

Sh. Ezad Masood for Appellant.

Zafar Saleem for Respondent,

Date of hearing: 11th November, 1984.

This is an appeal preferred against the decision, dated 16‑11‑1985 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.7, Gujranwala, directing the re‑instatement of the respondent in service with back benefits.

2. The respondent was appointed as In charge Receipt and Despatch Section. His basic pay was Rs.1,100 per month. His services were terminated on 11‑2‑1982 on one month's notice for the reason that the work for which he had been employed had ended and that his work was not satisfactory. He refused to accept the delivery of the notice of termination, whereupon he was charge‑sheeted and after holding an enquiry was dismissed from service for disobedience.

3. Obviously no misconduct was committed by the respondent. Refusal to receive notice of termination of services is not covered by any clause of Standing Order 15(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, ' ' 1968. However, there is no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent was debarred from coming to the Court after having received his dues in full and final settlement of his claim. Exh.P 11 does not contain either the amount paid or the details Of the dues. The receipt of those dues that cannot be paid during the subsistence of service debars an employee to challenge the order of removal from service. Since details are not given, the payment does not operate as estoppel.

4. The most important point involved in the case is of workman. It is argued that the respondent is not a workman. The respondent said in his statement that he had been maintaining record and doing clerical and manual work but RWs‑1 and 3 controverted his statement. There were two persons under him‑‑one was a typist and the other peon. According to RW‑1, Latif Butt who was a clerk and typist used to do the clerical work. But the said typist was not examined. Usually a typist does typing. Such an employee may do clerical work if he knows it, but since Latif Butt was not examined as witness, the statement of the respondent that he used to maintain record and do clerical work with his own hands does not stand controverted. The record was with the appellant, so if in reality Mr. Latif had been doing clerical work, the work done by him could be produced to show that he and not the respondent was doing clerical work. RW‑3 gave evidence in favour of the respondent. He said that the respondent used to maintain papers and files. RW‑4 did not say anything about the maintenance of record and doing of clerical work. RW‑4, no doubt, said that the respondent used to call explanation but since maintenance of record and doing of clerical work was being done by the respondent, he did not come within exception (b) to section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Since no clerk was given for clerical work, the respondent was doing that work not of his own accord but it was his duty. The bulk of the work done by him was clerical and maintenance of record, so he was covered by the definition of workman as defined in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and Standing Orders ‑Ordinance, 1968.

5. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

A.E.

Appeal dismissed.

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