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Appeals Nos. Lhr‑236 and Lhr‑237 of 1986, decided on 15th July, 1986.

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Grievance petition‑‑Employee given extension in service for one year on completion of 55 years of age‑‑Retirement of employee after such extension challenged‑‑Estoppel‑‑Cause of action‑ Superannuation age having been raised to 60 years, even if employee had made application for extension after attaining age of 55 years, such employee, held, would not be estopped from challenging order of retirement on plea that age of superannuation was sixty years‑‑There could be no estoppel against rules‑‑Cause of grievance would arise to employee on receipt of notice of retirement.

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Grievance petition‑‑Objection to limitation‑‑Such objection not taken in written statement, held, could not be entertained at appellate stage‑‑Factually, however, cause of action would arise to employee on receipt of notice of retirement‑‑Grievance petition would be within time if period for limitation was counted from receipt of notice of retirement.

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Grievance notice, proof of‑‑Where copy of grievance notice bearing signatures of official of establishment was exhibited in evidence without any objection to such admission by establishment, it would not be necessary to examine official to whom employee delivered such grievance notice.

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑‑Grievance petition‑‑Transport employee's age of superannuation changed from 55 years to 60 years‑‑Such enhancement of age would apply to all employees of transport including workmen in absence of express notification to the contrary.

Muhammad Iqbal Khokhar for Appellant.

S.M. Kaleem, Representative for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 12th July, 1986.

The two appeals captioned above emerge from the decisions, dated 6‑3‑1986 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore, whereby the grievance petitions of the respondents against the orders of their retirement were accepted and the respondents directed to be re‑instated in service.

2. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that since one year's extension was given to the respondents on the completion of 55 years of age and they agreed to it, they were estopped from challenging the retirement order contending that the age of superannuation was sixty years. Firstly, the respondents did not make any request for the extension of their service on the completion of 55 years of age and secondly there can be no estoppel against rules. Since according to 1959 rules, age of superannuation is 60 years for all employees of the appellant, even if the respondents had made application for extension, they would not have been estopped from challenging the order of retirement on the plea that the age of superannuation was sixty years. Cause of grievance arose to the respondents when notice of retirement was issued to them and before that it was not necessary for them to make an application under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

3. It has been further argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the grievance, if any, arose to the respondents when the order of extension was issued and since they did not challenge the same by issuing grievance notices within three months and bringing grievance petition within further two and half months, the grievance notice and the grievance petition were time‑barred. Firstly, no such objection of limitation was taken up in the written statement, therefore at the appellate stage these points cannot be ascertained; secondly, an observed in the previous paragraph, cause of grievance arose to the respondents when they were actually given notice of retirement. So neither the grievance notice nor the grievance petition was time‑barred.

4. The third point argued by the learned counsel for the appellants is that service of grievance notices was not proved by the respondents since they did not examine any official to whom they allege to have delivered the grievance notices. Since the copy of the grievance notice bearing the signatures of Mr. Israr Ahmad, Assistant, was exhibited in evidence without any objection from the appellant, it was not necessary for the respondents to examine Mr. Israr Ahmed to prove the delivery. C If the appellant had objected to the admission of the document in evidence, it would have been necessary for the respondents to examine the official to whom they delivered the notices. If the appellant was of the opinion that on copies of the grievance notices the signatures in token of receipt of the same were not of Isr4r Ahmad, it was their duty to produce the said employee in evidence to deny his signatures.

5. So far as this question is concerned whether the age of superannuation was 55 years or sixty years, I have held in many cases that vide the amendment of rule 33.1 of 1959 Rules made in February, 1977 by the Board, the age of superannuation was sixty years for all the employees of the appellant. An office note was put up at the 49^th meeting held in November, 1976 that for workers the age of superannuation was 55 years under regulation 19 of 1965 Regulations. In spite of such a note the Board decided that the age of superannuation for all the employees would be sixty years. If the intention had been that only for non‑workers the age of superannuation would be sixty years, it would have been in the said meeting expressly said that regulation 19 would continue to apply to the workers and that the age of superannuation would be sixty years only for other employees. It appears that the Board was of the opinion that there should be a uniformity in the age of superannuation for every employee, therefore, without any qualification the Government Gazette whereby the age of superannuation for Government servants was raised to sixty years, I was adopted, by the Board. No doubt in the 89th meeting held on l 30‑6‑1980 the Board expressed that the age of superannuation was 55 years under regulation 19 of 1965 Regulations for the workers, but it did not make any difference because rule 33.1 was not amended. Needless to say that only the Courts have power to interpret law and the rule‑making bodies have powers to make or amend the rules. So only by amendment the Board could provide that for workers the age of superannuation would be 55 years. Since this was not done, rule 33.1 continued to apply to the workers.

6. As a result of the observations made above, both the appeals fail and are dismissed.

A. A.

Appeals dismissed.

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