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Appeals Nos. 144, 151, CA‑177, 157 and 158 of 1986, decided on 16th May, 1986.
‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑WAPDA employee seeking interim stay order against suspension order, already implemented‑‑Impugned order having become final, held, was not within jurisdiction of Labour Court but within jurisdiction of Service Tribunal.
1985 S C M R 63 rel.
‑‑‑S. 37(3)‑‑Appeal to be brought by "party aggrieved" i.e. against whom impugned decision passed by Labour Court‑‑WAPDA was sued before Labour Court through particular officer but appeal filed not through that officer but through Director Legal‑‑Advocate signing memo, of appeal not authorised to sign pleadings in Power of Attorney‑‑Appeal, in circumstances, held, improperly instituted.
‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Limitation for bringing appeal already expired, defect in presentation and institution, held, could not be cured by presence of officer through whom WAPDA sued before Labour Court hence appeal dismissed.
Ch. Ghulam Hassan Gulshan for Appellant.
Mian Mahmood Hussain for Respondent
Date of hearing: 29th April, 1986.
The five appeals captioned above arise from the judgment, dated 29‑1‑1986 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 3, Lahore at Ferozewala, whereby the grievance petitions of the respondents for setting aside the orders of suspension were accepted and they were directed to be reinstated in service with back benefits.
2. The impugned decisions have been challenged on the ground that not the Labour Court but Service Tribunal has jurisdiction. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the, appellant that in cases where the orders of suspension have taken effect, they have become final and thus the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction. He has cited 1985 S C M R 63. The suspension orders had taken effect in all the cases except the case of Syed Zakir Hussain and this the orders have become final and the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction. So far as the case of Zakir Hussain is concerned, the order was passed on 16‑4‑1985 and before it could be given effect to and the 'said respondent could be brought actually under suspension, the learned lower Court had issued an interim stay order on 4‑5‑1985 with the result that the order of suspension was not implemented and the respondent remained on duty. The said order thereafter was confirmed. Syed Zakir Hussain had filed an affidavit in the learned lower Court to the effect that the order had not been implemented and he was on duty. The said affidavit was not controverted, nor the stay application was contested by the appellant. The suspension order, therefore, was not given effect to and did not become final, therefore, the Labour Court had jurisdiction. However, so far as the other cases are concerned, .as mentioned above, the suspension orders had been given effect to.
3. Learned counsel for the respondents has raised an objection that the appeals are incompetent since they have not been brought by the officer through whom WAPDA was sued in the learned lower Court. So far as the appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 1 and 6 are concerned, WAPDA was sued in the learned lower Court through Chairman, Area Electricity Board, Gujranwala, but WAPDA has not brought the appeals through the said officer but through Director (Legal). The memo. of appeals are not signed by either the Director (Legal) or Chairman, Area Electricity Board, WAPDA, Gujranwala but are signed by Mr. Ghulam Hasan Gulshan, Advocate. The power of attorney shows that the learned counsel has not been authorised to sign the pleadings. He has been authorised to present the appeal and to argue it. So far as Muhammad Iqbal, respondent, is concerned tile grievance petition was against the Superintending Engineer, 4th Circa Electricity, WAPDA but the appeal is through Director (Legal) In the case of Bashir Ahmad and Muhammad Ashraf, the grievance [petitions were against the Superintending Engineer, Sheikhupura, Circle Electricity, WAPDA, but the appeals have been brought through Director (Legal). Since the appeals are not signed by the party against whom the learned lower Court gave the decision, nor is signed by the lawyer duly authorised to sign the same, therefore, no proper to plead before this Tribunal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that since before the learned lower Court, WAPDA was the respondent and before this Court WAPDA is the appellant in all the appeals, all appeals are proper The argument is not acceptable. In labour cases employer is to be sued since in section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the word 'employer' is used and not the factory ‑0r the establishment The officer through whom WAPDA was sued only could bring the appeals and not a different officer. In section 37(3) AT the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the words 'party aggrieved' are written which mean that only the person against whom any decialo4 has been passed can bring the appeal. Subsection (3) reads as under:‑‑
"Any party aggrieved by an award given in subsection (1) or decision given under section 25‑A or section 34 or a sentence' passed under clause (c) of subsection (5) of section 35 may prefer an appeal to the Labour Tribunal within thirty days."
5. The learned counsel has also aruged that since the Director (Legal) has appointed him as counsel in this case, he had authority to sign the memo. of appeal. This argument also is without any force because in the power of attorney no power to sign the pleadings or memo. of appeal has been given to the learned counsel. Since the period of limitation for bringing the appeal has expired, now the defect cannot be cured by presence of the officer through whom WAPDA was sued in the learned lower Court to sign the memo. of appeal. A valuable right by lapse of time has accrued to the respondents, which cannot be denied.
6. As a result of the observations made above, appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 are dismissed on account of being improperly instituted and the appeal mentioned at serial No. 3 is dismissed on merits as well as on the ground that it was not brought properly.
A. E.
Appeal dismissed.
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