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Appeal No. SG‑90 of 1986/Pb. , decided on 17th May, 1986.

‑‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 49‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI, R. 1‑ Termination of service, grievance petition‑‑Dismissal of‑‑Appeal against‑‑Civil Procedure Code, held, would not apply to labour cases‑ Appeal against dismissal of grievance petition could be filed in terms of S.49 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969‑‑Labour leaders could represent workers in proceedings under Ordinance XXIII of 1969‑‑Legal practitioners, however, could represent workers with permission of Court.

‑‑‑S. 49(3)‑‑Phrase "represent in any proceedings", connotation of‑‑Such phrase, held, could not be stretched to include filing of cases or signing pleadings or memo. of appeal without special authority‑‑Counsel could act only to extent of authority granted by his client and not beyond that.

‑‑‑S. 49(3)‑‑Memo. of appeal filed without signature of worker‑‑Effect‑‑Where memo. of appeal was not signed by worker but by his counsel, no proper appeal, held, would be before Tribunal‑‑Period for bringing appeal having been expired, a valuable right by lapse of time would accrue to respondent which could not be denied by allowing appellant to put his signatures on memo. of appeal after such expiry.

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Grievance petition found to be filed within time‑‑No cross -objections against such findings filed by respondent‑‑Plea not raised in cross‑objections about grievance petition being time‑barred, finding thereon, held, could not be objected to.

Malik Muhammad Nawaz for Appellant.

M. Iqbal for Respondent No. 1.

Nemo for Respondent No. 2.

Ch. Ali Muhammad for Respondent No. 3.

Date of hearing: 11th May, 1985.

This is an appeal challenging the decision, dated 13‑12‑1985 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 5, Faisalabad Camp at Sargodha, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his promotion as Assistant Superintendent Fire Brigade was dismissed.

2. An objection has been raised on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 3 that no proper appeal is before this Tribunal, inasmuch as the memo. of appeal is not signed by the appellant himself but by his counsel who was not authorised in that behalf. Perusal of power of attorney display that authority to file appeal was given but not to prefer the appeal or to sign the memo. of appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to meet the objection by arguing that it is not necessary that the appellant should have himself signed the memo. of appeal. He has made reference to Order XLI rule 1 of the C.P.C. which states that the memo. of appeal may be signed by the appellant or his pleader. The words 'or his pleader' mean the pleader who has been duly authorised in that behalf. Apart from it C. P. C. is not applicable to labour cases and there is no provision in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 that an appeal can be signed by the counsel for the appellant. Section 49 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance authorises the labour leaders to represent the workers in the proceedings running under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. It is not mentioned that the lawyers can represent the workers. According to clause (3) of section 49 legal practitioners can represent with the permission of the Court. The words 'represent in any proceeding' clearly mean that where certain proceedings are pending in a Labour Court, the labour leaders can in such proceedings represent the workers. Proceedings come into existence after a grievance petition or a petition under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or an appeal has been brought. The words represent in any proceedings' cannot be stretched to include the filing ‑of cases or signing the pleadings or memo. of appeal without special l authority. When the office holders of a C.B.A. cannot lodge proceedings with their own signatures how the legal practitioners have authority to lodge appeal with their own signatures in the absence of any express authority in that behalf. Needless to say that a lawyer can act only to the extent he has been authorised by his client and not beyond that Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to cite any authority wherein it may have been held that in labour cases petitions or appeal can be lodged by lawyers with their own signatures in the absence of any express authority from the party which engaged them. Feeling the difficulty, learned counsel for the appellant has during arguments made a miscellaneous application for permission to get the signatures of the appellant on the memo. of appeal. I am afraid now it has become too late. The period for bringing the appeal has expired since long. A valuable right by lapse of time has accrued to the respondents, which cannot be denied to them by allowing the appellant to put his signatures on the memo. of appeal at this late stage.

3. However, the learned lower Court has wrongly held that the service of grievance notice was not established. Copy of the grievance notice is Exh. P. 9 and the appellant deposed before the learned lower Court that he had sent the grievance notice. This piece of evidence of the appellant was not controverted by the respondents. No doubt the postal or the A.D. receipt was not tendered in evidence but that was due to the mistake of the counsel. The appellant has in his possession even today the postal and the A.D. receipts. They cannot have brought on the file since no application for additional evidence has been given. Since I am satisfied that the appellant did serve a grievance notice, the finding of the learned lower Court on the point is not maintainable.

4. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the grievance petition is time‑barred. The finding of the learned lower Court on the point is in favour of the appellant and since no cross objections have been filed on behalf of the respondents, the point raised cannot be entertained.

5. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, minimum qualification for promotion to the post of Assistant Superintendent Fire Brigade is Matriculate according to the rules of Municipal Corporation and since the appellant is only a Middle pass, he could not claim promotion. It has been argued that according to rules, every vacancy is to be filled in by promotion unless the Municipal Corporation decides that certain vacancies can be filled in by direct appointment and that it has not been shown by the respondents that any resolution was passed by the Committee to the effect that the post of Assistant Superintendent Fire Brigade can be filled in by direct appointment. The relevant rule in this behalf is No. 8. Since the appellant had challenged the appointment of respondent No. 3, the onus was upon him to prove that no resolution was passed to fill in the vacancy by direct appointment. Such an objection has been raised at the appellate stage. The respondents, therefore, were unaware and for this reason may not have brought on the record the resolution. In the absence of any evidence that no resolution has yet been passed, it is difficult to hold that no vacancy by direct appointment can be filled in. If such an objection had been clearly raised in the grievance petition or in the evidence, of course the onus would have been upon the respondents to prove the existence of such a resolution. The case of the appellant throughout was that he too had made an application but he was not called for the interview. He thus did not challenge the suit of the respondent to fill in the vacancy by direct appointment. However, the appellant can ask for being considered for promotion in the next vacancy.

6. As a result of the observations made above, the appeal is dismissed.

A. A. Appeal dismissed.

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