Find a Lawyer

Appeal No. LHR‑68 of 1985, decided on 21st October, 1'985.

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Grievance notice‑‑Limitation runs from date cause of grievance comes to knowledge of petitioner‑‑Petitioner convicted and sentenced to imprisonment‑ Termination order allegedly sent through Jail vide Postal Certificate‑‑‑ Certificate produced not bearing signatures of Postmaster or any Postal authority‑‑No employee of Post Office examined to prove such document‑‑Service of order, held, not proved and grievance notice served after release of petitioner and date of his knowledge of impugned order within prescribed limitation period, held, not time‑barred.

1983 P L C 291; 1983 P L C 1084; 1985 P L C (C.S.) 515; 1980 PLC 765; 1980 P L C 510; 1983 P L C 392; 1984 P L C 557; 1975 P L C 818; 1975 P L C 313 and 1979 P L C 509 held not applicable.

‑‑‑Termination of service‑‑‑Workman involved in criminal case of murder sent to judicial lock up and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment‑ Termination of service on grounds that post according to nature of work could not be kept vacant for indefinite period‑‑Termination order, in circumstances, held, not wrong but workman entitled to one month's pay in lieu of notice.

1983 P L C 1084; 1985 P L C (C:S.) 515; 1980 P L C 765; 1980 P L C 510; 1983 P L C 392; 1984 P L C 557; 1975 P L C 818; 1975 PLC 313 held not applicable.

Appellant in person.

Sair Ali for the Respondent.

Date of hearing: 7th October, 1985.

The decision, dated 12‑12‑1984 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.2, Lahore has been challenged, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his reinstatement in service was dismissed.

2. The services of the appellant were terminated on the ground, that he had been involved in a murder case and sent to judicial lock up and his post, according to the nature of work, could not be kept vacant for an indefinite period. The order of termination of services is Exh. R‑8 dated 14‑4‑1980. It was sent firstly at the home address of the appellant but when it came back undelivered, it is alleged to have been sent to him through jail vide postal certificate Exh.R‑4.

3. The learned lower Court has held that the termination of services was conveyed to the appellant in the first or second week of July 1980, so the grievance notice dated 20‑11‑1982 and the grievance petition presented on 16‑12‑1982 were time‑barred. It has also been held that the respondent was justified in terminating the services of the appellant as the latter had been involved in a murder case and his post could not be kept vacant.

4. It has been wrongly held that the order of termination was conveyed to the appellant through jail. Exh.R‑4 is not a postal certificate issued by any post office. It does not bear the signatures of any Postmaster or any other postal authority. In the bottom on the left is 50 paisas' postage stamp and it does not stand defaced by any post office seal. On the right is the seal of Gulberg Colony Post Office, Lahore but the document does not bear the signatures of any postal authority, nor does it appear that it was issued by the post office. On the top is the seal of the respondent. Even the name of the appellant appears to have been added afterwards. No employee of the post office was examined to prove the document. Since no intimation of termination of services was sent to the appellant, so from the date of knowledge the grievance notice and the grievance petition are within time and the learned lower Court has wrongly held that they are time‑barred.

5. However, this is an admitted fact that the appellant was arrested and sent to judicial lock up, where he remained for about three years and was there at the time his services were terminated. The respondent was, therefore, justified in not waiting for him and keeping his post vacant for indefinite period. He, no doubt, applied for leave vide EXh.P.l, but it was received after his services had been terminated. I do not find any force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the order of termination of services was passed after the appellant was released from jail on being acquitted from the High Court. He says that the order of termination Exh.R‑8 was not actually sent to the appellant and is a fabricated one. The reason given by the learned counsel is that it does not bear the serial number of despatch register. This is true that despatch number is not given but the envelope Exh. R‑2 in which it was sent, bears the seal of the post office which carries the date as 16‑4‑1980. If the termination order had been passed after the appellant was acquitted Exh.R‑2 envelope would not have borne the seal of the post office. This is idle to say that some other letter was sent in envelope Exh.R‑2 and after it was received back the envelope was utilized falsely to show that in it Exh.R‑8 was sent. It has been argued that Exh.R‑7 report is to the effect that the appellant was absent, therefore, charge sheet of absence may have been sent in Exh.R‑2. There is no scope to say so, because other employee of the respondent made report on Exh.R‑7 that the appellant had been arrested in a murder case. Moreover, no suggestion was given to any PW that earlier to 16‑4‑1980 charge‑sheet was sent in Exh.R‑2. The other argument advanced is that if the respondent had in reality come to know that the appellant had been arrested, Exh.R‑8 would not have been sent at his home address but through the jail. This argument too is without any basis. No such question was put to the RW to get explanation for not sending Exh.R‑8 through jail. Probably the respondent was not aware of the full particulars of the case such as F.I.R. number or challan number if by that time the appellant had been challaned. So, Exh.R‑8 could be sent at the permanent address available with the respondent.

6. The other point raised is that this is wrong that the post of the appellant could not be kept vacant. The ground given by the learned counsel in support of his argument is that no evidence was produced as to who had been appointed in place of the appellant. So far as the appellant is concerned, it is argued that since Exhs. R‑7 and R‑8 were presented after the appellant had closed his case, so there was no occasion for him to produce evidence that the post was lying vacant. No doubt Exh.R‑7 and Exh.R‑8 were produced in the evidence of RW‑1 but much prior to that the order of termination was reproduced verbatim in the written statement. So the appellant knew before he close his case that on account of his involvement in the murder case and his arrest, his services had been terminated to employ another person in his place to be saved from loss of production. So, there was opportunity for the appellant to show that the post was lying vacant.

7. The last argument is that the provisions of Standing Order 8 of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 were not complied with by giving any reply to the leave application EXh.P.l. The answer is simple that Standing Order 3 applies, where the man is in service. Since the appellant had been removed from service before Exh.P‑1 was received, it was not necessary to give reply and to open the chapter of correspondence.

8. Few lines with regard to the rulings cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. 1983 P L C 291 is not relevant. It was held that the presumption of service of charge‑sheet does not arise when it was sent under postal certificate. Likewise 1983 P L C 1084 is not germane to the case in hand. Not for not keeping the post vacant but on account of being convicted and sentenced in a criminal case the workman was dismissed without being charge‑sheeted and holding inquiry. Same may be said about 1985 P L C (C. S.) 515. No opportunity of cross‑examination was given in the inquiry. It was not a case of termination of services for not keeping the post vacant but on account of misconduct the employee was removed from service. 1980 P L C 765 too is not relevant as it was a case of long absence and not having been arrested in e criminal case. In 1980 P L C 510 question of limitation was involved, so not relevant likewise in 1983 P L C 392 question of limitation only was involved. 1984 P L C 557 was a case of absence, so is not relevant. 1975 P L C 818 was a case of misconduct arid not of termination of services on the ground for not keeping the post vacant. In 1975 P L t. 313, wherein it is held that the award based upon the opinion of the Court is not a substitute for evidence. 1979 P L C 509 and 502 too are not germane as the observation is that service under postal certificate is no service. This is clear that none of the rulings cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is relevant to the present case.

9. In view of what has been said above, it is concluded that the services of the appellant were rightly terminated. However, he can recover one month's pay in lieu of notice as mentioned in the order of termination.

10. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

A.E.

Appeal dismissed.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.