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Civil Revision No. 669 of 1986, decided on 1st November, 1986.

‑‑‑Agreement of lease‑‑Expressions doranay muddat and baad alkazai muddat and connotation of‑‑Expression doranay muddat used in agreement between parties, held, would be pragmatic and invokable during subsistence of lease‑‑Such expression would have no application where duration of lease had already expired‑‑Expression baad alkazai muddat viz. expiring of term, used in agreement, wherein a lease‑holder had undertaken to deliver vacant possession would not create vested right in such lease‑holder to retain possession thereof and lessor would be entitled to get vacant possession of such property.

‑‑Relationship of‑‑Payment of rent, lease money or compensation for use and occupation, held, could not change complexion of relations because it was obligation of person in possession to pay for same‑‑A lessee would have no right to ask for perpetuation of his lease.

‑‑‑S. 115‑‑Revisional jurisdiction, exercise of‑‑Where after expiry of duration of lease, lessee sought ad interim injunction to retain possession of leased property, having no vested right therein, High Court declined to interfere with order of Appellate Court whereby such injunction was refused.

‑‑‑Compensation for improvement‑‑Lease‑holder occupying property under an agreement for a specified period‑‑Lessee spending considerable amount on improvement of property‑‑Lessee, held, should have kept period of lease in view while spending such amount on property‑‑Lessee would be deemed to have done it at his own risk.

Ch. Mushtaq Masood for Petitioner.

Dr. Mohyuddin Qazi for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 21st October, 1986.

This revision calls in question an order, dated 13‑3‑1986 of the Additional District Judge, Sargodha, whereby he accepted the respondent's appeal and dismissed the petitioner's application for ad interim injunction.

2. The petitioner‑plaintiff had obtained lease of the plot in question forming a part of the road‑berm in an open auction conducted by the respondent‑Municipal Corporation, Sargodha on 20‑4‑1978, initially for a year, but it was extended upto 12‑5‑1985. He being a medical practitioner installed a clinic thereon. The Corporation after the expiry of the extended lease period refused to accept the rent from the petitioner and asked him to vacate the site because the respondent S.M. Sharif had been able in the meantime to obtain the contiguous plot bearing N0.760‑A from the Housing Department to install a petrol pump whereas the petitioner's clinic obstructed access of the vehicles to it.

3. The petitioner brought the present suit for declaration that he was entitled to the transfer of the Plot No.760‑A being already in its possession as lessee under the Corporation; that its allotment to the respondent S. M. Sharif was void and ineffective against his interest; that termination of his lease by the letter dated 22‑8‑1985 of the respondent Mayor was mala fide, without jurisdiction and opposed to law. He prayed for a temporary injunction in order to restrain the respondents from demolishing his building or dispossessing him otherwise.

4. The suit as also the petition were opposed. The respondents maintained primarily that the petitioner has no vested right in the site and that after the termination of the lease he was bound under the terms thereof to deliver vacant possession to the Corporation and that the suit did not lie.

5. The trial Court granted the petitioner temporary injunction restraining the respondents from vacating the site, but the learned Additional District Judge in appeal reversed the order and dismissed the petitioner's application. Aggrieved by it he preferred the present revision.

6. Mr. Mushtaq Masood, Advocate for the petitioner laid considerable stress on Condition No.5 of the Agreement at page 49 whereby possession could have been taken from the petitioner if the site was needed for Provincial or Central Government Improvement Trust or any other Agency requiring it for public interest. He maintained that since the main idea behind his eviction was to accommodate the interest of respondent S.M. Sharif to enable him to operate his petrol pump, it was not covered by the terms of Item 5 of the Agreement, referred to above, and, therefore, the whole action was wrong. This argument was repelled by the learned Additional District Judge and was opposed before me for respondents on the ground that it applied if the lease was still existing. The expression " doranay muddat " used in the agreement in the context was really pragmatic and was invokable if the lease subsisted. The corollary was that it had no application when the duration of the lease expired. It is not denied by the petitioner that his lease initially meant for year to year, was lastly extended in lump sum for 5 years till 12‑5‑1985. In other words, the lease ended and the stipulation of terminating i earlier for those objects was quite irrelevant. At the same time it w' mean that after the expiry of lease there could be no possible hindrance in the way of the lessor to get vacant possession of the site. Indeed clause No.9 of the Agreement clearly provided for such a contingency where the petitioner had clearly undertaken to deliver vacant possession baad alkazai muddat viz. expiry of the term. The contention that he had a vested right to get the transfer of the adjoining plot from the Government, is neither here nor there. He was never even an applicant for it, nor could the Corporation deal with it as it vested with the Provincial Government. The respondent on the other hand had purchased it after paying a huge sum of 89.4,36,000. Installation of petrol pump was sanctioned in his favour by quite a few agencies which must have necessarily kept in view its location and accessability to vehicular traffic.) To say that it was not in public interest, was highly doubtful because the service of refueling was a public interest.

7. It was urged that the Corporation had received rent probably for a month beyond the date of expiry and had thereby tacitly agreed to the continuance of the lease. Payment of rent or lease money or compensation for use and occupation cannot change the complexion of the relations because it is always the obligation of the person in possession to pay for it. So, was held in Karachi Municipal Corporation v. Moosa M. Adam and 4 others P L D 1972 Kar. 571. If the respondent Corporation had really decided to further extend the lease, they could have done in some overt way as they had been doing earlier. Their letter forming cause of action clearly reveals that they had consciously decided to put an end to the lease and get the site vacated. The petitioner was after all a lessee and cannot ask for its perpetuation for any reason. The stipulations under which he entered upon the site were more than clear. and he should not have entertained any misgivings about his right to prolong it against the consent of the lessor. No doubt he may have spent considerable amount in raising his clinic on it, but the tenure of the lease may not have been lost sight of. He did at his own risk and may not blame others for it.

8. There is no substance in the revision petition and the same is dismissed.

A.A. Revision dismissed.

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