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Writ Petition No‑1802 of,1985, decided on 10th February, 1986.

‑‑‑S.22(4)‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199‑‑Pre‑emption suit‑‑Deposit of Zar‑e‑Panjum, furnishing of security‑‑Failure to deposit‑Effect‑‑Trial Court, held, was required to give direction to pre‑emptor before settlement of s ices to deposit either Zar‑e‑Panjum or to give security‑‑Failure to comply with direction, however, would attract penal provision of S.22(4) of Act I of 1913‑‑Non‑availability of security bond on file, submitted as per order of Court, would not attract penal provision‑‑Subsequent order regarding deposit of Zar‑e‑Panjum would not be called for‑‑Invoking of Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court on question of fact would be misconceived in circumstances.

Rana Abdul Majid for Petitioners.

Ahmad Awais for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 10th February, 1986.

The facts forming background of this writ petition are as follows: On 20‑2‑1971 respondent No.1 filed a suit for pre‑emption in respect of a sale of agricultural land. On 27‑2‑1971 the trial Court called upon him to give security in terms of section 22(1) of the Pre‑emption Act. The date within which the security was to be given was not specified. Unfortunately, the suit is still pending. However, that may be, more than ten years later, it was discovered that the security bond was not traceable on the record. On 15‑11‑1981 respondent No.1 moved an application alleging that he had submitted a security bond in terms of the order of the Court, but that it had been got removed or misplaced by the vendees and that he should be permitted to furnish a fresh bond. This application was resisted by the vendees. To dispose of the application and to record a decision on the objections raised by the vendees the leaned trial Judge framed two issues which were:‑--

(1) Whether the petitioner (plaintiff) had deposited the surety in Court in complying (sic) with the order of the Court, dated 27‑2‑1971 and

(2) Whether there are sufficient grounds for the petitioner (plaintiff) to deposit a fresh security in lieu of Zar-e‑Panjum

After considering the evidence led by the parties the learned trial Judge held that respondent No.1 had in fact furnished a security bond in terms of the orders of the Court. Nevertheless, he directed respondent No.1 to deposit Zar‑e‑Panjum in view of the fact that the bond was not available on the record. The vendees challenged the order of the trial Court in revision before the Additional District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge did not interfere with the order of the trial Court but directed it to hold an inquiry into the loss of the security bond and then make a report to the competent authority for taking necessary action. The vendees have filed this writ petition to challenge the orders of the learned Additional District Judge and the trial Court.

2. In support of this writ petition, it is contended that the order of the trial Court in directing respondent No.1 to deposit Zar‑e‑Panjum was illegal inasmuch as no such order could be made after the settlement of issues under section 22(1) of the Pre‑emption Act. In my opinion this contention is entirely misconceived. Under the said provision the trial Court was required to give a direction to the pre‑emptor before the settlement of issues to deposit either Zar‑e‑Panjum or to give security. Failure to comply with the direction would have attracted the penal provisions of subsection (4) of the same section. The trial Court did issue a direction under section 22(1) and asked respondent No.1 to furnish security. According to the finding of the trial Court this direction was complied with by respondent No.1 by furnishing a bond. This is a finding of fact which cannot be reopened in writ jurisdiction. The mere fact that' the security bond submitted by respondent No.1 is no longer available on the record would not attract the penal provision of section 22(4). The order regarding the deposit of Zar‑e‑Panjum was, therefore, not really called for. It. is also to be noticed that if any person who could have possibly complained about it was respondent No.1. He has not elected to do so. I do not see how the petitioners can be said to be aggrieved by the said order for now they have an amount lying in the Court from which they can recover their expenses of litigation in the event the suit of respondent No.1 fails. The writ petition is entirely misconceived and is hereby dismissed with costs.

A . A . Petition dismissed.

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