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Civil Petition No. 259‑R of 1985, decided on 3rd July, 1985.
(From the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 10‑3‑1985, passed in Writ Petition No.212 of 1983).
West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)‑‑
‑‑S.15‑‑Constituiion of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199‑‑Ejectment‑ Interference by High Court in writ jurisdiction ‑‑Ejectment granted by Rent Controller‑‑Order reversed in appeal but restored in writ jurisdiction‑‑Plea that High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, could not interfere with a finding of fact recorded by appellate forum, not sustained, because view taken by appellate Court was not only contrary to established principles of law but also to evidence on record‑ High Court, held, was competent and justified to have interfered in its writ jurisdiction, with appellate order in circumstances‑‑Leave to appeal refused.
Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail P L D 1981 S C 246 distinguished.
(b) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)‑‑
‑‑‑S.15‑‑Constitutipn of Pakistan (1973), Art.199‑‑Writ jurisdiction‑ Interference with appellate order‑ Ejectment‑.‑‑High Court interference with appellate order‑‑Plea that finding of fact recorded by appellate forum could not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction, repelled‑‑Contention could prevail if appellate forum had not flouted provisions of statute or failed to follow law relating thereto‑‑Where view taken was not only contrary ,to established principles of law but also to evidence on record, High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, was held, competent and justified to have interfered with appellate order.
Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail P L D 1981 S C 246 Distinguished.
Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Ch. Akhtar Ali Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
Mian Inamul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Ghulam Dastgir, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent No.1.
Date of hearing: 3rd July, 1985.
‑ This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a case of ejectment under the Rent Restriction Law. The ejectment of the petitioner had been sought on the grounds of (1) default in payment of rent for the period from May 1978 to May 1979 and (2) personal need. Both the grounds having been accepted, his ejectment was ordered by the Controller but on appeal the findings were reversed and the ejectment petition dismissed. The appellate order was, however, interfered with by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction and the order of ejectment was restored.
2. The contention is that the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction could not interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the appellate forum. For this, reliance was placed on Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail P L D 1981 S C 246. But the contention could prevail if, as observed in this cited case, the appellate forum had not flouted the provisions of the statute or failed to follow the law relating thereto as laid down by the superior Courts. No tender of rent in time for the alleged period of default had been made on the excuse that the landlord had refused to issue receipts. On this, the view‑ taken by the appellate authority was that no receipt having ever been issued, the question of paying rent did not arise and that as such there was no question of any default on the part of the petitioner. On the question of personal need, the appellate authority held that the landlady being all alone was not in a position to live at Rawalpindi and that her story of strained relations with her daughter‑in‑law was coined only to provide some substance to her plea. Obviously the view taken was not only contrary to the established principles of law but also to the evidence on record. The High Court was, therefore, in its writ jurisdiction competent and justified to have interfered with the appellate order. No case is made out for grant of leave to appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner then sought some time to vacate the premises. There being no objection on behalf of the respondent, we, while dismissing the petition, allow two months time to the petitioner, on the expiry of which he shall voluntarily surrender possession to the respondent.
M.I. Petition dismissed.
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