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Civil Petition No. K‑64 of 1984, decided on 3rd June, 1984.

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the Federal Service Tribunal Camp at Karachi, dated 23‑11‑1983 passed in Appeal No. 36 (K) of 1981).

‑‑‑S. 212(3)‑‑Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance (XIII of 1978), S. 3‑‑Removal from service‑‑Leave to appeal granted to consider following contentions raising legal questions of general importance: (i) Finding of Service Tribunal that appeal was barred by limitation proceeding on surmises and conjectures inasmuch as decision on departmental petition of petitioner was not received by him. (ii) Removal of petitioner from service was contrary to provisions of Ordinance XIII of 1978 as no evidence was produced to show that authority had applied its mind to question whether removal of petitioner was in public interest or not; and (iii) Law made no provisions for removal of incumbent on ground that post was not advertised and no selection procedure was adopted in accordance with rules, muchless on ground that appointment was political in nature.

S.A. Abass, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 3rd June, 1984.

‑‑ The petitioner was appointed as Deputy Manager Personnel by the Board of Trustees, Karachi Port Trust, on 28‑5‑1977. Subsequently the petitioner's appointment was approved by the Government of Pakistan on 10‑6‑1977. He was thereafter confirmed on successfully completing the probationary period and was also granted increment in his salary on 18‑2‑1979. However, the petitioner, was removed from service by the Secretary, Ministry of Communications, Government of Pakistan in exercise of powers under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978 vide letter, dated 28‑1‑1979 published in the Gazette of Pakistan on 19‑3‑1978. He filed a representation which was dismissed and according to the petitioner was communicated to him on 3‑5‑1981. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal which has been dismissed by a judgment, dated 17‑11‑1983.

2. The office has raised an objection that the present petition is barred by‑ 9 days However, the learned counsel submits that as would appear from the copy of the letter issued by the Assistant Registrar of the Service Tribunal, dated 23‑11‑1983 enclosing the copy of the judgment, it was receiving by the petition on 4‑12‑1983, and hence the petition having been presented in this Court on 1‑2‑1984 is within time. The submission of the learned counsel appears to be prima facie correct.

3. On the merits it has been urged by the learned counsel that the finding of the Service Tribunal that the appeal before it was barred by limitation proceeds on surmises and conjectures. In this connection it is argued that the letter, dated 24‑5‑1980 whereby the decision on the departmental petition of the petitioner is supposed to have been communicated to him was not in fact received by him, as also because no such statement was made before the High Court on behalf of the Karachi Port Trus, in a Writ Petition filed by the petitioner in regard to the disposal of his representation. It is next contended by the learned counsel that the removal of the petitioner from service is contrary to the provisions of Ordinance 1978 inasmuch as, no evidence was produced that the authority had applied his mind to the question whether the removal of the petitioner was in public interest or not. There is nothing in the impugned order of removal to that effect nor was any record produced before the Service Tribunal to indicate that this question was taken into consideration. The only reference to the record in the judgment of the Service Tribunal is in connection with the Minister of Communications having appointed the petitioner and waiving the condition of experience. The Service Tribunal, it is urged, took upon itself to furnish the grounds in support of the removal by observing that the post was not advertised and no selection procedure was adopted in accordance with the rules. It is forcefully contended that the law made no provisions for removal of incumbents on such grounds, muchless on the ground that the appointment was political in nature but the competent authority had to be satisfied that the removal of the incumbent was in public interest.

4. The contentions advanced by the learned counsel raise legal questions of general importance. We, therefore, allow this petition and grant leave to appeal, subject however, to all just exceptions as to limitation.

M.I. Leave granted.

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