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Application No.1 of 1984, decided on 16th February, 1984.

‑‑‑S.34‑‑Trade Union/ Collective Bargaining Agent‑‑Seeking relief in representative capacity‑‑Worker transferred to new organization with assurance that it has stepped into shoes of former worker to perform all functions thereof‑‑Office, staff, machinery, premises and management remained unchanged‑‑Workers forced to resign and seek fresh appointment‑‑Violation of guaranteed and secured rights of workers involved‑‑Action challenged before Labour Court with prayer for injunction‑‑Respondent's contention about lack of jurisdiction repelled‑ Held: Forcing workers to resign indicates mala fides of respondent‑ Petitioners have prima facie case‑‑Passing of interlocutory order to maintain status quo was within jurisdiction of Labour Court.

P L D 1973 Kar. 189; 1981 P L C 737; 1982 P L C 444 and Petition No. 124 of 1983 held not applicable.

P L D 1975 Kar. 858 rel.

Ch. Rashid Ahmad for Applicant.

Samiullah Khan, Representative for Respondents.

Briefly the facts of the case are that the applicant is a registered trade union of workmen and has been certified as a Collective Bargaining Agent. In its representative capacity, the applicant union is entitled to espouse the common and general cause of the workers. Originally, all the workers of the respondent‑Company were the workers of Ali Autos. After President's Order No.1 of 1972 (Economic Reforms Order, 1972) the said Company was nationalized and the respondent‑Company came into existence and took over. The services of all the employees' were continued and all 945 workers enjoyed all such facilities and benefits including security of service as were provided under the Economic Reforms Order, 1972. It is said that the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 are applicable to the workers employed by the respondents and have secured and guaranteed rights under the law. They could be transferred and terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. (On 3‑1‑1984, it is said that about 273 employees were transferred from the respondent‑establishment to Messrs Sind Engineering Limited). On 4/5‑1‑1984 it is said that, an office order was circulated amongst the workers by the Managing Director of the respondent informing all the workers that all the functions performed by the respondent i.e. Awami Autos Limited will. be performed by the Pak Suzuki Motor Company Limited from 15‑1‑1984. The workers were also informed that the Pak Suzuki Motor Company Limited being a separate entity has agreed to absorb in employment all the employees working in Awami Autos Ltd. However they were informed that the absorption will be effected on the day following the employees have separated themselves from the employment of Awami Autos Limited. The employees were advised to resign from the services of Awami Autos Limited and obtain letter of employment from the General Manager (A & P), Pak Suzuki Motor Company Limited latest by 8‑1‑1984. This was, however, not made applicable to the employees of Lahore and Rawalpindi Branches.

A pro forma was also distributed amongst the workers, requiring them to sign the same as token of resignation from the service of the respondent and seeking service with the Pak Suzuki Motor Company Limited. It is alleged by the petitioner that this was got signed from number of workers by force and under coercion. The petitioner represented to the respondent complaining of the uncalled for action which was replied to on 8‑1‑1984. The petitioner also approached the Joint Director Labour Central Division, Karachi where joint meetings were held but all in vain. The respondent, it is said have violated guaranteed and secured rights of the workers hence this petition for redress.

Alongwith this petition under section 34 of I.R.O., 1969 an application under section 39 rules 1 & 2 read with section 151, C.P.C. and section 36 of the I.R.O., 1969 was filed for restraining the respondents from implementing the order dated 4‑1‑1984 directing the workers to tender their resignations and accepting fresh appointments and to restrain the respondents to act upon the resignations obtained by force.

On 12‑1‑1984 status quo was ordered to be maintained by the parties and notice was issued to the respondents. The respondents contested this application and have filed counter‑affidavit of the General Manager (A & P). Rejoinder has also been filed by the petitioner.

I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at a great length and perused the record. Also perused the present application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 & 2, C.P.C. read with section 36 of the I.R.O., 1969 and the affidavits of the parties filed therefore.

Before I proceed any further I must say that this matter involves the case of two sets of workers. The first those 893 out of 945 workers who have resigned and obtained employment with the Pak Suzuki Motor Limited. The other is of the remaining workers who have not yet resigned.

In the earlier case it can only be said that since they have resigned no relief by way of this application could be granted to them. The question of dismissal, discharge or resigning in the present circumstances, proper or improper is beyond the scope of section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969. Consequently, nor interim relief can be ‑granted to them by way of this application. I, therefore, recall my order in respect of this set of workers. The injunction application stands dismissed in respect of said workers who have resigned from the employment of the respondents.

Now I come to the other set of workers who stand represented by the petitioner. The objection has been raised by the learned Representative for the respondents as to the jurisdiction of this Court to grant of injunction /interim order. Even the maintainability of the main application under section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969 has been challenged.

Since both these points are crucial I propose to decide them first. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that the petitioner cannot resort to section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969. Consequently this Court could not pass any ad interim order in the shape of injunction or status quo. He has placed reliance on P L D 1973 Kar. 189 a Division Bench Decision. Reliance has next been placed on 1981 P L C 737 and 1982 P L C 444. He has also placed before me the recent decision of the Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi given on 25‑1‑1984. It is argued by Mr. Samiullah Khan that in these authorities the law has been settled that the Labour Courts will have no jurisdiction to certain any application under section 34 of the I.R.O., 1969 nor can it pass any interim order for restraining the respondents to take a particular action. The Authority reported in P L D 1973 Kar. 189 pertains to an individual case and not a case of C.B.A. Admittedly, the petitioner is a registered C.B.A. hence could come under section 34 of I.R.O., 1969. Had it been a case of an individual worker the said authority would be applicable. The other two authorities viz. 1981 P L C 737 and 1982 P L C 444 are in respect of matters under section 25‑A of I.R.O., 1969 and of individual grievances. As already mentioned the instant case before me is of a Collective Bargaining Agent and not of an individual worker. These authorities, too, are, not favour-able to the respondents and are not applicable to the present case. The last and final authority which has been relied upon is the decision given by the Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi on 25‑1‑1984 in Petition No. 124 of 1983. In that decision I find that it pertains to a case of an individual worker who had come for relief before the said Court and my learned brother relied on the said authorities rightly in modifying his earlier order. This decision does not help the respondent at all. Thus I find that this Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate into the matter and could pass an interim order.

The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this proposition has placed reliance on the authority reported in P L D 1975 Kar. 858. It is argued by Mr. Ch. Rashid Ahmad, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that this Court was within its means to pass an interim order and the maintenance of status quo was justified as the respondents were acting against the union as a whole and depriving its members of secured and guaranteed rights. I have carefully gone through this authority. The authority reported in P L D 1973 Kar. 189 has been referred and it has been settled that passing of interlocutory order to maintain status quo was within the jurisdiction of Labour Courts. The said authority pertains to a union hence applicable in this case.

On the merits of the application I find that the letter dated 4‑1‑1984 on the one hand speaks of absorption of service and on the other hand it speaks of resignation and fresh appointment. It is also contended by the learned counsel of the petitioner that in fact the new Company i.e. Pak Suzuki Company Limited has stepped into the shoes of the Awami Autos only in respect of the Motor assembly plant. The office including the staff is the same. The machinery is the same. The premises is the same. So much so that the Management is the same. Hence forcing the workers to resign from Awami Autos and seek fresh appointment in its counter‑part indicates the mala fides of the respondent. All these issues can be considered only when the matter proceeds. The petitioner thus have a prima facie case and in case the earlier order is vacated the petitioner will be seriously prejudiced. I, therefore, confirm the earlier order and direct that it shall continue till disposal of this matter.

In order to make it clear, I once again mention that this order of status quo shall not apply in case of the workers who have already resigned and sought fresh appointment.

M. I.

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