Find a Lawyer

Appeals Nos. KAR‑100 to 116 of 1984, heard on 14th January, 1985.

‑‑ Promotion or passing training course for promotion ‑ Not a guaranteed or secured right under Labour Laws‑Cannot be claimed by way of grievance petition under S. 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969‑Railway employees (Gangmen) promoted pro visionally as Assistant Works Inspector and deputed for Training Course essential for such promotion‑Training Course subsequently postponed ‑ Postponement of Training Course challenged before Labour Court by way of grievance petition‑No right secured or guaranteed, held, violated and order of Labour Court dismissing grievance petition maintained by Appellate Tribunal‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss. 25‑A & 38 (3).

Appellant in person.

Nemo for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 14th January, 1985.

This instant Decision would dispose of 17 appeals arising out of the common impugned order, dated 17^th March, 1984 passed by the 1llrd Sind Labour Court, Karachi. The IIIrd Sind Labour Court has dismissed the 17 grievance applications of the appellants filed under section 25‑A, I.R.O., 1969, by a common order on the grounds that the facts in all the cases were same, evidence was same and the cause of action was same.

2. The facts which led to the grievance petitions are that the appellants were initially employed as gangmen on Railway tracks but were promoted subsequently as Assistant Works Inspectors (A. W. I.). For the purposes of promotion as A. W. I., it was incumbant to pass the training courses at the Walton Training School, Lahore. As such the appellants were selected for the courses and went to the Walton Training School scheduled to commence on 6th March, 1982. The appellants reported at the Walton Training School and were given open lectures on 6th March, 1982. On 7th March, 1982 the Principal of the Training School served them with a letter, Annexure 'A' which mentioned that the courses scheduled to commence on 6th March, 1982 were postponed to 3rd April, 1982. The letter, Annexure 'A' was purported to have been issued by the Chief Personnel Officer, Pakistan Railways, Headquarters Office, Lahore, and is dated 28th February, 1982. The said letter also mentioned that the nominations to the said courses would thenceforth be made by the Headquarters Office. Accordingly the appellants were redirected to their respective places of posting for duty instead of allowing them to complete their training. Railway travelling passes for back journey, were provided by the Principal of the Training School.

3. The case of the appellants was that the said order of the Principal, passed on the alleged letter, dated 28th February, 1982 was illegal, incorrect and mala fide and should, therefore, be cancelled. Their case that selections, already made, were rightly made by the competent authority, namely, the Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Karachi under the powers vested in him. The said powers of selections by the Divisional Superintendent were not withdrawn by the Headquarters Office nor was the selection cancelled. ‑It was contended that the appel lants had accrued a right to have training and the same was infringed by an arbitrary and mala fide order without giving the appellants a chance of being heard by way of a show‑cause notice. The appellants made departmental representations to the Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Karachi, who forwarded their representations to the Chief Manager, Personnel, Pakistan Railways, Lahore. Appellants made repeated representations without result. They ultimately sent grievance notices under section 25‑A, I. R. O. 1969 on 21st February, 1983 with a request to maintain previous selections and to make arrangements of training courses for them. No reply was received. The grievance petitions were filed on 2nd ‑May, 1983.

4. The versions of the respondents in their reply statement is that the grievance petitions were not maintainable and the Labour Courts have no jurisdiction in the administrative matters of the department as no guaranteed or secured right under any Law was infringed. The territorial jurisdiction of the Court was also challenged on the ground that the relief was sought against the Head Office which was situated at Lahore and that the employer was the Pakistan Railways, which was not a party. The further version of the respondents was that the appellants were provisionally promoted as stop‑gap arrangement as A. W. I., and as such no secured or guaranteed right under any law had accrued to them. The promotion was not a right nor departmental training was a guaranteed right. The. postponement of the training was administrative in nature within the competence of Chief Personnel Officer, Pakistan Railways, Lahore.

5. The appeals were heard. However, the learned counsel for the appellants, Syed Agha Asif Jaffery, Advocate, did not come on the date of hearing and he twice failed to travel from Multan to Karachi. The Advocate for the respondents, Mr. Latif Saghar argued the matter. The material on record and the impugned order was read by me attentively.

6. The Labour Court struck two issues, namely, (1) whether the application was barred by time; and (2) whether the appellants had any grievance due to infringement of a guaranteed or secured right under any law. The issues were answered as the grievance petitions were hopelessly barred by time and that no cause of action accrued to the appellants. Following is the text of section 25‑A, I.R.O., 1969: --‑

"25‑A: Redress of Individual grievances.‑ (1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his Shop Steward or Collective bargaining agent, within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises.

(2) Where a worker himself brings his grievance to the notice of the employer, the employer shall within fiteen days of the grievance being brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the worker.

(3) ..

(4) ..

Provided that a worker who desires to so take the matter to Court shall do so within period of two months from the date of the communication of the employer or, as the case may be, from the expiry of the period mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (3), as the case may be."

7. In the present case the grievance arose on 7th March, 1982 as per Annexure A to the grievance application on which date the appellants were told that the training course had been postponed and that nominations to the course would be made afresh by the Headquarters Office, at Lahore. The appellants did not bring the grievances to the notice of the employer within three months of the same date. The appellants however, relied on Annexure 'B' to the grievance petitions which they termed as departmental appeals. Though, in its very first line it was stated that they were bringing grievances to the notice of the General Manager, Railways. Annexure 'B' was not dated. However, Annexure 'C' to the grievance petitions, which was filed by the appellants themselves, showed that the joint representation was dated 12^th September, 1982 i.e., made more than 6 months after the cause of action had accrued on 7th March, 1982. The grievance notice itself, therefore, was barred by time. The second grievance notice was given on 21st February, 1982 nearly 12 months after the cause of action had accrued. The second grievance notice has no place in Law. The first representation, dated 12th September, 1982 will be treated as grievance notice. The grievance petitions were filed on 2nd May, 1983 i.e., after more than 4 months: The submissions of grievance notice on 12th September, 1982 violates section 25‑A, subsection (4) as provided in the proviso quoted above. The time schedule specifically laid down under the law was not observed. The grievance petitions, were therefore, obviously time‑barred. The appellants had made applications for condonation of delay on various grounds that they had been pursuing their departmental remedy and that they were kept on false promises. The letter containing promises is not exhibited on file. Besides, the arguments do not impress the least. The appellants bad to be vigilant and bad to approach the Court within time schedule laid down under the Law.

8. It was contended in the Lower Court that because the order was illegal and mala fide, the period of limitation would not start running against it. This was repelled by observing that the fact of mala fide has to be proved by tangible evidence and no such evidence was led as to show how the order of postponement of training course was mala fide. The pleas of mala fide was rejected and I feel it was rightly done so.

9. As regards the fact of cause of action having accrued to the appellants, the section 25‑A, I.R.O., 1969 itself is clear. Right or promotion is not a guaranteed right as contemplated in section 25‑A. I.R.O., 1969. The department has only postponed the training and no presumption be drawn that this postponement of the training course has cancelled the training altogether. The fact is that the training has postponed and was to be scheduled in future and it gave no cause of action to the appellants as such. Even if the future course entails into the nomination of selections it has yet to be performed, namely, the nominations are yet to be made as such no cause of action has arisen. The simple fact that no right secured or guaranteed against the appellants is violated. Under the Labour Law, the promotion or passing of training course for the same of promotion would not be deemed as guaranteed or secured right.

10. The general principle of natural justice that nobody could be condemned unheard do not apply in the present appeals as no guaranteed or secured right was infringed in the present case. The civil Courts of the country may have the jurisdiction to grant relief in cases of infringement of a civil right, if any.

11. After having gone through the material on record and after hearing the arguments of learned Mr. Latif Sagar, I have come to the conclusion that the appellants have no case in the instant appeals. The order of the Labour Court is maintained and the appeals are dismissed.

A. E.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.