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Appeal No. LHR‑789 of 1978, decided on 30th September, 1981.

‑‑‑S.37 read with Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5‑‑Appeal against decision of Labour Court‑-‑Limitation‑‑Condonation of delay‑‑Appellant aware that appeal already time‑barred‑‑Application for condonation to be attached by memorandum of appeal‑‑Appellant not disclosing fact that limitation period counted from date of receipt of copy of order appealed against already expired‑‑Cannot be said to have come to appellate Court with clean hand s‑‑Condonation application made subsequently after about 2 and half years‑‑Condonation of 11 days, in circumstances, refused.

‑‑‑S.37‑‑Appeal against decision of Labour Court‑‑Limitation‑‑More than one applications made for copy of order appealed against‑‑Limitation, in circumstances, held, to be reckoned with reference to copy according to which period was short.

A I R 1955 Lah. 682 rel.

Javed Altaf for Appellant.

Peer Anwar Rehman for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 16th September, 1981.

This appeal arises from the decision, dated 21‑6‑1978 passed by the learned Labour Court No.1, Lahore, whereby the respondent was directed to be re‑instated with full back benefits.

2. The facts of the case are that the respondent joined National Tyre and Rubber Company as an Accountant on 15‑2‑1955. He was transferred to Air-foam Limited, Ferozepur Road, Lahore on 9‑5‑1967 under the order of Mr. Q. D. Butt, Secretary to the Managing Director. His services were placed at the disposal of National Commercial Enterprises Limited on 13‑4‑1971 by the order of Mr. Q.D. Butt. On 31‑5‑1974 his services were terminated by the order of Mr. Wazir Ahmad, Secretary to the Governing Director. The said order of termination was challenged by the respondent in the learned Labour Court. A preliminary objection was raised before my learned predecessor, who heard arguments but could not announce the order on account of his sudden elevation to the Shariat Court. The learned counsel for the respondent has said that twice the question of limitation was argued and as no order was announced, the appellant took benefit of it and in the meantime made an application on 17‑3‑1981 under section 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of delay. The appeal was presented on 2‑8‑1978 without mentioning that it was barred by time. Two applications for copy of the lower Court's order were given. First application was given on 21‑6‑1978, but no copy was taken under the said application. On 3‑7‑1978 another application for copy was made and on the same day copy was supplied. On the said copy the appeal was brought. The appeal is barred by time by eleven days. After obtaining copy on the second application, dated 3‑7‑1978, an attempt was made to obtain another copy of the lower Court's decision on the first application, but the learned Presiding Officer refused to issue another copy since one had already been supplied on the application, dated 3‑7‑1978. It is obvious that after obtaining copy of order on 3‑7‑1978 it became clear to the appellant that time for bringing appeal had expired. This appears to be the reason that an attempt was made to obtain another copy on the strength of the first application. The learned counsel for the appellant says that the copy clerk of the lower Court refused to issue copy on the first application, dated 21‑6‑1978 to the Secretary of the Union on the ground that the said application had been made by the counsel. It is alleged that the copy clerk said that if another application was given by the Secretary of the Union, copy would be supplied to him and that it was on this that another application for copy on 3‑7‑1978 was made. May it be so, but this is not sufficient for the condonation of delay. If the copy clerk was not inclined to issue copy to the Secretary of the Union on the first application, the Secretary should have, instead of making another application, asked the counsel to go and collect the copy.

3. From the above discussion it is clear that the learned counsel for the appellant was aware of the fact that the appeal was time‑barred, but in spite of it neither this fact was disclosed in the appeal, nor any application under section 5 was made for the condonation of delay. An application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is always attached with the memorandum of appeal, but in the present case it was given after about two and a half years. No reason has been given in the said application for condonation of delay after the lapse of so much time. It has been held in A I R 1955 Lah. 682 that where there are more than one application for copy, copy obtained on that application is to be considered, according to which, the period was short. In the present case, only one copy was produced and not more than one and computing the period of limitation from the date of delivery of that copy, the appeal is obviously barred by time. Since the appellant did not disclose this fact, even though it was in his knowledge, it cannot be said that he has come to the Court with clean hands. In such circumstances, and even otherwise this is not a fit case for condonation of delay. The appeal, therefore, is rejected as being barred by time.

A. E.

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