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Writ Petition No. 284-F of 1982/BWP, decided on 2nd December, 1984.
---S. 8--Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199--Khula'--Determination of benefit derived by wife--Marriage having been dissolved on ground of cruelty--Observation of Appellate Court that record was silent to show any benefits derived by wife--Mere fact that appellate Court did not determine benefit derived by wife, held, would not make much difference, therefore, dissolution of marriage on ground of Khula' and cruelty was unexceptionable.
---S. 8--Right of Khulal--Husband having got registered case under Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance,1979, against wife--Dissolution of marriage on ground of Khula', held, justified.
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--Art. 199--Muslim Family Laws, Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S. 8--Constitutional relief being extraordinary and discretionary, held, no one was entitled to such relief as a matter of right.
Sh. Inayat Ali for Petitioners.
Muhammad Akhtar Shabbir for Respondent.
Dates of hearing: 1st and 2nd December, 1984.
Through this Constitutional petition, Munshi Abdul Aziz petitioner wants this Court to declare the judgment and decree, dated 14-7-1982 of the learned Additional District Judge, Rahimyar Khan to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. On 6-12-1978 Mst. Noor Mai filed suit for dissolution of her marriage against Munshi Abdul Aziz petitioner/defendant, on various grounds including that of Khula. The suit was resisted whereon five issues were framed. The trial Court finding all the issues against the plaintiff-respondent dismissed the suit on 17-11-1979. Feeling aggrieved Mst. Noor Mai respondent filed appeal before the learned District Judge which was entrusted to the Additional District Judge, Rahimyar Khan who, vide his judgment and decree, dated 14-7-1982 while reversing the finding of the trial Judge on issues Nos. 1 and 4 i.e of cruelty and Khula' decreed the suit hence this petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Additional District Judge having not determined the benefits taken by Mst. Noor Mai the wife was not legally justified to decree the suit: that the finding of the trial Court on issue No.1 has been reversed without cogent reasons and that the relevant evidence was not read by the learned Additional District Judge. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent while opposing the arguments of the learned counsel informed that after the dissolution of her marriage Met. Noor Mai contracted marriage with Faiz Bukhsh and out of this wedlock a child has been borne.
4. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties with care. I find that the learned Additional District Judge has applied his conscious mind to the relevant evidence and has 'given sound and cogent reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by him. Since the marriage has also been dissolved on the ground of cruelty of the petitioner with the respondent, therefore, the mere fact that the learned Additional District Judge did not determine the benefits derived by the wife would not make much difference. The parties had entered into criminal litigation. The husband got registered case under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 against respondent-wife. That being the position I am convinced that the learned Additional District Judge has rightly reversed the finding of the trial Court on issue of Khula as well. The learned Additional District Judge has stated that as for the terms and conditions for grant of Khula', there is nothing on the record to show that the respondent/plaintiff had derived benefit from her husband during the wedlock. Learned counsel has not been able to controvert this observation. It is remarkable that Mat. Noor Mai respondent has contracted second marriage and a child is also born from the new wedlock. There is nothing on record to show that the stay order granted on 4-9-1982 was served on her before 28-10-1982 when shelf contracted second marriage. Since constitutional relief is an extraordinary and discretionary relief and no one is entitled to it as a matter of right, I am of the view that in the circumstances stated above, this Court may decline to interfere in the matter. For what has been stated above, it is not a fit case for interference. The petition is, therefore, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. H.B.T. Writ refused.