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Writ Petition No.1263 of 1984, decided on 19th June, 1984.

(a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)--

---S.13--Ejectment on ground of bona fide use and occupation of landlord's son--Plea that another shop having fallen vacant during pendency of application for eviction disentitled landlord to get premises vacated, repelled--Which portion of building would suit to landlord better must be left to his own discretion--Nothing unreasonable in landlord's insisting that particular portion of building should be made available to him--Law, Rent Controller, or tenant has no power to determine choice of landlord.

1968 S C M R 1087 and 1973 S C M R 185 fol.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)--

---Art. 199--West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), S. 13--Constitutional jurisdiction--Determination of--Question of fact--Matters having been determined by appellate Court, being questions of fact. High Court would not, in exercise of constitutional' jurisdiction, go over entire matter once again--There was, held, no error of relevant kind which would be vitiative of appellate Court's judgment--Consti tutional jurisdiction would not be exercised unless exceptional,-case was made out--Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide matter was competent to decide same rightly or wrongly--Mere fact that another conclusion could be arrived at from evidence did not make it case for interference in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction--Writ jurisdiction was not available to embark upon reappraisal of, evidence and proceed as if it were hearing appeal from subordinate Court.

P L D 1981 S C 246 and P L D 1981 S C 522 rel.

---Art. 199--West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), S. 13--Constitutional jurisdiction- Ejectment on ground of bona fide personal need-.-Disputed shop was better on account of being Pucca and having cement plastering on walls as compared to other shops, case, held, was not fit for interference in exercise of discretionary constitutional jurisdiction.

Qazi Khurshid Alam for Petitioner.

Malik Allah Wasaya for Respondent No. 1.

Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.

Date of hearing: 19th June, 1984.

This writ petition has been filed by a tenant of commercial premises in Bhakkar town.

2. The brief facts are that the landlady had filed an eviction application against the petitioner on the ground that she needed the premises in dispute bona fide for the use and occupation of her son who was without any job. The Rent Controller came to the confusion that the bona fide personal need of the lady or her son was not made out. The respondent-landlady went in appeal which. was accepted by the learned District Judge, Bhakkar after disagreeing with the reasons adopted in this case by the Rent Controller. He was of the view that it was established on the basis of evidence that the need of the landlady was bona fide and the mere fact that during the pendency of application for eviction another shop had been vacated by the petitioner would not be sufficient to disentitle the landlady to get possession of shop of her own choice.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has criticised the judgment of the learned District Judge on the ground that once another shop had been vacated and had become available to the landlady, she could not insist on vacation of shop which is now in dispute. This argument of the learned counsel for tile petitioner has been met by the learned counsel for respondent Malik Allah Wasaya bar relying on 1968 S C M R 1087 and 1973 S C M R 185. In the former case, a plea had been raised that since another flat in the building had fallen vacant earlier but the landlord let out that flat to a tenant and did not utilise it for themselves, therefore, good faith was wanting. The argument was repelled by observing that as to which portion of the building would suit to the landlord better, trust be left to their discretion and that there wall nothing unreasonable in the landlords' insisting that a particular portion of the building should be made available to them. The latter case also supports the stand of respondents. It is also laid down that the law did not give a right to the Rent Controller or the tenant the power to, determine the choice of the landlord. In this connection, the safeguard/" provided by section 13(4) of the Ordinance had also been referred to. I find that the two precedents cited by the learned counsel for respondents fully covers the facts of the present case.

4. Moreover, the questions determined by the learned District Judge as appellate authority are questions of fact and inferences drawn from evidence led in the case and all other at attending circumstances of this case. I do not feel inclined in exercise of my Constitutional jurisdiction to go over the entire matter once again because after a fair assessment of the judgment of the learned District Judge, I find no error of the relevant kind which would be vitiative of his judgment. I must observe that this Court would not exercise its Constitutional jurisdiction normally in rent matters unless an exceptional case is made out. Reference may be made to P L D 1981 S C 246. It has further been laid down by the B learned Supreme Court in this case that a tribunal having jurisdiction to decide the matter is competent to decide it rightly or wrongly and the mere fact that another conclusion could be arrived at from the evidence does not make it a case for interference in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. The second principle which stands attracted to this case is that writ jurisdiction is not available to embark upon a reappraisal of evidence and proceed as if it were hearing an appeal from a subordinate Court. Reference may be made to P L D 1981 S C 522. This is also in consonance with the policy of Legislature that second appeal stands abolished.

5. Before parting with the. case, it may be observed that it is in evidence that the shop from which the petitioner's eviction was sought on the ground of personal need is better on account of being Pucca and having cement plastering on the walls as compared to other chops which are Katcha as held by the learned District Judge.

For all these reasons, I do not find it to be a fit case for interference in exercise of my discretionary Constitutional jurisdiction. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.

A.A.

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