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Constitutional Petition No. D-793 of 1979, heard on 23rd January, 1985.

---Art. 199--Provisional Constitution Order (1 of 1981), Art. 15(6)--Martial Law Order (Zone 'C') No. 55, para. 3--Jurisdiction of High Court--Constitutional petition--Employee of Municipal Corporation promoted on temporary and ad hoc basis without having requisite qualification--Such employee reverted by Committee constituted under M.L.O. No. 55--Jurisdiction of High Court, held, barred by reason of provisions of abatement of jurisdiction contained in Art. 15(6), Provisional Constitution Order, 1981--Constitutional petition dismissed against order of such Committee--In absence of any allegation regarding conduct of employee, High Court expressing hope that employer will re-examine his case so that, demotion that employee had to suffer, for no fault of his, could be cured. Ch. Muhammad Sharif and others v. Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and others C.P. No. D-1330 of 1978 rel. Petitioner in person. Muslim Naqvi for Respondents. Date of hearing: 23rd January, 1985.

.-- The petitioner was initially appointed as a Clerk in the Architect Control Department of Karachi Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) seems that some posts of Assistant Building Inspector fell vacant, and since there was a paucity of candidates having the requisite qualification of Diploma in Engineering, the petitioner was considered for such appointment. The reference was then made by the Corporation to the Government of Sind for reduction of the prescribed minimum qualification. It may, at this stage be stated that the petitioner had to his credit two additional technical qualifications of the Estimator and Architec Draftsman from the Polytechnic Institute, Karachi, but it is not the case of the petitioner that the rules had been amended or the rules had provided that this additional qualification put him at par with Diploma-holders. To put it in other words such qualification that the petitioner claims to have, do not equate with the requisite qualification of holding of a Diploma. The Government of Sind consider the case of the petitioner, and passed an order on 10-4-1974 which appears at age 35 of the record. It seems the case of the petitioner was considered in isolation it was not the was case for reduction-of qualification. The last paragraph of the sad order states as fellows;-

"Mr. Rizvi's appointment for the present may be on a purely temporary basis and he may be on probation for such period as the rules prescribe. If after examination of the case, the K.M.C. decides to reduce the qualifications then fresh application may be called for the post by advertisement in newspaper and Mr. Rizvi may appear with other applicants for confirmation of his appointment." The petitioner by virtue of the aforesaid order was promoted from Grade r to Grade 6 and posted as Assistant Building Inspector, and subsequently, he was even promoted as Inspector in Building Control Department. Even such order of this second promotion which is dated 24-9-1975 clearly shows that the promotion was purely temporary and on ad hoc basis and further provides that the petitioner shall be reverted to the post occupied by him prior to his promotion in case anything is found against him, or if it is found that any departmental case is pending against him. Martial Law Order 55 was promulgated by the Martial Law Administrator, Zone 'C' on 7-3-1978. Paragraph 3 of this Order provides for re-appraisal of ad hoc appointments. Part II of the said paragraph provides for constitution of Committees or Boards to examine the cases of ad hoc appointments. The Committee consisting of 4 officers of the Government of Sind was constituted and such Committee on 11-3-1979 examined the case of the petitioner. They took the view that the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification of three years Diploma in Civil Engineering, and such Committee also took into consideration the two certificates that the petitioner had been able to get from the Karachi Polytechnic Institute. The Committee came to the conclusion that the petitioner was appointed without having the requisite qualification, and therefore, the Committee recommended that he may be reverted to his original post. It is in these circumstances that the present petition has been filed. We have heard the petitioner in person and Mr. Muslim Naqvi for the respondent Corporation, as well as for the Provincial Government. The contention of Mr. Muslim Naqvi is that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition in view of the provision contained in clause 6 of the Article 15 of the Provisional Constitution Order. This provision in the Provisional Constitution Order states that the High Court has no power to pass an order relating to the validity or effect of any Martial Law Order or Martial Law Regulation made by the chief Martial Law Administrator or Martial Law Administrator. It also states that this Court cannot make any order relating to the validity of anything done or action taken or intended to be done or taken under a martin, Law Order or Martial Law Regulation. Clause 6 of the same Article also states that every order, injunction, or process made, granted, or issued by the High Court in relation to matters in respect of which jurisdiction of the High Court is barred shall not be binding on any Martial Law Authority or Civil Authority. In fact this position was examined by Division Bench of this Court in C.P. No. D-1330/78 Ch. Muhammad Sharif and others v. Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and others, and the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the petition was barred by reason of the provision of abatement contained in the Provisional Constitution Order. We cannot possibly take a different view. The next point urged by Mr. Muslim Naqvi was that the promotion of the petitioner was purely temporary and on ad hoc basis, and for that reason also, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. It is not necessary for us to enter into those questions after holding that we have no jurisdiction, and we will, therefore, refrain from entering into that question. The petitioner lastly contended that the order was very harsh and in absence of any allegation in regard to his conduct such punishment was not merited. To that we can only sympathize with the petitioner and express hope that the employer will re-examine his case, so that this demotion that the petitioner had to suffer for no fault of his could be cured. This, however, is only our hope. On consideration of all the material, we are of the view that our jurisdiction is barred and we therefore, dismiss this petition, but make no order as to cost. M.A.K. Petition dismissed.