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Case No. 247/185 of 1983, decided on 22nd March, 1984.

‑‑ R. 6(3)‑Removal from service on charges of corruption after dispensing with regular enquiry procedure ‑ Allegations based on secret reports of Anti‑Corruption Establishment and Special Branch of Police contradicted by secret enquiry conducted by Head of District administration‑Appellant not confronted with evidence, nor given opportunity to defend himself including personal hearing -Order challenged as arbitrary and against principles of natural justice‑Held : No body can be condemned unheard as it would be against principles of natural justice which also emanate from Holy Qur'an‑In circumstances of case it was incumbent upon authority to give full chance to appellant to defend himself‑Appellant re‑instated in service with back benefits.

‑‑ R. 6(2)‑Discretion of Authorized Officer to hold enquiry or issue show cause not challengeable‑Contention that enquiry was dispensed with to avoid scandle not accepted‑Held: In circum stances Authorized Officer was not justified to dispense regular enquiry procedure without giving cogent reasons.

A I R 1957 All 297 ; P L D 1958 Pesh. 157 ; P L D 1967 Lah. 42 ; P L D 1967 Lah. 408(j) ; P L D 1959 Docca 48(j) ; 1979 C L C 217(a) ; 1982 P L C (C. S.) 102 ; 1982 P L C (C. S.) 431 ; 1981 P L C (C. S.) 256 ; 1981 P L C (C. S.) 263 ; 1980 S C M R 850 ; 1983 P L C (C. S.) 243 ; P L D 1959 S C 25 ; P L D 1967 Lah. 120.1 (at 1212); 1984 PLC (C. S.) 176; PLD 1957 Kar. 576; 1970SCM R475;PLD 1970 Lah. 416 ; P L D 1977 Lah. 117 ; A I R 1953 S C 404 and A I R 1958 S C 538 distinguished.

Miss Shafqat Hameed v. Secretary, Education 1981 S C M R 1034 ref.

Riaz Anwar Asadi for Appellant.

Sh. Riaz Ahmad, A.‑G. for Respondents.

A. G. Humayun, District Attorney for the Department.

Date of hearing : 22nd March, 1984.

‑ Syed Tassadaq Hussain Bokhari, ex‑E. A. C./City Magistrate, Faisalabad, has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Tribunals Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat, Lahore, and the Governor of the Punjab, Lahore, as respondents.

2. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the impugned order dated 3rd February, 1983 be set aside and appellant be reinstated in service with all back benefits.

3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant while working as City Magistrate, Faisalabad, the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Services, General Administration and Information Depart ment, acting as Authorised Officer served a show‑cause notice accompany ing by statement of allegations vide memo. No. S. O. (C) 1/308/82, dated 7th December, 1982 on the appellant, by which he was told :‑

(a) that he has a persistent reputation of being corrupt as defined in rule 3(c) (iii) of Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975.

(b) that he has assumed a style of living beyond his ostensible mean; as defined in rule 3(c) (ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Effcienc3 and Discipline) Rules, 1975.

(c) that be was indulging blantantly in heavy drinking and womanizing.

In the said show‑cause notice, it was further stated that it has been decided that it was not necessary to have an inquiry conducted in support of the same and the appellant was proceeded under rule 6(3) of Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975. The appellant submitted his reply to the said show‑cause notice and submitted that the statement of allegations contained charges of very vague and general nature and he should be given a chance to defend himself as he did not know what was the evidence and material on the basis of which he has been issued a show cause notice. He also recounted his excellent performance and conduct during the entire course of service and also referred certain incidents in which he as Qazi Shariat Court, had come down with heavy hands upon the offences like consumption, manufacturing, possession of alcohol and intoxicants and had awarded exemplary punishments to the drunkards and boot‑leggers. In his explanation he highlighted all the possible points in his favour and demanded a personal hearing and prayed that he may be allowed to produce proof so made out in his written reply. However, his reply did not find favour by the competent authority and he was removed from service by the competent authority vide impugned order dated 3rd February, 1983. Aggrieved against this summarily dismissal, he filed appeal under rule 13 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, to the Governor/ Martial Law Administrator, Punjab, Lahore, and as the same could not be decided by the said authority, therefore, after a lapse of 90 days the appellant chose to file this appeal before this Tribunal.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned District Attorney and then later on learned Advocate‑General, Punjab, assisted by the representative of the Department and have perused the entire record of this case were carefully with their assistance.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant has inter alia submitted that Authorised Officer could not dispense with regular enquiry as the allega tions levelled against the appellant though vague, were of very serious in nature including the charge of corruption. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the law on this point has been settled by the Punjab Service Tribunal as well as by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that where charges of corruption are involved, inquiry is a must. He has also assailed the procedure so adopted by the Authorised Officer while dispens ing with regular inquiry in this case by submitting that he was under obliga tion to give reasons for the same, which he had failed to do so.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the appellant has not been given reasonable opportunity to show‑cause against the proposed action, as such he was not confronted with the evidence in support of the charges, thus the appellant has been condemned without being heard. He has also made a grievance that the Authorised Officer before recommending the punishment of removal from service on the basis of which the respondents passed the order failed to give him personal hearing. This according to the learned counsel for the appellant, was a material irregularity which would vitiate the entire proceedings of the case. In the end it was forcefully argued that all the charges against the appellant were baseless and false and without any foundation. It has been pointed out that the appellant has been condemned on the secret report of the Anti‑Corruption Department whereas the secret inquiry conducted by the Deputy Commissioner, Faisalabad, at the behest of the learned Chief Secretary, revealed that the appellant was absolutely innocent and all the charges so levelled against him, were ill‑founded, He has also referred to the letter so placed on the record issued by the Sub‑Martial Law Administrator Sector Faisalabad, dated 2nd December, 1982 addressed to the Commissioner, Faisalabad, in which the services of the appellant have been appreciated and it was further observed in the said letter that the appellant was honest and clean officer. He has also further referred to the comments of Mr. Abdul Waheed, Deputy Commissioner, Faisalabad, under whom the appellant served for 3 years, in which it was stated that the appellant was picked up from Magistracy of Faisalabad and sub sequently posted City Magistrate, which was highly a sensitive post and the learned Deputy Commissioner did not receive any sort of complaint against the appellant during all these 3 years, either with regard to his conduct or integrity or otherwise. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, it was intriguing as well as surprising that such like reports in favour of the appellant, were completely ignored and action was taken against the appellant on the basis of secret report of the Anti‑Corruption Department, which would be of no value, in the face of the findings of the senior officers, like Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner, Faisalabad Division. While concluding his case, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has fallen victim due to the intrigues of anti‑social elements, against whom the appellant made campaign under the orders of Deputy Commissioner by removing encroachments, as well as taking other action of punitive in nature to streamline the administration of the city. He has also referred to the service record of the appellant and has submitted that he rendered 8 years service which according to him was blotless, therefore, it was stated that extreme penalty of removal from service was an act, highly unjustified, arbitrary and in flagrant violation of Efficiency and Discipline Rules, besides being against fundamental principle of natural justice.

7. On the other hand learned Advocate‑General has submitted that under rule 6(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, the Authorised Offcer was not required to convey the reasons for dispensing with the enquiry procedure to the appellant. According to the learned Advocate‑General discretion for holding an enquiry or for issuing a show‑cause notice has been vested solely in the Authorised Officer, which was not challengeable anywhere. With regard to the dispensation of the inquiry it was submitted that the same has become necessary in view of the allegation of scandalous in nature against the appellant specifically, the illicit relations with the women, therefore, to avoid scandle, the enquiry was rightly dispensed with. It was further argued that the charges were neither vague nor uncertain, as the appellant was rightly condemned on the report of Special Branch of Police and the Directorate of Anti‑Corruption Establishment, as both the agencies which enquired into these allegations independently, had confirmed that the allegations against the appellant were correct. With regard to the grievance that the appellant was not given reasonable opportunity by show cause, it was submitted that he was given reasonable opportunity by show‑cause notice, as he submitted reply to the said show‑cause notice, which was duly considered. In this way, it has been submitted that he was given full chance to defend himself. It was however, submitted that there was no law or rule, which required that prosecution evidence should be produced against the appellant and he should be allowed to cross -examine the same, therefore, this contention of the appellant was invalid. With regard to the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that Authorised Officer was supposed to give personal hearing to a civil servant, before recommending imposition of major penalty, learned Advocate General has submitted that such like procedure was not envisaged under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1975. With regard to the observation of the learned Deputy Commissioner, Faisalabad, regarding the conduct of the appellant, it was submitted that although the Deputy Commissioner gave him a clean chit yet the learned Commissioner stated that he heard certain complaints against him, therefore, it could not be stated that the Commissioner has fully endorsed the claim of the Deputy Commis sioner. Learned Advocate‑General, Punjab, has relied in support of his contention on : ‑

(1) A I R 1957 All. 297

(2) P L D 1958 Pesh. 157

(3) P L D 1967 Lah. 42

(4) P L D 1967 Lah. 408(c)

(5) P L D 1959 Dacca 48(j)

(6) 1979 C L C 217(a).

However, on the other hand learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the following rulings :‑

(1) 1982 P L C (C. S.) 102

(2) 1982 P L C (C. S.) 431

(3) 1981 P L C (C. S.) 256

(4) 1981 P L C (C. S.) 263

in support of his contention that where there was a charge of corruption, show‑cause notice under rule 6(3) was uncalled for and regular inquiry was a must. He has also further relied on

(1) 1980 S C M R 850 .

(2) 1981 P L C (C. S.) 263

(3) 1983 P L C (C. S.) 243

He has submitted that the statement of allegations and show‑cause notice was in flagrant violation of rule 6(3)(a) as it did not give the grounds and substance of evidence on which such allegations were based. Similarly he has relied on P L D 1970 Lah. 416 and P L D 1977 Lah. 117, in support of the claim of the appellant that reasonable opportunity of hearing as required by rule 6(3)(b) was not given and appellant was not confronted with the evidence as well as not given chance to cross‑examine the witnesses. With regard to the action so taken on the secret report of the Anti‑Corruption Establishment and Special Branch Police, learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the following rulings :‑

(1) 1980 S C M R 850

(2) P L D 1959 S C 25 at 30

(3) P L D 1967 Lah. 1204 at 12 1 2

(4) 1984 P L C (C. S.) 176

(5) P L D 1957 Kar. 576

(6) 1970 S C M R 475

to show that no action should have been taken against the appellant on such reports.

8. We have given our anxious throght td the arguments so advanced by the parties and first of all will deal with the most crucial and important legal point involved in this case i.e. whether a civil servant can be condemned on the basis of secret reports (with which he was not associated) so secured by the authority against him or not, particularly when he has not been con fronted with the same and given a chance to defend himself.

9. We have taken pains to go through the entire law on the subject as pronounced from time to time and particularly. we have thoroughly read the law so cited by the learned counsel for the appellant on which he has relied, in support of his contention vis‑a‑vis this issue. The consensus of opinion of all the rulings so mentioned above is that nobody can be condemned unheard as the same would be against the principle of natural justice. However, we will take up the case so cited as 1980 S C M R 850 which is a ruling of Full Bench of Supreme Court of Pakistan in which this issue has been discussed in detail and ultimately settled. It was observed in the said case by their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, when their attention was drawn to the fact that civil servants were condemned on the basis of report submitted by an inquiry committee of which they had no knowledge and no opportunity had been given to them to defend their case. Their lordships were appalled to come across this sort of treatment so met out to the civil servants. It was after expressing this dismay and horrification on the treatment so met out to the civil servants by the authority, it was ultimately held in the said case that the conduct of the Government in issuing a vague show‑cause notice was most un fortunate on its part and similarly it condemned the procedure adopted is other cases, when it was found that the Inquiry Committee report, which was a part of the material on the basis of which the said civil servant had been dismissed, was neither shown to them, nor they were allowed to participate in such inquiry. Similarly in 1984 P L C (C. S.) 176 (Service Tribunal Azad Jammu & Kashmir) in Muhammad Rafique v. Azad Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the learned Tribunal came to a positive conclusion that disciplinary proceedings made secretly on the back of a civil servant. has no intrinsic value of evidence against him. In this judgment the learned Tribunal has relied on A I R 1953 S C 404 and A I R 1958 S C 538. In view of the law laid down we have no hesitation to hold this issue in favour of the appellant as it is apparent from record without any dispute, that he has been removed from service on the basis of secret reports provided to the authority by the Special Branch of Police as well as by the Anti‑Corruption Establishment. We are further strengthened in our findings when we go through the record of this case and find that at one time after receiving the said secret reports, the Authorised Officer viz: Additional Chief Secretary was pleased' to refer this matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Faisalabad under whom the appellant was working at that time, to make inquiries, of course secret in nature against him and inform the said authority accordingly. We have gone through the reports of this officer and find that the matter was entrusted by the Deputy Commissioner to the A. D. C. (G), Faisalabad, who after making enquiries into all these allegations so levelled against him by the Police Agency, found hits absolutely innocent. The Deputy Commissioner, under whom the appellant worked for 3 years also positively observed that he never received any complaint of any sort against the appellant during the said period of his service and rather picked up him out of Magistracy for sensitive post of City Magistrate, Faisalabad. The Deputy Commissioner has further observed that all what has been happened was due to strict action taken by the appellant at his behest against the encroachers of the city, which involved big people and as well as anti‑social elements. In this way the Deputy Commissioner was of the opinion that the appellant had created a large number of enemies on account of his straightforward attitude against them. The views of the Deputy Commissioner were endorsed by the Commissioner, Faisalabad. We have also taken notice of document so placed on the record by the appellant which is a letter from the S. M. L. A., Sector. 2, Faisalabad who while lauding the services of the appellant has declared him clean and honest officer. Accepted by both these inquiries, one made by the Police and other made by the Head of the administration of the District, were available with the authority when it chose to take action against the appellant. In view of the above circumstances, it was all the more incumbent upon the authority to give full chance to the appellant to defend himself, particularly when he has asked for this right, in his explanation so submitted by him after the show‑cause notice. In this manner we have no hesitation to hold that the authority has acted both against the principle of natural justice which is enshrined not only in the codified law of this country but emanates from the Holy Qur'an itself. Reference of the same is drawn from Surah Bani Israil of our Holy Qur'an, Reliance is placed on P L D 1977 Lah. 117 at page 129, wherein Justice Mushtaq Hussain and Justice Gul Muhammad Khan, have discussed in detail the verses in Surah Bani Israil and Surah Namal, to show that no body can be condemned unheard, a basic right of every human being.

10. However, a number of other legal issues have been raised in this matter such like not affording of personal hearing to the appellant and giving no reason for dispensation of inquiry against him. All these matters need not to be discussed at length as the significance of these issues pale into insignificance when the major issue in this case has been decided in favour of the appellant. However, it will be necessary to deal with another important legal issue, whether enquiry could be dispensed with in this case or not. In this matter learned :Advocate‑General has placed reliance on the case of Miss Sadaqat Hameed v. Secretary Education (1981 S C M R 1034) In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan were of the view that when there was involvement of certain scandalous affairs which where going to hurt the reputation of young girls it was not necessary to give the entire detail of the allegations, as the nature of allegations being sensitive in nature, were likely to affect the reputation and good name of the College/Institution. The learned Advocate‑General has argued that as there were a number of ladies involved in this case with whom the appellant was alleged to have illicit relation belonging to good as well as bad repute, therefore, the Authorised Officer/Authority were within their discretion to couch the charges in general manner and without bringing the details of the same in public by holding regular inquiry into such like scandalous affairs.

11. We have carefully perused the above rulings with respect, and find that the facts of the said case were absolutely different from the present case so before us. In that case a lady lecturer was involved in certain scandalous affairs and good name of the students of the Girls College was to be protected but in the present case the reading of the public report clearly reveals that most of the women with whom the appellant was alleged to have illicit relations, were women of ill‑repute and thus no such sensitivity was involved in his case. Furthermore the appellant has not been dismissed /removed from service on the sole charge of womanising but he has been condemned of being corrupt. We have repeatedly held in our various judgments that in matter of corruption, procedure under rule 6(3) was uncalled for and regular enquiry was must. We have only allowed dispensation of inquiry under rule 6(3) in corruption cases also but where we have found that charge could be proved simply by documentary evidence. In the present case the situation is quite different and the charges of corruption though levelled are vague in nature but nevertheless related to corruption of the appellant, therefore, the appellant was fully entitled to regular enquiry before holding him guilty of this charge. Reliance has been rightly placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the law so cited above in the earlier part of our judgment in support of the said contention.

12. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant has been condemned on secret reports of the Anti‑Corruption Establishment and Special Branch of Police, which have based their reports without recording any evidence but only by probe at their own end, without associating the appellant at any stage of these enquiries and submitting at the same time that the appellant was reportedly or allegedly or stated to be corrupt.

13. We have also no hesitation to hold that on the charge of corruption the appellant was entitled to full‑fledged inquiry and Authorised Officer was not justified to dispense with the said procedure and also without giving any cogent reasons for the same.

14. When we asked the learned Advocate‑General to assist this Tribunal by producing any ruling to the contrary to show that conclusion drawn by us on the strength of law so cited above by the learned counsel for the appellant were not correct, he was unable to cite any such authority.

15. The result is that we accept this appeal, set aside the impugned order dated, 3rd February, 1983 and direct that the appellant be reinstated in service with all back benefits. However, the competent authority in the case of the appellant, can proceed against him if it so deem fit, but in accordance with law so laid. There will be no order as to costs.

M.I Appeal accepted.

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