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Case No. 437/1842 of 1982, decided on 30th June, 1983.

----R. 3 (a) read with West Pakistan Registration Rules, 1964, ‑Inefficiency ‑Sub‑Registrar charged for negligence in register ing sale deed in respect of property contrary to instructions‑Sale deed dependent upon a registered deed already in existence in favour of vendor ---Sub-Registrar neither having personal knowledge of data pertaining to property which was subject‑matter of instruction nor sale deed indicative that if related to same property Sub‑Registrar in view of r. 135 of West Pakistan Registration Rules, 1964, held, bound to register disputed sale without going into further inquiry and as such could not be said to be negligent- No ulterior motive attributed ‑Penalty of stoppage of increment, in circumstances, held, not justified hence set aside by Service Tribunal ‑Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974), S. 4.

Masud Ahmad Riaz for Appellant.

A. G. Humayun, District Attorney for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 30th June, 1983.

Irshad Ahmad Bosal, Extra Assistant Commissioner has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded the Government of the Punjab through the Chief Secretary, S. G. A. & I. Department, Civil Secretariat, Lahore, as respondent.

2. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the impugned orders dated 18th April, 1982 and 8th August, 1982, be set aside.

3. Brief facts of the case are that while working as Extra‑Assistant Commissioner as well as Sub‑Registrar Lahore Cantt., the appellant was served with a charge‑sheet dated 21st November, 1981, to the effect that while acting as Sub‑Registrar Cantt. Sub‑Division, Lahore, be registered two sale deeds in respect of the land of Government F. C. College Lahore known as Plot No. 36 Block C' Gulberg II, Lahore, measuring 1 Kanal 10 Marlas and 70 sq. ft. and Plot No. 36‑A measuring I Kanal, 9 Marlas and 9 sq. ft. respectively, in the names of Mst. Shameem Afzal wife of Mr. Muhammad Afzal and Msr. Sajida Arshad wife of Muhammad Arshad despite clear instructions for him, as not to register any sale deed and attest any mutation in respect of the property attached with the Government F. C. College, Lahore. Under M. L. R. 118 the landed property attached with the Government F. C. College Lahore was nationalized and the Principal of the College had written letters to all the A. Cs. in the Lahore District not to register any sale deed presented by any person pertaining to the land attached with the said college. Statement of allegation was also provided to him in this respect. The appellant filed his explanation and, an. Inquiry Officer was appointed to enquire into the matter. The Inquiry Officer held the appellant guilty of negligence therefore, the competent authority imposed a minor penalty of stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect. The appellant made a representation against the imposition of the said penalty which was rejected by the Government, vide its order dated 8th August, 1982. Hence this appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that while the appellant was working as Sub‑Registrar, Cantt. Sub‑Division; Lahore, an application for appointment of Local Commission was presented before him on 11th May, 1981 which he allowed under the law. When the sale deeds executed between the Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Belation of the United Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. (formerly known as Board of Foreign Missions of the United Presbytarian Church in the U. S A.) through its General Attorney Mr. Darwood A Busse vendo and Mst. Sajida Arshad wife of Ch. Muhammad Arshad Vendee and Mr Darwood A. Busse, General Attorney, Vendor and Shamim Afzal wife of Muhammad Afzal Vendee entered into a sale deed and said parties on completion of said document which was presented before him duly authenticated recommended by the Local Commission, therefore be registered the same. It was also further submitted that according to the conditions of the documents, the Vendor was described as Presbytarian Church which owned various properties in different parts of Lahore and it was nowhere mentioned that properties belong to the F. C. College, Lahore. It was further argued that the contents of sale deeds further reveal that the ownership of the said properties had already been trans ferred on 27th August, 1974, from the hands of L. D. A. (then known as L. I. T.) i. e. about two years after the nationalization of the F. C. College. In this manner it has been vehemently argued that the appellant bad no alternative but to accept the sale deeds as they were based on an already registered documents in favour of the Vendor. Learned counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to the provisions of rule 135 of the West Pakistan Registration Rules, 1964, which forbids the Registration Officer to go into intricate questions of ownership/title of the parties to a particular transaction. He has also further submitted that the allegation that the appellant was informed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, that he had not to transfer the particular property(s), was incorrect, as there was nothing on the record to show that the appellant was personally served with this direction. A grievance has also been made that although the matter was enquired into by Mrs. Sarosh Sultan, Deputy Secretary, Finance Department but the copy of the same inquiry report was not supplied to the appellant in order to provide him opportunity to defend him properly.

5. On the other hand learned District Attorney has relied on the inquiry report so held by the Government and contended that as a vigilant officer he was bound to consult the correspondence with regard to the properties and then to register the same in the name of the vendees.

6. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments so advanced by the parties and have carefully gone through the inquiry report as well as arguments so mentioned in the Memorandum of Appeal in detail.

7. In nutshell the allegation against the appellant is that he had been informed through various letters that properties belonging to the F. C. College after its nationalization had not to be mutated or registered in any manner whatsoever, therefore, the appellant has acted in a negligent manner and has allowed the sale of these two plots which actually belonged to the said authority. In view of this allegation and charge against the appellant the most crucial document in this case would be the contents of the sale deeds presented to him at the time of the registration. What we find from the sale deeds is that the said sale deeds were dependent upon a registered deed already in existence in favour of the Vendor by the L. I. T. and the sanctity of the same was also dependent upon the earlier Registered Deed which had already taken effect 2 years later than the nationalization of the F. C. College. The letter dated 24th January, 1981 only refers to the properties belonging to F. C. College and not to any property of a particular person i. e. Mr. D. Dussy. The contents of the sale deed further reveal that Mr. D. Dussy did not figure any where as Vendor but it is the Presbytarian Church in the U. S A. through its General Attorney Mr. Darwood A. Busee and not Mr. D. Dussy. These particular properties already stood transferred by the L. D. A. then known as L. I. T. about 2 years after the nationalization of the F. C. College, therefore; the appellant was justified to believe that the properties which were the subject‑matter of sale deeds, have nothing to do with the F. C. College, Lahore as the disputed properties had already been vested in L. D. A. in 1974 and the same had been alienated from L. D. A. to aforesaid church. The reference to rule 135 which also finds mention in the inquiry report fully shifts the burden from the shoulders of the appellant. Rule 135 lays down that at the time of registration of a property, the Registration Authority is required only to look into the affidavit and the documents so produced by him, and to see whether the vendor is legitimate owner either on the strength of the previous register ed deed or due to the entries in his favour being owner in the revenue record of that area. In the present case as mentioned in the earlier part of our judgment, the present registered deed was dependent upon the previous registered deed and thus in no manner it can be questioned by the appellant, whether the previous registered deed was a legal document or otherwise. The purpose of rule 135 was clearly made not to empower the Registration Officer with vast powers of probe into the sanctity of the documents, which on the face of it, were genuine, in order to close, the doors for corruption in such matters. If the Registration Officer arroga ted himself with the powers to look into the genuineness of each and every document by holding enquiries in the matter, then of course he would become all omnipotent to harass the public and to make money freely. The philosophy behind this rule was to minimise the chances of corruption and to save the public at large from unnecessary harassment.

8. The conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Officer is mostly based on conjecture and speculations, which we as a judicial Tribunal cannot accept as a correct verdict. It has been stated in the inquiry report that the appellant should have been all vigilant and fully conversant with all the correspondence on the subject before allowing the sale deeds to be completed. As we have already mentioned in the earlier part of our judgment that there was no such data within the personal knowledge of the appellant and if at all any correspondence had been made it was only with regard to the property of F. C. College in general, therefore, we do not agree with the Enquiry Officer's observation that the appellant has failed to exercise vigilance in the said matter. The appellant had acted as a man of prudence, when he allowed the registration of deed when the same had been approved by the Local Commission and the said Commission had also issued a certificate to that effect. In this manner we are fully satisfied that appellant did nothing of the sort which should bring him within the ambit of a negligent officer, as held by the Enquiry Officer.

9. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the penalty imposed upon the appellant is not justified as be had committed no fault in any manner whatsoever and performed his duties as required by the rules so laid down in this behalf. We have further seen that even in the inquiry report, it has not been stated that the appellant had any ulterior motives in the bargain and thus his negligence was motivated.

The Supreme Court in case of A. U. Mussarrat (P L D 1977 S C 24), has even gone to the extent to ignore an inefficient act of an officer if the same has been done without any ulterior motives. and is not subsequently repeated.

10. The result is, we accept the appeal, set aside the impugned orders as being without any justification. There will be no order as to costs.

A. E. Appeal accepted.

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