Lawyers Directory Listing
Chat with us free on WhatsApp — tell us your city and legal matter and our team connects you with the right lawyer. No form, no fee.
Writ Petition No. 59 of 1957, decided on 16th January 1958.
S. 5‑A‑Permission of Provincial Government to installation of new factory or extension of old one‑Not necessary after coming into force of Development of Industries Rules, 1950:
Held, that after the Development of Industries Rules, 1950 came into force, in view of the provisions of subsection (2) of section 49 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the executive authority of the Provincial Government (which was co‑extensive with its legislative competence), with respect to factories engaged in any of the manufacturing processes specified in the Schedule to the Development of Industries (Federal Control) Act, 1949, came to an end and, therefore, whatever may have been the number of persons employed in any such factory, the necessity of obtaining permission from the Provincial Government under section 5‑A of the Factories Act, 1934, also came to an end.
--
Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952‑Powers conferred on Textile Commissioner or Chief Controller‑Not of judicial Dr quasi judicial but of an administrative character.
Certain powers were conferred by the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955, and the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, on the Textile Commissioner and the Chief Controller. In dealing with applications of consumers, dealers and importers, these two officers had to determine certain questions of fact and were expected to dispose of those applications in accor dance with the general policy and orders of the Government. In dealing with such applications these officers, apparently, acted in an administrative capacity.
Abdul Majid v. The West Pakistan Province P L D 1956 Lah. 615 rel.
Arts. 11, 12, 170 proviso (a) Licensing Authority arbitrarily acting in a manner so as to deprive one of a fundamental right‑Remedy by petition under Art. 170.
If a licensing authority acts in such a manner as to deprive a person of his fundamental right to acquire and dispose of property and the power so conferred is exercised by that authority arbitrarily and capriciously, it would certainly amount to denial of the funda mental rights guaranteed by Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution and would, to that extent, be void.
The powers conferred by Article 170 of the Constitution are wide enough and can be invoked even where the order in question is not of a judicial or a quasi‑judicial nature and has been passed by an authority in an administrative capacity. The decision would depend upon the determination of the question as to whether the discretion was exercised justly, fairly and reasonably, on a correct interpretation of and in accordance with law and without any discrimination. The fact that the authority, which passed the order in question, was acting in an administrative capacity would not be enough to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court, especially when the question of exercise of the fundamental right of the petitioners to acquire and dispose of property, guaranteed by Article 11 of the Constitution, is involved.
Rex v. Board of Education (1910) 2 K B 165 and Montgomery Flour and General Mills Ltd. v. The Director of Food Purchases, West Pakistan and others P L D 1957 (W. P.) Lah. 914 ref.
Nakhuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayara the P L D 1950 P C 102 distinguished.
If, due to shortage of foreign exchange, imports of artificial silk yarn had to be restricted, the decision of the Central Govern ment declining to provide raw material for those factories which were not working prior to the 31st October 1953, or which had not been installed before the 31st March 1954, cannot be considered to be unreasonable and if the respondents had for this reason refused to issue any import licences to the factories which were installed after the due dates, there would be no ground for inter ference by the High Court.
Art. 170‑Whether and in what cases will High Court determine disputed questions of fact.
Ordinarily, in exercise of the special jurisdiction conferred by Article 170 of the Constitution, the High Court declines to determine disputed questions of fact, but there may be cases where it may be necessary for that Court to give such a determination without starting an elaborate inquiry into the matter.
Ss. 6, 7‑Yarn imported under licence‑Cannot be withdrawn from importer --Whether and when a previous order can be cancelled.
An order can be modified or cancelled before it has been acted upon, but the power to modify or cancel an order comes to an end after a decisive step has been taken.
In this case, the intention of the Textile Commissioner under lying his subsequent order was to withdraw the goods which had been imported by the petitioners under an import licence. Such an order could not be passed after the goods had been imported and the import licence had been exhausted.
Shahbaz v. Crown P L D 1956 F C 46 ref.
The provisions of clauses 6 and 7 of the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955, to the extent to which they were incon sistent with those of the Control of Essential Commodities Ordi nance, 1956 as properly understood, were not saved by section 16 of the Ordinance and hence the Textile Commissioner was not competent to pass the order intended to withdraw the yarn from the importer.
S. 3.‑Whether confers power on Central Government for acquisi tion of movable property in a Province or for regulating supply and distribution of goods in a Province.
Provisions how far in accordance with Constitution of Pakistan.
Held, that the provisions of the Control of Essential Commo dities Ordinance (IV of 1956) were in accordance with the Consti tution, except to the extent to which it provided for trade and commerce between a Province and the Federal Capital.
Sardar Muhammad Iqbal and Naseem Hassan Shah for Petitioners.
S. A. Mahmood, A. A. G. for Respondents.
Dates of hearing: 17th to 20th December 1957 and 6th January 1958.
Writ Petitions Nos. 59, 577, 277, 825 and 1258 of 1957, which are being disposed of by this judgment, arise out of the refusal on the part of the Textile Commissioner, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, (hereinafter referred to as the Textile Commissioner), to recommend to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Government of Pakistan, Karachi (herein after referred to as the Chief Controller), to issue licences for the import of artificial silk yarn to the petitioners, the failure on the part of the Chief Controller to issue such licences to the petitioners and out of an order conveyed to one of the petitioners (the Frontier Textile Mills) by the Textile Commissioner, in his letter, dated the 3rd October 1956, directing them to keep intact a con signment of artificial silk yarn imported under a licence issued for the shipping period January‑June 1956. The facts of these cases, in brief, are given below.
2. A concern, by the name of the Muslim Cloth House, Lahore, gave an application under section 5‑A of the Factories Act, 1934, as inserted by the Factories (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1940, to the Director of Industries, Punjab, to obtain permission for the installation of ten power looms at Garhi Shahu, Lahore. The permission asked for was granted on the 29th June 1953 and ten power looms are alleged to have been installed by this concern shortly afterwards. On the 10th January 1955, an application was given to the same officer to obtain permission for the altera tion of the name of the concern from the Muslim Cloth House, Lahore, to the Frontier Textile Mills. This permission was granted on the 4th March 1955. It is alleged that before the end of the year 1954, twenty‑nine power looms, including ten for the instal lation of which permission had been obtained from the Director of Industries, Punjab, were installed by the Frontier Textile Mills, without obtaining further permission from the Director of Indus tries, under section 5‑A of the Factories Act, 1934, or from the Central Government, in accordance with the Rules framed under the Development of Industries (Federal Control) Act, 1949, as such permission was not considered necessary. The Textile Commis sioner recognized this concern for the issue of import licences and, on his recommendation, 3,300 lbs. of artificial silk yarn were allocated to this concern for the shipping period January -June 1955. For the next two shipping periods of July‑December 1955 and January‑June 1956 this concern was granted licences for the import of artificial silk yarn of the value of Rs. 13,000 and Rs. 10,000, respectively, by the Chief Controller, on the recommen dation of the Textile Commissioner. On the 3rd October 1956, however, the Textile Commissioner, without assigning any reasons, by means of his letter of that date (copy Annexure D' in Writ Petition No. 59), withdrew the "recognition" of this concern and directed that the goods imported under the licence issued for the shipping period January‑June 1956 should be treated as commercial imports and kept intact for distribution to other factories. The validity of this order is being challenged in Writ Petition Nos. 59 and 577 of 1957, which are by the same petitioners. In the first- mentioned petition, it is prayed that a writ of mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, direction or order may be issued against the respondents (the Textile Commissioner and the Chief Con troller) to the effect that the order dated the 3rd October 1956 was null and void and that the petitioners are entitled to have their factory recognized for the purpose of grant of import licences. In the second‑mentioned petition, it is prayed that appropriate writ, direction or order may, be issued to the effect that their factory, consisting of twenty‑nine power looms, had been establish ed in accordance with law and that they are entitled to all the facilities regarding grant of import licences etc.
3. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 277 of 1957, the Allied Textile Mills, claim that they had set up twenty power looms in the year 1954 and though they applied to the Textile Commissioner, on the 27th November 1954 and the 24th February 1956, for the supply of artificial silk yarn, neither any such yarn has been supplied to them, nor have the grounds of refusal been communi cated to them. They pray that a writ of mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, order or direction be issued to the respondents directing them that the petitioners are entitled, like other such factories, to the supply of artificial silk yarn.
4. The next petition (No. 825 of 1957) is by the Asia Cloth Mills. This factory, consisting of fifteen power looms, is alleged to have been set up in September 1953, without obtaining any permission from the Director of Industries, Punjab, under section 5‑A of the Factories Act, 1934, as inserted by the Punjab Act of 1940. A quota of artificial silk yarn, of the value of Rs. 12,460, was granted to this concern, on the 17th November 1953. Subsequently, two applications, the first sometime after the 18th December 1954, and the second, sometime after the 16th August 1955, were submitted by them to the Textile Commissioner for being granted a licence for the import of artificial silk yarn and sometime after the 5th May 1955, another application was given for the grant of a quota. No reply is said to have been received by the petitioners to any of these applications, nor have the respondents communicated to them the grounds of their refusal to issue the import licences and to allocate quota of artificial silk yarn, though informally it has been made known to them that as their factory was not set up with the permission of the Central Government, it could not be recognized for the purpose of alloca tion of quotas and for the grant of import licences. The relief asked for in this petition is that a writ of mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, order or direction may be issued to the respon dents requiring them to recognize that the petitioners had set up their factory, consisting of fifteen power looms, in accordance with law and that they are entitled to all the facilities for the supply of artificial silk yarn and for the grant of import licences.
5. The petitioners of the last of these petitions (No. 1258 of 1957) are M/S. Muhammad Ibrahim & Sons. Their allegations are that on the 30th April 1952, permission was granted to them for the installation of ten power looms at Grand Trunk Road, Lahore, and shortly afterwards, the same were duly installed. They claim to have installed, before the 31st October 1953, without obtaining permission, eleven more power looms, making a total of twenty one. An application for the grant of a licence for the import of artificial silk yarn was submitted by them on the 5th May 1956, but they were allotted quota only for thirteen power looms. They pray that an appropriate writ may be issued to the respondents directing them to admit the petitioners' claim for the grant of quota, or import licences, for twenty‑one power looms.
6. All the five writ petitions are contested by the two respon dents, the Textile Commissioner and the Chief Controller, on almost the same legal grounds, namely, that the grant of import licences and release of quota are within the sole discretion of the Chief Controller and the Textile Commissioner and that their decisions are neither judicial nor quasi‑judicial and, as such, the orders passed by them are not capable of interference by this Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. They also contend that none of the petitioners has any legal right to the grant of any quota or import licence. On facts, they contend that in accordance with the declared policy of the Central Government (which was based on the recommendations of a committee set up for. the pur pose and which was notified by means of a press note on the 20th December 1954), installation of new power looms was stopped with effect from December 1954 and only those factories which were working on the weaving of artificial silk fabrics, on or before the 31st October, or those which had been installed before the 31st March 1954 with permission of the Provincial authorities granted before the 31st October 1953, were to be recognized for the purpose of supplying artificial silk yarn and necessary facilities for procure ment of raw material were to be extended to them. According to them, by making false representations the Frontier Textile Mills managed to obtain quotas of yarn and import licences from the Government, but when it was found that they had not installed power looms for the weaving of artificial silk fabrics before the 31st October 1953, the goods imported by them, on the basis of the import licence issued for the January‑June 1956 shipping period, were ordered to be treated as commercial imports, so that the same maybe made available for the use of other factory -owners. With regard to the Allied Textile Mills, the respondents contend that no power looms had at all been set up by them and, therefore, they were not eligible for the supply of artificial silk yarn. Regarding the Asia Cloth Mills, while impliedly admit ting that they had set up six power looms before the 31st October 1953, the respondents contend that as no sanction of the Provincial authorities was obtained to the installation of power looms in their factory, they were not entitled to the grant of any quota, or import licence. Lastly, with regard to M/S. Muhammad Ibrahim & Sons, their contention is that they were not in possession of twenty‑one power looms in working order on the 31st October 1953, though they had installed ten prior to that date, and that on the basis of ten power looms and some hand‑looms, which had been installed by them before the due date, they were supplied artificial silk yarn for running thirteen looms.
7. Before taking up the case of each of the petitioners individually and deciding whether. any of them are entitled to the reliefs asked for, it would be useful to explain the procedure which was followed in the matter of grant of quota and import licences, the legal sanctions behind the various orders passed by the respondents and the extent of validity of the Factories (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1940, and the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955.
8. To place restrictions on and to otherwise control the imports into, and exports from, Pakistan of various goods, the imports and Exports Control Act, 1950, was enacted. Subsection (1) of section 3 of this Act laid down that the Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette and subject to such conditions and exceptions as may be made by or under the order prohibit, restrict, or otherwise control the import or export of goods of any specified description or regulate generally all practices, including trade practices, and the procedure connected with the import and export of such goods, including the submission of applications for licences under this Act, the evidence to be attached to such applications and the grant, use, transfer, or sale or cancellation of such licences. Under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act, it was provided that no goods of the specified description shall be imported into or exported from Pakistan except in accordance with the conditions of a licence to be issued by the Chief Controller, or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government. In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1950, the Central Government on the 11th December 1952, issued the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, by means of which detailed procedure was laid down for the grant of registration certificates by the Chief Controller, without which no person could import any goods into or export out of Pakistan. On the same date, a notification was issued exempting all exporters from the provisions of clause (3) of that Order, the effect of which was that that Order was to apply only to those persons who were to import goods into Pakistan. That Order did not lay down any procedure for the grant of licences for the import of goods into Pakistan, nor did it specify the powers of the Chief Controller in this respect. On the 24th November 1953, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1953, was issued, which remained in force up to the 18th January 1955. On the 3rd May 1955, the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955, was issued, under the same provision of law. The last‑mentioned Order, under which action is being taken by the Textile Commissioner, from time to time, empowered him to fix the maximum prices above which no importer, or dealer, was to sell any specified kind of artificial silk yarn. Clause (6) of this Order empowered the Textile Commissioner, by notification in the Official Gazette, to direct importers, dealers, or consumers, to obtain licences for the import, sale or purchase, as the case may be, of artificial silk yarn, under such conditions and on payment of such fees as may be specified in the notification. So long as any such notification remained in force, no importer or exporter could carry on import or wholesale or retail trade in artificial silk yarn and no consumer could purchase such yarn unless he had obtained the necessary licence. Further, for the purpose of securing proper distribution of artificial silk yarn, or of securing due compliance with his orders, the Textile Commissioner was empowered by clause (7) to direct any importer or dealer to sell to such person, or class of persons, such quantities of artificial silk yarn as may be‑specified by him, or not to sell or deliver artificial silk yarn of a specified description, except to such person or persons and subject to such conditions as he may specify. We were told that no notification under clause (6) of this Order has so far been issued by the Textile Commissioner.
9. After control on the purchase, sale etc., of artificial silk yarn was re‑imposed on the 3rd May 1955, by means of the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955, consumers, dealers and importers, as defined in this Order, were required to apply to the Textile Commissioner for grant of licences to import artificial silk yarn and on his recommendations, the Chief Controller granted licences for the import of such yarn to industrial consumers and commercial importers. Before recommending such applications, the Textile Commissioner made necessary inquiries through his own officers or through the Director of Industries, Punjab, and normally the recommendations made by him were accepted. As a result of such inquiries, or otherwise, if the Textile Commissioner thought that an applicant was not a deserving one his application was not forwarded to the Chief Controller.
10. The Essential Supplies (Continuance of Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1955, under which the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955, was issued and which has now been replaced by the Essential Supplies Act, 1957, has an interesting history and it would be useful, at this stage, to make a brief reference to it. This Ordinance had replaced the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, which had been enacted in exercise of the powers conferred by section 2 of the India (Central Government and Legislature). Act, 1946, an Act of the British Parliament, which empowered the Central Legislature to enact laws on some of the matters which had been enumerated in the Provincial List of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. This Act had a limited life and was kept alive by virtue of the resolutions, passed from time to time, by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of the Act; the last of these resolutions having been passed on the 30th March 1954. The Act was to come to an end o the 1st April 1955, and before it expired the Essential Supplies (Continuance of Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1955, was promulgated by virtue of the Proclamation of Emergency issued under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935, on the 30th August 1948. The Proclamation of Emergency came to an end with effect from the Constitution Day, namely, the 23rd March 1956, and with it ended the power of the Parliament to enact laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Provincial List of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, except with regard to the Federal Capital. The Essential Supplies (Continuance of Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1955, was, therefore, replaced by the Control of Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1956, which was promulgated on the 25th April 1956. The last‑mentioned Ordinance was replaced by another Ordinance of the same name (No. V of 1956) and this, in its turn, was replaced by the Essential Supplies Ordinance, 1956, which was promulgated on the 17th November 1956. Each of these three Ordinances had a savings clause, the effect of which was to keep alive any orders made, or deemed to have been made, under the repealed Ordinance, in so far as they were not incon sistent with the provisions of the new Ordinance. The last of these Ordinances of the year 1956 was replaced by the Essential Supplies Act, 1957, which, while repealing the Essential Supplies Ordinance, 1956, did not have a savings clause similar to the one in each of the three previous Ordinances, but, by virtue of the provisions of sections 24 and 30 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, any orders made, or deemed to have been made, under the Essential Supplies Ordinance, 1956, if they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act of the year 1957, would be deemed to be still in force.
11. The Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955, which, as indicated above, was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by the Essential Supplies (Continuance of Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1955, has not yet been repealed and by virtue of the savings clauses contained in the three Ordinances of the year 1956 and the provisions of sections 24 and 30 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, still remains in force, to the extent to which its provisions are not inconsistent with those of the Essential Supplies Act, 1957, but it cannot be considered to be operative to the extent to which it comes into conflict with the provisions of the last‑mentioned Act. A reference to that Act would show that it was intended to provide for the control of prices and for regulation of trade and commerce between the Provinces and between a Province and the Federal Capital, in respect of certain commo dities. As the Federal Capital, according to Article 1 of the Constitution, is a part of the Province of West Pakistan, it appears to us to be doubtful if the Parliament could enact a law for regulating trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan, though Parliament was fully competent, by virtue of the powers conferred by clause (3) of Article 211 of the Constitution, to enact a law for the production, manufacture, supply and distribution of goods within the Federal Capital; which is one of the matters enume rated in the Provincial List of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. As the Essential Supplies Act, 1957, was not intended to provide for the production, manufacture, supply and distribution of goods within the Province of West Pakistan (except the Federal Capital), the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955, to the extent to which it provides for the last- mentioned matter being inconsistent with the provisions of the Essential Supplies Act, 1957, has become inoperative. The Textile Commissioner, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by clause (3) of this Order, is competent to fix the maximum prices above which no importer, or dealer, can sell any specified kind of artificial' silk yarn, but, except in the matter of control of prices, he cannot, in our opinion, pass any of the orders envisaged by clauses (6) and (7) of this Order, with respect to any importer, dealer or consumer, after any such person has imported any kind of artificial silk yarn under an import licence duly given to him.,
12. A few words may now be said about the powers con ferred on the Provincial Government by the Factories (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1940. This Act was intended to regulate the establishment of large factories for the promotion of key -industries, in order to avoid the evils resulting from un economic competition and congestion of labour, in a few big cities. Its purpose also was to heavy fees for the registration of factories in order to meet a part of the cast of inspections. Under section 5‑A, any person desiring to establish or to extend a factory, for the purpose of carrying on one or more of the manufacturing processes mentioned in the Schedule to the Act has to obtain permission, in writing, of the Provincial Government, or of such person or persons as it may direct. If an application, for this purpose, sent by registered post, is not replied to within a period of six months, the applicant is to be regarded as having obtained the required permission. After obtaining the required permission no factory can be allowed to work unless a registration certificate has been granted in respect thereof. Any certificate so granted is to remain in force for a period of one year from the date of grant or endorsement and is to be renewed automatically every year on payment of the prescribed fees. Nine industries are mentioned in the Schedule to the Act, one of them being the weaving of cotton and woollen fabrics. In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (3) of section 5‑A of this Act, by means of the Punjab Government Notification No. 442‑L&P‑46/39319 dated the 31st October 1946 published in the Punjab Government Gazette, on the 15th, November 1946, the industry of weaving artificial silk fabrics was added to the Schedule to this Act. The object of the Act being to regulate the development of industries and to provide for the levying of fees, it fell within the purview of Entry No. 29 of the Provincial Legislative List and Entry No. 26 of the Concurrent Legislative List of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, and hence the legislation was within the competence of the Provincial Legislature. As there was no repugnancy between the amendments made by means of this Act and the Factories Act, 1934, it was not necessary that the Bill should have been reserved for consideration of the Governor-General, as required by section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, after it had been passed by the Provincial Legislature. The position, however, changed when the Development of Industries (Federal Control) Act, 1949, was enacted by the Central Legislature, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 100 of the Government of India Act; 1935, read with Entry No. 34 of the Federal Legislative List in the Seventh Schedule to the Act. This Entry was in the following words:‑
"34. Development of industries where development under Federal control is declared by Federal Law to be expedient in the public interest."
13. Entry No. 29 of the, Provincial Legislative List in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, which was in the following words, was to be read subject to the provisions of Entry No. 34 of the Federal Legislative List referred to above:‑
"29. Production, supply and distribution of goods; development of industries, subject to the provisions of List I with respect to the development of certain industries under Federal control."
14. In pursuance of the powers conferred by section 4 of the Development of Industries (Federal Control) Act, 1949, the Development of Industries Rules, 1950, were framed on the 19th February 1951. Rule 4 of these Rules laid down that permission, in writing, of the Central Government was to be obtained for establishing any new industrial undertaking with regard to one or more of the industries specified in the Act which was likely to employ more than fifty persons, or to extend an existing under taking, which, as a result of the proposed extension, was likely to employ more than fifty persons.
15. The question requiring decision is whether after the date of coming into force of the Development of Industries Rules, 1950, the provisions of section 5‑A of the Factories Act, 1934, as inserted by the Factories (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1940, remained operative and was it necessary, after the said date, to obtain permission from the Provincial Government to the installation of any new factory, or to the extension of an old one, engaged in any of the manufacturing processes mentioned in the Schedule to the Punjab Act, in addition to the permission required by rule 4 of the Development of Industries Rules, 1950, or, at least, with regard to those factories which employed less than fifty persons The Development of Industries Rules, 1950, did not lay down that permission of the Central Government would be necessary for the installation, or extension, of such factories employing less than fifty persons, nor did those Rules save the amendments made by the Factories (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1940. After those Rules came into force, in view of the pro visions of subsection (2) of section 49 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the executive authority of the Provincial Government which was co‑extensive with its legislative competence), with respect to factories engaged in any of the manufacturing processed specified in the Schedule to the Development of Industries (Federal Control) Act, 1949, came to an end and, therefore, whatever may have been the number of persons employed in any such factory, in our opinion, the necessity of obtaining permission from the Provincial Government under section 5‑A of the Factories Act, 1934, also came to an end.
16. The next question requiring determination is whether the orders passed by the Textile Commissioner and the Chief Controller on the various applications of petitioners were of a judicial or quasi‑judicial nature and, as such, subject to control by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. We think no arguments are needed to support the respondents' contention that the various orders were not of a judicial or quasi‑judicial nature. Certain powers were conferred by, the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control)) Order, 1955, and the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, on the Textile Commissioner and the Chief Controller. In dealing with applications of consumers, dealers, and importers, these two officers had to determine certain questions of fact an were expected to dispose of those applications in accordance with the general policy and orders of the Government. In dealing with such applications these officers, apparently, acted in an administrative capacity and, applying the test laid down in Abdul Majid v. The West Pakistan Province (P L D 1956 Lah. 615); it cannot be said that the orders passed by them were of a judicial or a quasi‑judicial nature.
17. The question whether the orders passed by the respon dents are subject to control by this Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction is, however, not so easy to answer. This question is linked up intimately with the right, if any, of the petitioners to obtain import licences and quotas of yarn without which the business of manufacture of artificial silk fabrics could riot be carried on and the discretion, if any, given to these two officers in disposing of their applications. As stated in an earlier part of this judgment, the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, provided only for the registration of importers and exporters, but did not provide f or the manner in which applications for grant of import licences were to be dealt with, though a provision to this effect could be made by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1950. Clause (6) of the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955, empowered the Textile Commissioner, by notification in the Official Gazette, to direct importers, dealers or consumers to obtain licences for the import, sale or purchase, as the case may be, of artificial silk yarn, under such conditions and on payment of such fees as may be specified in the notification and where such notification was in force no importer or dealer could carry on import or wholesale or retail trade in artificial silk yarn and no consumer could purchase such yarn unless he had obtained the necessary licence. It was stated at the Bar that so far no notification was issued by the Textile Commissioner, which means that in the matter of grant of licences for import of artificial silk yarn, the only power which could be exercised was that conferred on the Chief Controller by subsection (2) of section 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1950, which is in the following words:‑
"No, goods of the specified description shall be imported or exported except in accordance with the conditions of a licence to be issued by the Chief Controller or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government."
The respondents' contention is that the power conferred by this provision of law on the Chief Controller is absolute and is not subject to control by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. For this contention, reliance is, presumably, placed on the provisions of proviso (a) of Article 12 of the Constitution, which saves the power of the Legislature to regulate any trade or profession by a licensing system. Though the words "reasonable restrictions", which occur in Article 11 of the Constitution, which deals with the matter of acquisition, holding and disposal of property, do not find any place in Article 12 of the Constitution, the use of the word "regulation" in proviso (a) of this Article; in our opinion, does indicate that the licensing system envisaged by this provision of the Constitution is not intended to confer absolute and unfettered power of grant of licences on any authority and that any law, which confers such a power, would be unconstitutional. Moreover, as in these particular cases, the grant of licences for the purpose of carrying on a trade and the acquisition of property for the purpose of carrying on a trade are so intimately connected together that the two cannot be separated from each other. If a licensing authority acts in such a manner as to deprive a person of his fundamental right to acquire and dispose of property and the power so conferred is exercised by that authority arbitrarily and capriciously, it would certainly amount to denial of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution and would, to that extent, be void. If from a perusal of the material placed on the records of these cases, we come to the conclusion that the licensing authority, namely, the Chief Controller, or the Textile Commis sioner, who was to initiate action in the matter, did not act in accordance with law, or that their decision was based on a wrong interpretation of the law, or that the discretion which vested in them was exercised arbitrarily and not justly, fairly and reasonably, we would not hesitate to exercise the power conferred on this Court by Article 170 of the Constitution.
18. Though the power to grant writs and to issue directions and orders conferred by Article 170 of our Constitution is much wider than the powers exercised by the High Court in England, the following observations made by the learned Judges in Rex v. Board of Education ((1910) 2 K B 165) would give some idea of the extent to which judicial control of administrative actions has been considered proper and desirable:‑
"If the Board of Education gives a decision which proceeds upon a wrong interpretation of the statute, such as the meaning of the word maintain', the decision is not conclusive, and it is competent to the Court in an action, notwithstanding the decision of the Board of Education, to do what is right between the parties.
"Such department when so entrusted (with administrative powers) becomes a tribunal charged with the performance of a public duty, and as such amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court, within the limits now well established by law. If the tribunal has exercised the discretion entrusted to it bona fide, not influenced by extraneous or irrelevant considerations, and not arbitrarily or illegally, the Courts cannot interfere; they are not a Court of Appeal from the tribunal, but they have power to prevent the intentional usurpation or mistaken assumption of a jurisdiction beyond that given to the tribunal by law, and also the refusal of their true jurisdiction by the adoption of extraneous considerations in arriving at their conclusion or deciding a point other than that brought before them, in which cases the Courts have regarded them as declining jurisdiction. Such tribunal is not an auto-crate free to act as it pleases, but is an inferior tribunal subject to the jurisdiction which the Courts of King's Bench for centuries, and the High Court since the Judicature Acts, has exercised over such tribunals."
19. In a recent case decided by this Court somewhat similar views were expressed. In the Montgomery Flour and General Mills, Ltd. v. The Director of Food Purchases, West Pakistan and others (P L D 1957 Lah. 914), it was held that the, discretion given by clause (7) of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order for the distribu tion of sugar was not absolute or arbitrary, to be exercised according to the pleasure of the Director of Food, and that even though there be no express words in the relevant legal provision to that effect, the discretion is always circumscribed by the scope and object of the law that creates it and has, at the same time, to be exercised justly, fairly and reasonably. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to Nakhuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Tayaratne (1951 A C 66=P L D 1950 P C 102), to support his contention that in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 170 of the Constitution this Court cannot issue any writ, direction or order in the circumstances under consideration, but the views expressed therein have no application to the present case, because of the limited power conferred by section 42 of the Ceylon Courts Ordinance on the Supreme Court of that country. The powers conferred by Article 170 of our Constitution are wide enough to cover a case of the present kind and can be invoked even where the order in question is not of a judicial or a quasi‑judicial nature and has been passed by an authority in an administrative capacity. The decision of the present cases would depend upon the determination of the question as to whether the discretion which vested in the respondents, was exercised justly, fairly, and reasonably, on correct interpretation of and in accordance with law and without any discrimination, The fact that the authority, which passed the orders in question, was acting in an administrative capacity Would not be enough to oust the jurisdiction of this Court, especially when the question of exercise of the fundamental right of the petitioners to acquire and dispose of property, guaranteed by Article 11 of the Constitution, is involved.
20. Due to shortage of foreign exchange, imports of artificial silk yarn had to be restricted and the decision of the Central Govern ment declining to provide raw material for those factories which were not working prior to the 31st October 1953, or which had not been installed before the 31st March 1954, cannot be considered to be unreasonable and if the respondents had for this reason refused to issue any import licences to the factories which were installed after the due dates, there would be no ground for interference by this Court.
21. Before taking up the case of each of the petitioners individually it is necessary to refer to one more point, namely, as to whether this Court should itself determine disputed questions of fact, or whether the findings of fact arrived at by the respondents should be accepted as correct for the purpose of decision of these petitions. Ordinarily, in exercise of the special jurisdiction conferred by Article 170 of the Constitution, this Court declines to determine disputed questions of fact, but there may be cases where it may be necessary for this Court to give such a determination without starting an elaborate inquiry into the matter, The correctness of some of the allegations made by the petitioners is denied by the respondents, but on the material placed on the record, we find that, without making any further inquiry into the matter, it would be possible for this Court to come to a definite conclusion on the disputed points and, therefore, we propose to follow this course.
22. Taking up the case of the Frontier Textile Mills first (petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 59 and 577 of 1957) the respondents' decision not to issue further import licences to the petitioners and to treat the imports made by them for the shipping period January‑June 1956 as commercial imports was based on the ground that this concern had not installed all the twenty -nine power looms by the 31st October 1953, the date mentioned in the Central Government's press note dated the 20th December 1954. We find from the record that eighteen power looms were purchased by this concern on the 2nd May 1953, and eleven on the 19th July 1953. Permission had been granted to the Muslim Cloth House by the Director of Industries, Punjab, on the 29th June 1953, to install ten power looms at Garhi Shahu, Lahore. Permission was also granted by that officer to the alteration of the name of the concern from the Muslim Cloth House to the Frontier Textile Mills, but this was done after the 31st October 1953. The petitioners' case is that all the twenty‑nine power looms had been installed before the 31st October 1953, but with a view to obtain a licence for the import of power looms in their letters dated the 24th September 1954 and the 27th July 1954, (copies R/1 and R/2) address to the Director of Industries, Punjab, this fact was not disclosed. In the letter dated the 24th September 1954, the petitioners merely stated that they had purchased land for this factory and preliminary arrangements for the construction of buildings, etc., were under way. In the application dated the 5th May 1955, addressed to the Textile Commissioner (copy A/45) it was clearly stated that as the concern had not received any raw material no business had been done. A general survey of all the industries was made under orders of the Director of Industries, Punjab, in the month of October 1954, and according to the letter dated the 15th May 1956, addressed by the Deputy Director of Industries, Lahore Region, to the Textile Commissioner (copy R/3) in the survey report the existence of this factory was not mentioned. The Deputy Director, however, admitted that nineteen power looms had been purchased by this concern before the 2nd May 1953, and eleven power looms on the 19th July 1953. He also added that the factory started consuming electric energy, in the present premises, from December 1955. In paragraph 4 of the letter, dated the 3rd October 1956, (copy R/6); addressed by the petitioners to the Textile Commissioner, it was alleged that all the twenty‑nine power looms had been installed at Garbi Shahu by September 1953. There is, however, nothing on the record to show that these allegations were in fact true. Admittedly, sanction to the installation of ten power looms had been accorded to the Muslim Cloth House,' lit June 1953, and it would be reasonable to presume that these ten power looms had been installed before the 31st October 1953. As there is nothing on the record to show that the premises at Garhi Shahu, where these ten power looms were intended to be installed, were sufficient to accommodate the remaining nineteen power looms also and as, admittedly, the construction of the new premises had not even been started before the 24th September 1954, when the letter of that date (copy R/1) was addressed by the petitioners to the Textile Commissioner, it cannot be held that any more looms had been installed by the petitioners before the due date. As to the question of obtaining sanction from the Director of Industries, Punjab, for the installation of the additional power looms, our view being that after the Rules framed under the Development of Industries (Federal Control) Act, 1949, had come into force, permission of the Provincial Government to the installation, or extension, of such factories became unnecessary, if the additional nineteen power looms had been installed by the petitioners before the 31st October 1953, the failure on their part to obtain permis sion from the Provincial authorities to their installation would not have stood in their way. But as it is, they are, in our opinion, not entitled to the full relief asked for.
23. When the order conveyed by means of the letter dated the 3rd October 1956, was passed by the Textile Commissioner, presumably, under clause (7) of the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control), Order, 1955, the relevant law in force was the Control of Essential Commodities 'Ordinance, 1956, (Ordinance V of 1956). The question is whether such an order could be passed under that provision of law. The learned Additional Advocate‑General, who appeared for the respondents, contended, firstly, that as these petitioners obtained the licence by making false representations, m exercise of his inherent power, the Textile Commissioner could rescind that order and, secondly, that as the provisions of clause (7) of the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955, did not come into conflict with the provisions of section 3 of the Control of Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1956, such an order could be passed by him. While conceding that after the 23rd March 1956, the Parliament could not enact a law to provide for production, manufacture, supply and distribution of goods within the Province of West Pakistan, the learned Additional Advocate‑General contended further that the Parliament was competent, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (4) of Article 106, read with Entry No. 4 of the Federal List of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, to enact a law for regulating trade and commerce between the Provinces, or between the Federal Capital and a Province, that the Provincial Legislature, by virtue of Article 119 of the Constitution, was not competent to legislate on any such subject and that in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Control of Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1956, the petitioners could be directed by the Textile Commissioner to sell the stocks imported by them to a person resident in the Federal Capital, or in East Pakistan, and, therefore, the order conveyed by means of the letter dated the 3rd October 1956, was valid.
24. As to the power to rescind the order previously passed by the Textile Commissioner, reliance was placed on Shahbaz v. Crown (P L D 1956 F C 46), but the following observations made in this case do not, in our opinion, support the contention raised by the learned Additional Advocate‑General:‑
"But in the present case the order of cancellation was passed before the date of release and in the order under appeal it has been made clear by the High Court that a locus poenitentiae will be left only if the order has not been carried into effect. Mr. Mahmood Ali's contention that it is not appropriate to speak of a locus poenitentiae in the case of Government is not sup ported by the very decision on which he relies, where it was observed that there might be a locus poenitentiae in such a case, but that it was at an end when the order of cancellation was passed in that case. Locus poenitentiae in law refers to the power of receding till a decisive step is taken. If a decisive step is taken other considerations would arise, but if that step is yet to be taken, we see no reason to restrict the power to modify or cancel."
It is quite clear that the view of the Federal Court, as that of the High Court, was that an order can be modified or cancelled before it has been acted upon, but that the power to modify or cancel and order comes to an end after a decisive step has been taken. In the, present case, the original order which was intended to be modified by the order conveyed by means of the Textile Commissioner's letter dated the 3rd October 1956, is not before us, but as the intention of that officer was to withdraw the goods which had been imported by the petitioners under an import licence, we are of opinion that such an order could not be passed after the goods had been imported and the import licence had been exhausted.
25. In the Textile Commissioner's order, conveyed by means of the letter referred to above, no indication has been given that the goods imported by these petitioners will have to be handed over to a person resident in the Federal Capital, or in East Pakistan, but if such be the intention and the Textile Commissioner's order is a prelude to the passing of an order of that kind, the respondents could take shelter behind clause (d) of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Control of Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1956, provided it can be held that under that provision of law a person could be compelled to surrender his goods without his consent. For deter mining this question it will be necessary to refer to the objects for which that law was enacted and the powers which were intended to be conferred on the Central Government for the purpose of giving effect to the objects of that Ordinance.
26. As remarked in an earlier part of this judgment, though by virtue of the powers conferred by Article 106, read with Entry No. 4 of the Federal List of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, Parliament is competent to enact a law for regulating trade and commence between 'the Provinces, as the Federal Capital is consti tutionally a part of the Province of West Pakistan, it is doubtful if it could enact a law for the purpose of regulating trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan. The Control of Essential Commodities Ordi nance, 1956, like the present Act on this subject, namely, the Essential Supplies Act, 1957, was enacted, as its preamble shows, for regulating trade and commerce between the Provinces and between a Province and the Federal Capital and was not intended to provide for the production, manufacture, supply and distribution of goods within the Province of West Pakistan (except the Federal Capital). To find out the meaning of clause (d) of subsection (2) of section 3, the object for which that law was enacted will have to be kept in view. This clause was in the following words:‑
"2. Without prejudice to the generality of the powers con ferred by subsection (1) an order made thereunder may provide‑
(d) for requiring any person holding stock in the Federal Capital or in a Province of an essential commodity to sell in another Province or in the Federal Capital the whole or specific part of the stock at such price to such person or class of persons under such circumstances as may be specified in the order."
In our opinion, this provision should be understood as carrying an implication that the goods in the possession of the person con cerned were intended for inter‑Provincial trade and commerce, within the meaning of Entry No. 4 of the Federal List of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. If this had not been the intention and a person could be compelled to surrender his goods not intended for sale outside, or even inside, the Province without his consent, it would have amounted to acquisition of property, which power, according to Entry No. 13 of the Provincial List of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, could be exercised only by the Provincial Legislature. The Central Ministry of Law, probably, was aware of this constitutional position and for this reason omitted the word "acquisition" from section 3 of that Ordinance, though that word occurred at several places in section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Continuance of Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1955, which was promulgated at the time when the power to acquire such property did vest in the Federal Legislature, by reason of the Proclamation of Emergency which had been issued under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935, in the year 1948. To hold that, after that Proclamation came to an end, the Parliament could, by law, provide for acquisition of movable property in either of the two Provinces (except the Federal Capital) and could compel persons resident therein to surrender any goods held by them for sale in the Federal Capital, or in either of the two Provinces, con trary to the purpose for which the same were originally imported, would amount to conceding to the Parliament the power to enact laws for the purpose of compulsory acquisition of property and also to provide for production, manufacture, supply and distribu tion of goods within the Provinces. As this power did not vest in the Parliament, ,the Control of Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1956, could not legally confer such a power on the Central Govern ment and in fact did not purport to do so. It follows that the provisions of clauses (6) and (7) of the Artificial Silk (Yarn, Control) Order, 1955, to the extent to which they were inconsistent with those of the Ordinance as properly understood, in the light of the observations made above, were not saved by section 16 of the Ordinance and hence the Textile Commissioner was not competence to pass the order conveyed by means of his letter dated the 3rd October 1956.
27. Before concluding discussion on this subject, a reference may be made to the provisions of clause (4) of Article 106 and Article 119 of the Constitution, on which reliance was placed b h the learned Additional Advocate‑General, to find out whether the object of section 3 of the Control of Essential Commodities Ordi nance, 1956, could be to confer power on the Central Government to provide for acquisition of movable property in a Province and for regulating supply and distribution of goods in a Province. Clause (4) of Article 106 has to be read with clause (2) of Article 1, which defines the territories of which Pakistan is comprised. The territories specified in sub‑clauses (b), (c) and (d) of clause (2) of Article 1 do not form part of either of the two Provinces and, therefore, the power conferred by clause (4) of Article 106 on the Parliament to enact laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Provincial List could have reference to the territories specified in sub‑clauses (b), (c) and (d) of clause (2) of Article 1 and not to the territories included in either of the two Provinces. This is clear from the language of clause (4) of Article 106, as well as from that of the remaining three clauses of that Article. If, as was contended by the learned Additional Advocate‑General, Parliament is competent to enact laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Provincial List of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution even with regard to the territories included in either of the two Provinces, clause (3) of Article 106 would become meaningless and the Parliament would be able to encroach upon the legislative sphere of the Provincial Legislatures. This, in our opinion, could not have been the intention of clause (4) and, therefore, with respect to matters enumerated in the Provincial List of the Fifth Schedule, the Parliament is not competent to enact laws for the Provinces, though it can enact such laws with respect to the territories specified in sub‑clauses (b), (c) and (d) of clause (2) of Article 1.
28. Article 119 of the Constitution, to which also reference was made by the learned Additional Advocate‑General, has no relevancy, so far as this question is concerned, because what this provision lays down is that the Provincial Legislature, or the Provincial Government, shall not have the power to pass any law, or to take any executive action, prohibiting or restricting the entry into, or export from, the Province of goods of any class or description. This being a matter relating to trade and commerce between the Provinces would fall within the legislative sphere of the Parliament (in view of the wordings of Entry No. 4 of the Federal List of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution) and hence, even if Article 119 had not been there, the Provincial Legislature would have been incompetent to enact any law on this subject. The object of the Control of Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1956, as its preamble shows, was to provide for trade and commerce between the Provinces and to that extent that law was within the legislative competence of the Parliament. The object of that law was not to provide for regu lating trade and commerce within a Province, which is a Provincial subject, nor to provide for production, manufacture, supply and distribution of goods within a Province, which, again, is a Provincial subject, but if it is assumed that such a power was intended to be conferred on the Central Government, by means of the Control of Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1956, we would not have hesitated to declare that no such power could be conferred on the Central Government and hence to that extent that law was void. However, as this did not appear to have been the intention behind that Ordinance, we hold that the provisions of that Ordinance were in accordance with the Constitution, except to the extent to which L it provided for trade and commerce between a Province and the Federal Capital.
29. For reasons given above, Writ Petitions Nos. 59 and 577 of 1957 are partially accepted and a direction is issued to the respondents to allow the petitioners' application for the issue of import licences, or quota, for artificial silk yarn for the use of ten power looms installed by them before the 31st October 1953. A direction is also issued to them not to pass any further orders with regard to the quota of yarn imported by these petitioners during the shipping period January‑June 1956, which they would be entitled to use m their factory. The respondents are also directed to pay costs of these .two petitions to the petitioners.
This direction of course assumes that the present policy of the Central Government would continue to be enforced in the relevant period.
30. In the petition of the Allied Textile Mills (No. 277 of 1957), we find that no satisfactory proof has been placed on the record to show that any power looms were set up by these peti tioners before the 31st October 1953. The original applicants were Rustam & Company and one M. B. Chaudhry applied on their behalf for permission to install thirty‑five power looms. On making inquiries it was found that Rustam & Company was a firm owned by one Mr. Rahim Bakhsh, who had nothing to do with the person who had applied to the Textile Commissioner. In the second application dated the 27th November 1954 (copy R/3), it was stated that the name of the concern had been altered to the Allied Textile Mills. This was signed by one Abdul Qayyum Arif on behalf of Mr. M. B. Chaudhry. Inquiries made through the Direc tor of Supply and Development, Government of Pakistan, Lahore, revealed that the office of this concern did not exist at the address given in the application and it had neither any factory nor had installed any power looms until the 4th February 1956. In these circumstances, the respondents were justified, in view of the clear policy of the Central Government, to refuse the application for the grant of an import licence, or a quota, to this concern. The petition is without any substance and is, hereby, dismissed with costs.
31. In Writ Petition No. 825 of 1957, the petitioners, Messrs. Asia Cloth Mills, claim to have installed fifteen power looms before the 31st October 1953, but their application, dated the 5th Novem ber 1953, addressed to the Textile Commissioner, Karachi, (Appendix II) clearly indicates that up to that date they had installed only six power looms. The same fact was certified by the Vice -President of the Punjab Power Looms Textile Manufacturing Association by whom this application was forwarded to the Textile Commissioner. Their contention that, in fact, fifteen power looms had been installed by them before that date cannot, therefore, be accepted as correct. Admittedly, no sanction had been taken by these petitioners from the Provincial Government, or the Director of Industries, under section 5‑A of the Factories Act, 1934, as inserted by the Factories (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1940, but for reasons already given, on this ground alone, the issue of a quota for artificial silk yarn could not be refused by the respondents. Their petition is, therefore, accepted in part and a direction is issued to the respondents to continue supplying artificial silk yarn during the currency of the present policy, for the use of six power looms which had been installed by these petitioners before the due date. As these petitioners have succeeded only partially, we make no order as to costs of this petition.
32. In Writ Petition No. 1258 of 1957, submitted by Messrs. Muhammad Ibrahim & Sons, it is established from the material placed on the record that sanction had been accorded to these petitioners on the 30th April 1952 for the installation of ten power looms and these looms were duly installed by them before the 31st October 1953, as indicated in the certificate (copy 1/6) of 31st August 1953. The claim made by these petitioners that the remaining eleven power looms were also installed by them before the due date has, in our opinion, not been established. We are inclined to hold that the certificate, dated the 29th June 1953, issued by one lqbal Mirza (copy 1/2), is not a genuine document. On the basis of the Central Government's policy decision, these petitioners could not claim import licence, or quota, for the supply of artificial silk yarn for more than ten power looms and to that extent only their claims can be held to have been established. A direction is, accordingly, issued to the respondents to allow during the currency of the present policy, import licence, or quota, for artificial silk yarn for being used in the ten power looms installed by the peti tioners before the due date. As the success in this case also has been partial, we make no order as to costs.
A. H. Orders accordingly.
Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.
🔍 Find a Lawyer