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Writ Petition No. 754/R of 1978, decided on 1st February, 1983.

‑‑Art. 199‑Constitutional jurisdiction ‑Findings of fact, mostly conclusive‑Cannot be re‑opened or re‑examined‑Such findings can be upset only in exceptional cases when found perverse or contrary to relevant evidence.‑[Finding of fact].

Para. 11‑Allotment of land‑Mere proposal, held, does not give right to claimant.

‑‑‑Para. 11‑Rateable distribution of land at discretion of Settlement Commissioner to accommodate maximum deserving candidate -Authority concerned to take all relevant facts into consideration Provision of para. 11 of Scheme construed and applied rightly Order passed, held, not suffering from any error of law.

Hafiz Rao Muhammad Daud Khan v. Rehabilitation Commissioner, Hyderabad and another P L D 1961 Kar. 224; Abdul Hafiz v. Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan acrd 4 others P L D 1966 S C 483; Wali Muhammad and others v. Sakhi Muhammad and others P L D 1974 S C 106 and Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others P L D 1974 S C 139 ref.

Malik Amjad Hussain and Mian Nusrat Ullah for Petitioner.

Ghulam Muhammad Bhatti and A. R. Shaukat for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 26th September, 1982.

This is the 3rd round of litigation. The second round concluded on 2nd September, 1976 when I disposed of Writ Petition No. 1042‑R of 1975. Case was remanded to the Settlement Commissioner with a direction "that he should not only decide the disputed questions of fact finally but also write an order/judgment as envisaged under Order XX, rule 4, C. P. C."

Thereafter, the case was decided by the Additional Commissioner (Revenue)/ Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha by order dated 20th June, 1978. This order was against the petitioner. Hence, he has impugned the same by means of this petition.

Facts have elaborately been stated in the impugned order, I have also dealt with the facts in detail. It is, therefore, not necessary to repeat. Nevertheless, I shall refer to those facts only which are necessary for the disposal of this petition.

Before proceeding further I would like to observe that I made it clear to the learned counsel for the parties that I shall. not re‑open the findings of fact and would confine myself to examine only the legal propositions.

The disputed land comprising Killa Nos. I to 5 and 6/2 of Square No. 47 is situated in Chak No. 44/NB. Initially, allotment in this Chak was banned. Vide Memo. No. 3560‑58/1727‑R (P), dated 4th June, 1958, it was decided that the land situated outside the prohibited belt of Sargodha town be used for allotment to the entitled claimants under Rehabilitation Scheme. This meant that the ban on the allotment of rural agricultural land situated in Chak No. 44‑NB was removed on 4th June, 1958. The Deputy Commissioner, however, made a back reference to the Board of Revenue vide Memo. No. 247/G/SO, dated 12th September, 1958 for reconsideration of the matter.

According to the impugned order, no further correspondence took place between the Deputy Commissioner and the Board of Revenue However, the ban was removed vide Memo. No. 6810‑59/5098‑RC, dated 12th November, 1959. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commis sioner, Lahore, vide Memo. No. 571‑AQN/SRD/13, dated 16th June, 1560 directed that 11 squares of land out of the landed property of Sir Maharaj Singh be utilised for the settlement of claims.

The petitioner claims to be a claimant. He filed his claim in Chak No. 115‑SB. His entitlement to the extent of 337 units was satisfied and the remaining was transferred to Chak No. 44/N B. The transfer took place on the written request of the petition in March, 1960.

It is alleged that the order of transfer was passed by the D. R. C. (Land) on 14th May, 1960. On 10th June, 1960, the petitioner was proposed land in Killa Nos. 1 to 16 and 17/1 of Square No. 47 situated in Chak No. 44/N B.

On 23rd June, 1960, Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha, fixed a limit of 121 acres. , This limit was fixed keeping in view the principle of Consolidation and Land Reforms. When the proposal was put up before the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner, he confirmed the land comprising Killa Nos. 6/1, 7 to 16 and 17/1 of Square No. 47 and deleted Ktlla Nos. 1 to 5 and 6/2 from the proposal. The order of the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner was challenged by the petitioner before the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner. An appeal was filed against the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner's order and then a revision and so on and so forth till the matter came before this Court in Writ Petition No. 1042‑R of 1975 whereby case was remanded ; the impugned order was passed. Hence this petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Settlement Commissioner committed grave illegality in fixing the scale in this Chak. He relied on Land Reforms and Consolidation Scheme, and submitted that it was neither relevant nor applicable to this case. It was next submitted that Para. 11 of the Scheme was not attracted. The scope of this paragraph and its operation was limited to only those cases where the question of rateable distribution among the sitting allottees arose. It was then submitted that the petitioner was first in time. He was, therefore, first in right. Learned counsel in support of his conten tions relied on Hafiz Rao Muhammad Daud Khan v. Rehabilitation Commissioner, Hyderabad and another (P L D 1961 Kar. 224).

Learned counsel submitted that if at all the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner was competent to fix the scheme, then the same would not have been made applicable retrospectively. The submission being that the claim of the petitioner was, thus, damaged which had assumed a definite form of proposal as far back as 10th June, 1960.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there was no order of transfer on the file in favour of the petitioner. In this connec tion he referred to an earlier decision in Writ Petition No. 133‑R of 1961. Incidently, his stance was that the respondent was first in time. It has been so held in the impugned order. His claim in the Chak was pending since 1957. If allotment bad then banned, it was not the fault of the respondent nor could he be made to suffer for that. 1 hat was a policy matter. The moment the ban was removed the respondent became entitled to the settlement of his claim. He relied on Abdul Hafiz v. Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan and 4 others (P L D 1966 S C 483) Wali Muhammad and others v. Sakhi Muhammad and others (P L D 1974 S C 106) and Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (P L D 1974 S C 139).

As already observed by me, I am not going to either re‑open or re examine the findings of fact. The reason being that a finding of fact is mostly conclusive. It is upset in exceptional cases i.e. where it is found that the order/judgment is perverse or contrary to the relevant evidence.

In this case it is not so.

As is clear from the impugned order, the respondent submitted his claim in Chak No. 44/N B to the year 1957. According to. petitioner's own pleadings, it was‑in the yeai 1960 when a proposal was made in his favour. The mere proposal does not give a right . to a claimant. A/u proposal after all is a proposal.

The next question is about the application of Para. 11 of the Settle ment Scheme.. The aforesaid paragraph is to the following effect :‑

"Rateable distribution of land among allottees.‑In case where claimants of land under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. Whether in congested or non‑congested tracts, cannot be accommo dated in the estates in which they hold, temporary allotments on the plea that the land is not sufficient to meet the claims of all the allottee‑claimants for the particular estate, ail available land should be individually allotted to the entire group of allottee- claimants in a particular estate for which a separate maximum should be fixed for each estate based on the extent of the avail ability of land. The allottees found entitled to allotments beyond that maximum should be accommodated on evacuee land that may be found available in other villages

A plain reading of the aforesaid para shows that discretion ha been given to the Settlement Commissioner for rateable distribution. This is done in order to accommodate maximum deserving candidates It is, therefore, for the Authority concerned to take all the relevant e facts into consideration. This has been done in this case and I ad of the view that the aforesaid provision has been rightly construed and applied. The impugned order as such does not suffer from any error of law.

This petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

M. Y. H. Petition dismissed.

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