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First Rent Appeal No. 73 of 1983, decided on 4th October, 1983.

‑‑S. 2(c)‑Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979), Ss. 2 (f ), 15 & 2l‑Eviction of tenant‑Tenant denying relationship of landlord and tenant‑House let out to tenant by landlord's wife who collected rent on behalf of her husband‑Wife of landlord corroborat ing, in her evidence, plea taken by landlord that she was not owner and that she was collecting rent on behalf and with authority of land lord‑Held, being an owner, landlord could maintain eviction applica tion against tenant.

Bagh‑e‑Shah v. Muhammad Akhtar Hussain P L D 1977 Kar. 460 rel.

S. Inayat Ali for Appellant.

Khalid Latif for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 4th October, 1983.

The respondent sent a notice, dated 30th May, 1981 under section 14(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance of 1979 addressed to the appellant/ tenant claiming to be the owner/landlord of the house in question and in forming the appellant that he shall be attaining age of 60 years on 14th August, 1981 and requiring the appellant to deliver the possession of the house to the respondent at the expiry of two months from the date of receipt of the notice. It was also mentioned in the notice that the respondent did not own or occupy any other building in any locality. The notice was re ceived back with the endorsement of the Postal authorities that nobody at the addressee's house was ready to receive the registered notice and the addressee had gone to Punjab. Another similar notice, dated 7th Septem ber, 1981 was sent by the respondent which met the same fate. Thereafter a telegraphic notice was given to the appellant on behalf of the respondent. Rent Case No. 5133 of 1981 was instituted by the respondent before the Rent Controller on 21st November, 1981 under section 14 of the 1979 Rent Ordinance seeking an order of ejectment against the appellant on account of personal need of the respondent. The ejectment application was resisted by the appellant mainly on the ground that the wife of the respondent was the landlord of the appellant and there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was pleaded that the ejectment application was incompetent. On behalf of the respondent, the respondent himself appeared and his wife also came in the witness‑box before the Rent Con troller to give evidence. The appellant was the sole witness on his behalf. It may be mentioned that previously Rent Case No. 5499 of 1979 was filed against the appellant for his ejectment in which application both the res pondent as well as his wife were joined as applicants. During the pendency of the previous application under section 15 of the 1979 Rent Ordinance, the instant rent case under section 14 was filed. By the impugned order dated 7th December, 1982, the learned Rent Controller allowed the ejectment application under section 14 and ordered the ejectment of the appellant. This first rent appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging the order of ejectment. It may be observed that; according to Mr. Khalid Latif, learned counsel for the respondent, the previous Rent Case No. 5499 of 1979 filed under section 15 was dismissed for non‑prosecution after the impugned ejectment order had been passed under section 14. I have heard Mr. S. Inayat Ali, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Khalid Latif, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. On the basis of various documents on record it was found that the respondent was the owner of the house in question. I am also of the view that the documents clearly show that the respondent is the owner of the house in question.

3. It has however, been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that various documents including the receipts of rent issued to the appellant show that relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the wife of the respondent and the appellant and there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was further pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that all along the wife of the respondent had been claiming to be the lessor/owner of the house in question. According to Mr. S. Inayat Ali, the appellant's landlady was the wife of the respondent and not the respondent. It was further contended that as the tenancy had been created prior to coming into force of the Rent Ordinance, 1979, the definition of "landlord" given in section 2 (c) in the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, would apply in this case and the new definition of the term "landlord" given in section' 2 (f) of the, Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, will not be applicable. A perusal of the two definitions of the term "landlord" in . 1959 Rent Ordi nance and 1979 Rent Ordinance shows that the definitions are different. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant/tenant that if the ' definition of the word "landlord" contained in the repealed 1959 Rent Ordi nance was applicable the respondent could not be considered to be a land lord to maintain his application for ejectment against the appellant/tenant. On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Khalid Latif, learned counsel for the respondent, that as the ejectment application had been filed under the 1979 Rent Ordinance, 1979 Rent Ordinance would be applicable and the definition of the word "landlord", ‑which included owners, contained in section 2 ( f ) of the 1979 Rent Ordinance would be applicable, 'and as the respondent is admittedly the owner of the house in question, the ejectment application was competently filed and could be maintained by the respondent. In the alternative, it was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that even if the definition of "landlord" given in repealed 1959 Rent Ordi nance had been applicable the ejectment application under section 14 could be maintained by the respondent. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Mr. Justice Zaffar Hussain Mirza in the case of Bagh‑e‑Shah v. Muhammad Akhtar Hussain (P L D 1977 Kar. 460).

4. In this case, both respondent and his wife came in the witness‑box to give evidence. The case of the respondent was that he was the owner of the house in question and the house had been let out to the appellant through respondent's wife, who was also collecting rent for and on behalf of the respondent. The wife of the respondent in her evidence corroborated the stand taken by the respondent that she was not the owner but she was collecting rent and issuing receipts in her name but the rent was being re ceived on behalf and with the authority of the respondent. In my view, this is a case where there are two landlords. The wife of the respondent is a landlady of the appellant, as she had rented out the premises to the appellant and she was also collecting the rent and issuing rent receipts. But the respondent is also a landlord of the appellant inasmuch as he is the owner of the house in question and according to his evidence and the evi dence of his wife, the wife was collecting rent on behalf and with the authority of the respondent. Being an owner, the respondent could maintain an ejectment application under the 1979 Rent Ordinance in view of the definition given in section 2 (f ). According to this definition, the word "landlord" includes the owner of the premises. Even under the 1959 Rent Ordinance, an ejectment application on the ground of personal requirement could have been maintained by the respondent. Under section 2 (c) of the 1959 Rent Ordinance a landlord included a person who was entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land. If the wife was collecting rent from the appellant, according to the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent, she was collecting the rent on behalf and with the authority of the respondent. Even if it had not been disclosed to the appellant that the real owner of the house was the respondent, the fact remains that the wife of the respondent was receiving rent from the appellant on behalf of the respondent, who is the owner of the house in question.

5. The authority reported in P L D 1977 Kar. 460 supports the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the ejectment application was competently filed and could be maintained by the respondent. I am in respectful agreement with the principle laid down in that reported judgment. In that case a daughter had let out the premises to a tenant without the per mission of her father, the owner of the property. Later, however, this act of the daughter was ratified by the father. The rent was being received by the daughter and it was not disclosed to the tenant that the real owner of the house was the father. An application for ejectment on the ground of per sonal requirement under the 1959 Rent Ordinance by the father against the tenant, in those circumstances, was held to be competent by the learned Single Judge. It was held that the father was landlord of the premises within the meaning of the, 1959 Rent Ordinance and as such could maintain the evidence proceedings against his tenant.

6. I am of the view that the respondent could competently file and maintain an application under section 14 of the 1979 Rent Ordinance against the appellant. I find no merit in this appeal.

7. First Rent Appeal No. 73 of 1983 is dismissed but with no order as to costs. The appellant, is however granted time till 31st January, 1984 to vacate the premises subject however to payment deposit of rent.

M.Y.H. Appeal dismissed.

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