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Writ Petition No. 120 of 1957, decided on 13th"January 1958.
‑Misuse of‑May be rectified by recourse to Court which issued it and not by a writ petition‑Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 170.
The misuse of a search warrant can be checked and rectified by the Court which issued it, and the same Court can examine what documents should be retained by the police, which of them should be returned. The aggrieved party could then approach the High Court by way of a revision petition.
Recourse to a writ petition for adjudication of such questions was not approved by the High Court.
, S. 19 (3) ‑Search warrant‑General terms of‑Whether illegal‑Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 96.
Objection to a search under a warrant issued in accordance with provisions of section 19 (3), Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947), was taken that the search was meant for discovering evidence on vague allegations and that the procedure adopted was aimed at fishing out legal defects in the dealings of the party affected.
Held, that a search for documents which are unlimited in number and which are described generally with reference to their nature and contents means that the required documents are to be traced out from the documents which are not required by studying practically all available documents. It is in the nature of such a search that any documents which is found should be studied. If in the course of the study new offences come to light then it cannot be said that the procedure was adopted for fishing out legal defects and was meant for discovering evidence on vague allegations.
If the description of each document for which search was ordered had not been given in the search warrant, it was only it accordance with section 19, Foreign exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947).
The documents seized were in no way unconnected with the items mentioned in the search warrant and it was not desirable to thwart the investigation o1 the case by pre judging the trial or by going into the merits of the charges which were yet to be formulated by the authorities concerned.
The view that a search warrant should be in respect of definite documents believed to exist which must be clearly specified in the warrant (section 96, Criminal P. C.) was not applicable to the provisions of section 19, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947).
Chwa Hum Htive and another v. Emperor A I R 1933 Rang. 146 and M. I. Mamsa and another v. Emperor 38 Cr. L J 983 mentioned.
In re: Muhammad Tahir A I R 1934 Born. 104 and V. S. M. Moideen Brothers v. Eng Thaung & Co. 17 Cr. L J 543 not relevant.
(c) Search‑Carried out at night‑Not illegal.
, S. 19 Not discriminatory and not against Art. 5, Constitution of Pakistan ‑Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 5 (2) & 96.
Held, that section 19, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947), was not discriminatory or against Art. 5 of the Constitution.
The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not applicable where the provisions of section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 could be applied. There was thus no choice and no discrimination.
Waris Meah v. The State and the State Bank of Pakistan P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 157 rel.
Emperor v. Kaitan Duming Fernad I L R 31 Bom. 438 and Khilinda Ram and others v. Emperor A I R 1922 Lah. 458 ref.
, S. 19 (3) ‑Authorisation in regard to search by name‑Not necessary-- - Authorisation need not be gazetted.
, S. 19 (3) ‑‑‑Assistant Secretary to Government may authenticate orders issued iii name of President‑Rules of Business, R. 7 (2) read with item (I) Schedule III‑Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 41 (I) General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 8 (a n) (c)‑Expressions "Central Government" interchangeable with expression "President".
Suhrawardy for Petitioner.
Mohsin Raza Rizvi for Respondent No. 1.
Raymond for Respondent Nos. 2‑5.
--‑ In the year 1951, the petitioner exported gram and cotton by six consignments to Cochin, Bombay and Goa but their proceeds of foreign exchange were not received in Pakistan. The State Bank of Pakistan informed the Deputy S. P. Special Police Establishment, State Bank of Pakistan Circle, Karachi to investigate the facts of the case and S. I. Najmul Hasan was directed by the Police Establishment to carry out the investigation. He tried to gather information and obtain relevant documents from the petitioner but his efforts did not bear fruit. He issued at least three orders dated the 25th of March 1955, the 5th of May 1955 and the 5th of August 1955, under the provisions of section 94,‑ Criminal P. C. to Messrs. Farid Sons Ltd., but it appears that the only information that was communicated to him was that the goods which were exported were damaged and were found to be unfit for consumption and as such were destroyed. Full facts were not disclosed and it was given out that the facts were yet to be ascertained for which purpose enquiry was being purused. The investigation was in the meantime entrusted by the Special Police Establishment to Sultan Mufti an Inspector of the Establishment, who applied on 23rd of May 1956 to the City and A. D. M. Karachi for orders to investigate the case under section 155 (2), Criminal P. C. and obtained permission to do so. He then applied on the 27th of November 1956 to the Foreign Exchange Tribunal for authority to search the office of Messrs. Farid Sons Ltd., and the places of the residence of the petitioner and his Secretary, namely Shahedul Ghafoor. The Tribunal granted him two search warrants for carrying out search for the recovery of the documents relating to the export of the goods and other related documents and the seizure of the correspondence, accounts shipping documents etc. Mr. Shahedul Ghafoor, how ever, changed his residence from Nazimabad to Paposhnagar and therefore, according to para. 4 of the counter‑affidavit of Sultan Mufti another search warrant in respect of Shahedul Ghafoor's new residence was obtained. The search commenced on the 28th of February 1957 and continued till the mid‑night when the petitioner produced a stay order from the High Court. The premises were therefore sealed and a police guard was posted outside the premises and the search was stopped. On 6th of March 1957 the search warrants were held to be illegal by my brother Lari, J. on the ground that the Tribunal could not issue the search warrants unless a complaint was pending before him but he pointed out that section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act could be utilised for the purpose of obtaining search warrants without making complaints.
Before this order, but apparently on a realisation that there was a technical flaw in the search warrants, the Ministry of the Interior issued a notification on the 2nd of March 1957 by which the Central Government authorised the Inspectors of the State Bank Circle, Pakistan Special Police Establishment to make representations in terms of subsection (3) of section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. This notification was signed by an Assistant Secretary to the Government of Pakistan and was allegedly published in the Official Gazette. A search warrant was issued on the same day in favour of Sultan Mufti Inspector of Pakistan Special Police Establishment, by Mr. Mujtaba Khan, A. C. M., Karachi for searching the office of Messrs. Farid Sons Ltd., and the residence of the petitioner. This warrant was executed on the 4th of March 195‑/. According to para. 8 of the counter‑affidavit of the Inspector, he went to the office of Farid Sons Ltd., at 4‑30 p.m. where the petitioner was present and promised to be with him within few minutes, but slipped away and was followed by his employees, The Inspector of Police had therefore to wait until 7 p.m. for the petitioner or his employees to return in order to be able to open the iron‑safe, drawers and filing cabinets, which were locked. Finding that they were not co‑operating with him he in the meantime arranged that a Magistrate should be appointed as that the search might be carried out in his presence. Mr. Tahir Hussain, A. C. M. was deputed to supervise the search. The order deputing him was passed at 5‑30 p.m., Mr. Tahir Hussain received it after 6‑0 p.m. and soon went to the office premises. Actual search commenced at 7‑30 p.m. The search was going on in the absence of the petitioner and his employees, who were probably working else where to stop it. According to the facts stated in the order dated the 9th of March 1957, of Mr. Altaf Gauhar, D. M. Karachi, the petitioner met him at 1‑30 a.m. on the morning of the 5th of March 1957 and informed him orally that the office premises were being searched in an unauthorised and improper manner without a proper search order. The D. M. personally visited the premises at that late hour and was informed that a valid search warrant was being executed but he stayed the search by an oral order and informed the parties to appear before him on the same day between 9 and 10 a.m. A revision petition in writing was presented to the D. M. at about 9‑30 a.m. and arguments of the parties were heard on it by him. The D. M. did not pronounce his judgment and adjourned the case for the production of the High Courts order passed by Lari, J. by which the previous search warrant was set aside. The District Magistrate announced his order on 9th of March 1957 and dismissed the revision petition. On the same day the Inspector of Special Police Establishment applied for a fresh search warrant and a such a warrant was issued authorising him to carry out the search of the office premises of Messrs. Faridsons Ltd., and Fredricks Ltd., which is a sister concern of Faridsons Ltd., and the residence of the petitioner and to seize correspondence, accounts, shipping documents etc., pertaining to ten items which are enumerated in detail in the warrant. The search commenced in the afternoon of the same date but had to be stopped again because a stay order was produced at 4‑30 p.m. This order was passed on a revision application which was dismissed on the 18th of March 1957, and the order of stay was vacated. Lari, J. who dismissed the petition, however, pointed out that in order to remove the suspicion of the petitioner it was proper that the search should take place in the presence of a Magistrate and in the day time. We may mention that after the order of D.' M. by which he had dismissed a revision application of the petitioner and vacated the order of stay, the police had applied to him for the appointment of a Magistrate to supervise the search but this application was rejected by the D. M. The police applied again after the order of Lari, J. dated the 18th of March 1957 and on the strength of it the A. D. M. deputed Mr. Tahir Hussain, A. C. M. on the 20th of March 1957 to supervise further search, which however could not proceed much further because the petitioner presented the present writ petition on the 22nd of March 1957 and interim stay was ordered on the 25th of March 1957.
Mr. Suhrawardy, who has argued the petition has alleged that the motive of the Police in obtaining search warrants was the harassment of the petitioner and their object was to fish out some legal flaw somewhere in order to create further trouble for the petitioner. This motive and the object are revealed, according to him, by the fact that undue enthusiasm was shown by the police as well as by the fact that a beginning was made with applications for the, recovery of the documents of export of cotton and gram to Portuguese India and later on the items of search increased in number so that the last search warrant relates to documents pertaining to "Messrs. J. Payen Ltd., Bucks, England (2) Import of Worsted Wollen Nill Blant, (3) Messrs. Shiu Wing Hong of Hongkong and the payments received by Mr. Shahid in Hongkong on behalf of Messrs. Farid Sons Ltd., (4) Commission Account with Messrs. Daimler and Mercedes Benz Car of Fredrick Ltd., (5) Commission Account with Messrs. Fricks U. S. A. of Messrs. Fredricks Ltd. and Messrs. Farid Sons Ltd., (6) Purchase of disposal jeeps in Hongkong, (7) payments made to representatives of their German Principals to be credited to Messrs. Fredricks Ltd., and Farid Sons Ltd. in Germany (8) Supply of Benz Cars to Khan Azam Khan Chief Engineer, West Pakistan and others against under invoice shipping documents, (9) Unauthorised payments made in foreign currencies to the son of Mr. Ghulam Faroque, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana and others, and (10) accounts maintained by Messrs. Farid Sons Ltd., Fredricks Ltd., and their officials in foreign countries with the Lloyds Bank Ltd., Mercantile Bank Ltd., and other banks in Calcutta, Bombay and other foreign countries, into the offence." This enlargement of the scope of search shows, according to the learned counsel, that the search was not restricted to the documents which were actually required but a probe was made at random, together with study of all documents which fell into the hands of the Police in an attempt to angle as many imaginary offences as was possible for them to make out. He has pointed out that in para. 2 of the affidavit dated the 9th of March 1957, Sultan Mufti has admitted that "while carrying on the search of the office premises of Messrs. Farid Sons Ltd . . . . . . I saw innumerable documents "and found that "Messrs. Farid Sons Ltd., and their sister concern Messrs. Fredricks Ltd., . . . . . . were regularly contravening the provisions of sections 4, 5, 10, 19 read with section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, by over‑invoicing and under‑invoicing their imports and exports, avoiding to repatriate their commission earnings in foreign countries, making and accepting un‑authorised payments of foreign exchange, withholding the repartriation of their foreign exchange earnings abroad and by not declaring their foreign exchange earnings to the State Bank of Pakistan . . . . . ." He contended that the police have illegally removed more than hundred files in defiance of the Court's stay order. According to him the documents seized by the police do not relate to the items mentioned in the search warrant and in any case the documents which have been taken must ‑be produced before the Magistrate in terms of the search warrants. Themselves and the police has no right to keep them in their possession or to study them. Moreover, the fact, that a number of constables, who were armed with guns, were posted at the residence of the petitioner, shows that the life of the petitioner was made miserable. The report of the Official assignee, who was appointed to take into his possession the documents which were seized by the Police, shows that 123 files relating to various subjects have been seized by the Police and each file contains, on average, dozens of documents. There is nothing, according to the counsel, to show that these documents disclose any offence except an allegation to this effect made by the Police themselves. The allegations contained in the writ petition against the I. G. Police were not pressed by Mr. Suhrawardy but he contended that the circumstances were clear enough to lead to the conclusion that the documents which were seized could not be allowed to be retained by the Police and should be returned forthwith to the petitioner.
A short answer to this argument is that the misuse of a search warrant could be checked and rectified by the Court which issued it and that the same Court could examined what documents should be retained by the police and which of them should be returned. The petitioner could come to the High Court in revision but he has preferred to get these questions adjudicated by a writ petition It may be mentioned that the petitioner did come in revision to the High Court twice before and his Revision Petitions Nos. 102 of 1957 and 117 of 1957 were dismissed. We have entertained this petition on account of other objections which will be discussed later but the argument regarding the misuse of the search warrants and undue retention of the documents has been pressed before us with so much persistence and vigour that we must state that a search for documents which are unlimited in number and which are described generally with reference to their nature and contents means that the required documents are to be traced out from the documents which are not required by studying practically all available documents. It is in the nature of such a search that any documents which is found should be studied. If in the course of the study new offences come to light then it cannot be said that the procedure was adopted for fishing out legal defects and was meant for discovering evidence on vague allegations. It is true that the documents which have been seized have not been produced before the Court which ordered the search in spite of the fact that the search warrants contain directions that they should be produced before the Court after the execution of the warrants. Mr. Raymond has explained that the documents which have been seized could not be so produced as the warrants were not allowed by the petitioner to be fully executed. The petitioner's counsel is right in pointing out that the description of each document for which search was ordered has not been given a in the search warrants now in dispute, but this is in accordance with section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. Subsection (3) of the section permits such orders. It runs as follows :‑
"On a representation in writing made by a person authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the State Bank and supported by a statement on oath of such person that he has reason to believe that a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act has been or is being or is about to be committed in any place or that evidence of the contravention is to be found in such place, a District Magistrate, a Sub‑Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, may, by warrant, authorise any police officer not below the rank of Sub‑Inspector.
(a) to enter and search any place in the manner specified in the warrant ; and .
(b) seize any books or other documents found in or on such place.
Explanation.‑In this subsection, place' includes a house, building, tent, vehicle, vessel or aircraft."
Clause (B) is couched in very general terms and this is in consonance with the object of the law which is to enable the discovery of offences which are usually committed with help of misleading documents and whose evidence is often concealed and spread out in bits which need to be traced out and correlated by references to diverse incomplete entries which often have their connecting links hidden outside the country. The difficulties of proof which arise from the complicity of persons residing outside Pakistan is met by the provisions of subsection (2) of section 24 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. In view of this and in view of the general terms of the search warrants which are in dispute it cannot be said that documents which have been seized and which have been listed by Mr. Raymond in his report are in no way connected with the items mentioned in the search warrants.(D The case is yet at the stage of investigation and we would not like to thwart it by pre judging the trial or by going into the merits of charges which are yet to be formulated by the authorities concerned. Mr. Suhrawardy has relied on In re. Muhammad Tahir (A I R 1934 Bom. 104) and V. S. M. Moideen Brothers v. Eng Thaung & Co. (17 Cr L J 543), in support of his contention that the documents which have been seized should be returned to the petitioner. The latter judgment lays down that under section 96 of the Criminal P. C. a search warrant should be in respect of definite documents believed to exist and that they must be clearly specified in the warrant. This view is not applicable to the provisions of section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The judgment of the Bombay High Court is not relevant because it is concerned with the issue of a search warrant under the Criminal P. C. for the purposes of an enquiry by the Customs authority into an offence under the Sea Customs Act.
Here we may note the argument of Mr. Raymond that the only right of the petitioner for claiming the seized documents is that he or his companies own them combined with an allegation that the search has been irregular, high handed and degrading to his personality. This claim cannot go further than the point that he should get back his property if it is legitimately not required for a legal purpose. If there is or can be a legal purpose for which the documents may be used by the police then the police are under no obligation to return them to the petitioner. The petitioner has alleged no other harm to himself besides a temporary deprivation of his possession of the property caused by an irregular act and damage to his reputation. Damage to his reputation is irrelevant because his case is not that there could be no search at all under the circumstances. His only grievance is that it was wider and harshar than was permissible. Damage to reputation is equal in either case. Irregularity arising from the scope and manner of the search does not affect the evidentiary value of the documents which have been seized. Conviction can follow on the basis of the evidence of articles which may have been illegally taken into possession. The illegality of the process by which possession is obtained is to be separated from the evidentiary value of the articles which are taken into possession. He has relied on Chwa Hum Htive and another v. Emperor (A I R 1933 Rang. 146) and M. I. Mamsa and another v. Emperor (38 Cr. L J 983). This being so the petitioner cannot succeed unless he shows that the documents which have been seized cannot possibly be used against him, his companies and their offices but his case in the writ petition is differently conceived because his grievance is that the search was made for fishing out evidence on the suspicion of crime. Section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, however, permits a general search if there is reason to believe that there has been a contravention of the Act.
We may add that we have not found any undue enthusiasm on the part of the police in their persistence to carry out the search. Mr. Suhrawardy has laid much stress on the search being made at night but has not cited any law against it. There is as yet no rule of law applicable to this part of the country against a search at night. Lari, J. suggested in his order dated the 18th of March' 1957, that in this case the search should take place during the day and in the presence of a Magistrate and the suggestion was followed. As against the legitimately determined persistence of the police to perform their duty, we are unable to appreciate the attitude of the D. M. who, in the words of Mr. Raymond, rudely' interrupted the search by visiting the premises at 1‑30 a.m. on an oral request of the petitioner made to him at his residence at night and in spite of the fact that a prima facie valid search warrant was disclosed to him by the police and the search was going on in the presence of a Magistrate. He afterwards declined to depute a Magistrate to supervise the search which was restated when he dismissed the written revision petition submitted to him after his oral stay order, in spite of stating in his order that there were suspicious circumstances in the search made by the police.
Mr. Suhrawardy's main argument, is that section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 is unconstitutional because it is wider in its scope and application than section 96 of the Criminal P. C. and creates a discrimination between those who are suspected of the commission of offence under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and all other offences to which the Criminal P. C. applies. He has addressed elaborate arguments to give prominance to the disadvantages which are involved to the appli cation of section 19 and has challenged the validity of the section under, Article 5 of the Constitution. Mr. Raymond met him by pointing out the following page from Waris Meah v. The State and the State Bank of Pakistan (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 157), in order to show that offences under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, were a class by themselves ;
"In the present case, if the Act had merely set up a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction, though with a procedure different from that prescribed by the Criminal P. C. for the trial of ordinary offences, no objection could successfully have been taken to the constitutionality of the Act because the offenders against the Foreign Exchange Regulation could validly and reasonably be considered to be a class different from offenders under the ordinary law. Nor, could any objection on the strength of Article 5 of the Constitution succeed if the Act itself had indicated, the classes of cases which were to be tried by the ordinary Courts, the Tribunals and the Adjudication Officers respectively. Even if the Act itself made no such classification but had required the Central Government to make it, the dis cretion so vested in the Central Government would have been constitutional, provided the classification made by the Govern ment proceeded on a rational and reasonable basis and was not arbitrary, capricious or whimsical".
Mr. Suhrawardy was able to get round his reply by referring to the following passage from the same judgment
"Here, not only is there discretion in the specified authorities whether they will proceed at all against any member of the class concerned viz., offenders against the Act, but there is also an unfettered choice to pursue the offence in any one of throe different modes which very greatly in relation to the opportunity allowed to the alleged offender to clear himself, as well as the quantum and nature of the penalty which he may incur: The scope of the unguided discretion so allowed is too great to permit of application of the principle that equality is not infringed by the mere conferment of unguided power, but only by its arbitrary exercise. For, in the absence of any discernible principle guiding the choice of forum, among the three provided by the law, the choice must always be, in the judicial view point, arbitrary to a greater or less degree. The Act as it is framed, makes provision for discrimination between persons falling, qua its terms, in the same class, and it does so in such manner as to render it impossible for the Courts to determine, in a particular case, whether it is being applied with strict regard to the requirements of Article 5 (1) of the Constitution."
He argued that section 96 of the Criminal P. C. and section 19 the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act could be utilised by the authorities at their own sweet will and in the absence of any rule of guidance in this regard there was discrimination. This argument was simply and squarely met by Mr. Mohsin Raza Rizvi, who referred to subsection (2) of section 5 of Criminal P. C. and pointed out that the provisions of the Code were not, applicable where the provisions of section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, could be applied. There was thus no choice and no discrimination. Section 5 is itself clear but he referred to Emperor v. Kaitan Duming Fernad (I L R 31 Bom. 438) and Khilinda Ram and others v. Emperor (A I R 1922 Lah. 458), in support of his contention.
Mr. Suhrawardy has attacked in his usual telling style the validity of the notification dated 2nd March 1957, issued by the Ministry of the Interior under subsection (3)‑of section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947, authorising Inspectors of Special Police to apply for search warrants on the grounds that (1) the notification ought to have granted authority to individuals to make representations, that (2) an Assistant Secretary could not sign it, that (3) the authority has not been expressly granted in the name of the President and that (4) it has not been gazetted. The notification is as follows:‑
In pursuance of the provisions of subsection (3) of section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, (VII of 1947), the Central Government is pleased to authorise the Inspectors of State Bank Circle, Pakistan Special Police Establishment to make representations in writing as contemplated in that sub section.
(Sd.) M. S. Siddiqi
Assistant Secretary to the
Government of Pakistan.
There is nothing in subsection (3), which has been reproduced before, to show that the authorisation should have been by name. The learned counsel has shown no rule or law in support of the H contention that an Assistant Secretary could not sign it and until some law or rule having the force of law is shown which points to the contrary; we have to presume that official acts have been done regularity. Sub‑rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules of Business read with item (1) of Schedule III of the Rules of Business shows, contrary to the contention of the learned counsel, that an Assistant Secretary can authenticate orders issued in the name of the President. The notification in question is not expressed to be in the name of the President and Mr. Suhrawardy has argued that it had to be so expressed under clause (1) of Article 41 of the Constitution. The order says, " ..the Central Govern ment is pleased to authorise ..but the expression Central Government is interchangeable with the expression President under the General Clauses Act read with Article 219 of the Constitution. The authorisation is therefore in substance expressed to be in the name of the President. It is to be noted that the expression used in subsection (3) of section 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, under which the order was made, is "the Central Government" and not "the President."
Mr. Raymond has cited State of Bombay v. Purnshottam Jog Naik (A I R 1952 S C 317), which is almost on all fours with the circumstances of the present case and we respectfully adopt the cautious language used in the judgment.
"Now we do not wish to encourage laxity of expression, nor do we mean to suggest that ingenious experiments regarding the permissible limits of departure from the language of a statute or of the Constitution will be worth‑while, but when all is said and done we must look to the substance of Article 166 and of the Order.
The short answer in this case is that the order under con sideration is "expressed" to be made in the name of the Governor because it says "By order of the Governor". One of the meanings of "expressed" is to make known the opinions or the feelings of a particular person and when a Secretary to Government apprehends a man and tells him in the order that this is being done under the orders of the Governor, he in substance saying that he is acting in the name of the Governor and, on his behalf, is making known to the detenu the opinion and feelings and orders of the Governor. In our opinion, the Constitution does not require a magic incantation which can only be expressed in a set formula of words. What we have to see is whether the substance of the requirements is there.
It has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 and therefore had to conform to its terms."
As to the publication of the order in the Official Gazette, Mr. Raymond stated before us repeatedly that the notification was published in the Official Gazette but has failed to produce a copy of the Gazette. We therefore conclude that it was not so published, yet we do not find that its publication in a Gazette was legally necessary. We, therefore, hold that the notification is valid.
The result of the above discussion is that the writ petition is dismissed with costs.
A. H. Petition dismissed.
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