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Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 227-R of 1981, decided on 14th November, 1982.

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, dated 16-9-1981, in R. S. A. No. 138 of 1981).

Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (M L R 115)-

Pars. 25 (3) (d)_Pre-emption, right of-Pre-emptor, to succeed, should have superior right at time of sale, at time of suit and at time of decree-Possibility of contemporaneous acquisition of superior right during process of sale-Held, cannot be given any importance for purposes of interpreting para. 25 (3)(d). [Pre-emption].

Molvi Sirajul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Afzal Siddiqui, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 14th November, 1982. .

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J. -Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment dated 16-9-1981 of the Lahore High Court, whereby a regular second appeal arising out of a pre-emption suit was dismissed. The petitioners are the plaintiffs/pre-emptors while the defendant is a vendee, who defended the suit an the basis that be, being a tenant had a preferential right as against the plaintiffs. Reliance was placed in this behalf on para. 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The petitioners' plea that after the respondent purchased the land he lost the status of a tenant and became an owner; therefore, he also lost the right of pre-emption and thus could not defend the suit on the basis of said provision of law did not succeed and accordingly the High Court dismissed their appeal.

2. Same argument has been reiterated -before us. Learned counsel has admitted the obvious condition for the petitioners to succeed as pre-emptors that they should have superior right of pre-emption at the time of sale, at the time of suit, and at the time of decree. It is. not denied that before the sale the defendant was a tenant' and qua him the plaintiffs had no preferential claim. This situation continued up to the time when the sale was to take place because at the time of and during, the sale the defendant remained a tenant. Even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that after the completion of sale in every respect, the tenancy right merged into ownership rights that would in no way clothe the plaintiffs with superior right, The, possibility of contemporaneous acquisition of superior right- during the process of sale is too philosophical to be given any --importance for the purpose of interpreting para. 25 (3)(d). It was never so intended by the law maker. Thus the plaintiffs could not claim superiority, merely because after .the safe the defendant became an owner. They failed to show superiority at the first crucial stage of sale.

3. The reasoning in the impugned judgment which is based 'on the object], of the said provision, is .a(so unexceptionable. There is no, request. To with the learned Judge that first right of pre-emption having been conferred on the tenant under para. 25, if a vendor acting on the dictates of general law of pre-emption accepts the offer of a would-be. pre-emptor (here the tenant) and sells the land to him, it could not be the intention of the law to deprive the vendee of the right simply because he himself had become the purchaser. In that eventuality anomalous situation would develope ; namely that, although a tenant when he brings the suit under para. 25, would succeed but would lose if he is defendant vendee in so far as the defence of equal/superior right of pre-emption, is concerned. Thus there being no force in this petition, the same is dismissed.

S. Q. Petition dismissed.

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