Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 Section 25A&37 Scoop Labor Court and the Appellate Tribunal were empowered to move behind the termination order to determine the correct status for which the service order period has been extended for employment. After meeting expectations for nearly 9 years in the same job, employees said that they had been given a new appointment on the double assurance that job conditions were being improved. Not that the new appointment is on probation, there is no solid evidence that in fact the work of the laborer is a complaint Ltd. and the Labor Court order was found to mark to mark, in the circumstances, the appellant maintains that the Tribunal, ordered the re-directed with the same benefits.
Appeal No. KAR‑610 of 1982, heard on 10th March, 1983.
Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑---
--‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 37‑Scope‑Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal empowered to go behind order of termination of service in order to determine true position‑Termination of service order purportedly passed during probation period‑Probation period stated to have been extended because work of workman was not up to expectations- Workman after having put in about 9 years service in same job stated to have been given fresh appointment on categorical assurance that terms of employment were being made better‑No tangible evidence that fresh appointment was on probation‑No tangible evidence that in fact work of worker was found not up to mark- Order of Labour Court accepting grievance petition and awarding re‑instatement with full back benefits, in circumstances, upheld by Appellant Tribunal.
Masood Mirza for Appellant.
Mirza Muhammad Kazim for Respondents.
Date of hearing : 10th March, 1983.
DECISION
This appeal is directed against the decision of the learned Fourth Labour Court, ‑given on 2nd December, 1982, allowing the grievance petition of the respondent workman challenging the termination of his services and directing the appellant‑Company to re‑instate him in service with full back benefits, within seven days.
2. The case of the respondent is that he has worked ass permanent workman of the appellant management at Landhi as jobber since 29th March, 1973. However, the appellant mills pressed and forced the respondent to change his old employment into new employment vide letters, dated 18th January, 1982 and 21st February, 1982. It may be pointed out that there is also on the record of the learned Labour Court the resignation from his job submitted by the respondent, dated 24th February, 1982. and the acceptance of the resignation on 1st March, 1982. Further more, there is a receipt, dated 15th March, 1982, bearing the signature of the respondent in token of having received his dues. Although the respondent is said to have been given fresh appointment, and the letters, dated 18th January, 1982 and 21st February, 1982, seem to support this view, no fresh order of appointment of the respondent has been brought on record. This is important because there is controversy as to the terms and conditions of the fresh appointment of the respondent. It is the case of the respondent that though he was appointed afresh his seniority and continuity in service were maintained while according to the appellant Company the fresh appointment was op' probation. The appellant Company has also filed a letter, dated 30th May, 1982, extending the period of probation of the respondent for a further period of three months upto 31st August, 1982. This letter is alleged to bear the signature of the respondent in token of having been communicated this decision but the respondent was not confronted with this letter and he denied that he was on probation or his probation was extended. Although according to the letter of the appellant‑Company, dated 30th May, 1982, the probationary period of the respondent was extended upto 31st August, 1982, his services were terminated with immediate effect by the appellant‑Company's letter, dated 28th June, 1982. Aggrieved by the termination of his services, the respondent preferred a grievance petition before the learned Fourth Labour Court which has allowed the same, as already stated. The learned Labour Court has allowed the grievance petition of the respondent on the grounds, firstly, that though the letter of the Company, dated 21st February, 1982, contained an assurance that the terms of employment of the respondent were being improved ; if the version of the appellant‑Company is believed that the respondent was employed as a probationer, the terms of employ ment of the respondent were greatly to his disadvantage and in complete contravention of the assurance given to him, secondly, that the respondent had worked as a jobber for nine years and under the circumstances it is not under‑stood how his work could be considered unsatisfactory, thirdly, that no evidence was brought on record to show how and in what manner the work of the respondent was found unsatisfactory and fourthly, although the period of probation of the respondent is stated to have been extended upto 31st August, 1982, his services were terminated on 28th June, 1982.
3. It was contended by Mr. Masood Mirza, the learned representative for the appellant‑Company, that as the respondent admittedly was employed as a jobber, he cannot be deemed to be a workman and hence his grievance petition against the termination of his services is not maintainable. No such plea was raised before the learned Labour Court and hence this plea cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage. Furthermore, the respondent in his evidence before the learned Labour Court stated that although he was designated as a jobber but in fact he performed various manual duties with his own hands.
4. It was next submitted by Mr. Masood Mirza, that the appellant had voluntarily resigned his former service and was appointed afresh as a probationer. There is no doubt the respondent had resigned and his resignation was accepted. He himself admits this position and conceded that he was appointed afresh but there is no evidence that the respondent was appointed as a probationer: The letter of his new appointment has not been brought on record. Furthermore, the letter of the Company, dated 21st February, 1982, contains a categorical assurance that the terms of employment of the respondent were . being made better. It cannot be said that appointment of the respondent on probation with the attendant risk of termination of services during the probationary period was an improvement upon the previous employment of the respondent and in implementation of the categorical assurances given to the respondent. Such a course would be characterised as fraud played upon the respondent. The bona fides of the appellant‑Company appear to be further in doubt in view of the letter, dated 30th May, 1982, by which his probationary period was extended on the ground that his work was not upto the 'expectation of the appellant Company. It is difficult to believe that the respondent who had nine years' experience as a jobber was found deficient in the work of such post on his fresh employment. I requested Mr. Masood Mirza, the learned representative for the appellant Company, to point out evidence indicating in what manner the work of the respondent was found deficient or unsatisfactory. Although Mr. Masood Mirza stated that the produc tion of the respondent was not upto the work as compared with other workers of the same category the frankly conceded that no such evidence has been brought on record. As such neither the letter extending the period of probation of the respondent nor the letter, dated 28th June, 1982.. terminating the services of the respondent during the period of his proba tion can carry weight, firstly, because there is no‑tangible evidence that the respondent in his fresh employment was appointed on probation, and secondly, that in fact his work was found not upto the mark or not satisfactory. Subsection (5) of section 25‑A. I. R. O. entitles a Labour Court and this Tribunal to go behind the order of termination of services of a workman in order to determine the true position.
5. For the reasons discussed by me above, I find no merit in this appeal and would dismiss the same.
A. E. Appeal dismissed.
