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Appeal No. KAR‑311 of 1982, heard on 7th October, 1982.

West Pakistan

‑‑‑ S. Os. 2 (1) (b) & 12 (3)‑Temporary workman‑Termination of service of ‑Permanent and temporary posts not specifically specified --All appointments initially made on _ temporary basis and confirmations made after completion of probationary period ranging from 3 to 9 months‑Petitioner workman .stated to have not been confirmed but. retained in purely temporary capacity by extension of period from time to time‑‑Services terminated. without assigning any reason pur portedly or completion of extended period of temporary appointment --Persons appointed similarly subsequent to date of appointment of petitioner retained ‑Petitioner. workman having served for more than 9 months, held, had attained status of permanent workman ‑Termina tion order, in circumstances, held, invalid ‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S. 25‑A.

Pakistan International Airlines v. Sind Labour Court No. 5 P L D 1980 S C 323 ref.

S. P. Lodhi for Appellant.

Samiullah Khan for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 7th October, 1982.

This appeal is directed against the decision of the learned VIth Labour Court, given on 26th May, 1982, dismissing the grievance petition of the appellant challenging the order of his termination from service, dated 8th March, 1980.

2. The admitted facts of the case are that the appellant was originally employed in the respondent Corporation, purely on temporary basis, as Telephone Operator, vide office order, dated 4th September, 1978. Her initial period of appointment, as appears from her letter of appointment, was only for 3 days, i.e. upto 7th September, 1978, but it was extended, from time to time, upto 31st May, 1979. It, however, appears that the appellant tendered resignation .from her post which resignation was accepted vide office order, dated 26th May, 1979. Some 14 days later, vide order dated 9th June, 1979, the appellant was re‑appointed, again on temporary basis; as Junior Assistant. The appointment was expressed to be for a period of 3 months. The period of her appointment was first extended by office order, dated 12th September, 1979, upto 8th December, 1979, and then by office order, dated 5th January, 1980 upto 7th March, 1980. Finally, by office order, dated 8^th March, 1980, the services of the appellant were terminated with effect from 8th March, 1980. No reasons have been specified in the said office order for terminating the services of the appellant except that she was appointed on temporary basis.

3. Some time before the services of the appellant were terminated, she had approached the employees' union in the respondent‑Corporation for taking up the matter of her confirmation with the respondent‑Corporation. The employees' union took up her case by letter, dated 29th January, 1980, addressed to the respondent‑Corporation, and demanded that the appellant be made permanent as in fact by the provisions of law she was deemed to be a permanent workman. The respondent‑Corporation, however, turned down the request of the employees union and by its letter, dated 27th February, 1980, informed the employees union that the appellant had been employed in a purely temporary post and. hence her services were liable to be terminated at any time as temporary nature of work may not exist due to organizational requirement. The appellant, after serving the requisite grievance notice upon the respondent corporation. filed a grievance petition before the learned Vth Labour Court, which has dismissed the same by the impugned order. The learned Court has held that since the appointment of the appellant was of purely temporary nature, and had been extended upto 7th March, 1980, it was well within the right of the respondent‑Cor poration to terminate her services and the appellant could have no grievance against the termination of her services as she was made fully aware of the temporary nature of her appointment.

5. I find no quarrel with the first plea of the respondent‑Corporation Obviously in an organization like the respondent‑Corporation, whose main function appears to be to purchase cotton from the local market and ginners and to export the same, the quantum of work and in consequence the number of jobs available would vary with the amount of purchases made, the number of orders received and the quantity of cotton exported, The question, however, which merits consideration is whether the respondent= Corporation is entitled to appoint employees oh temporary basis for an indefinite period and to prefer, in the same category, for confirmation the employees who may be junior to others. The practice in the respondent Corporation as appears from the evidence of Muhammad Amin, Manager (Administration), is that all appointments are initially made on temporary basis and such employees are placed on probation, ranging from 3 to months, and thereafter are confirmed only if they ate considered fit for the .job. This practice unfortunately is in direct conflict with the provisions of law. Clause (1) (b) of Standing Order 2 provides that a permanent work man is a workman who has been engaged on .work of permanent nature likely to last more than 9 months and has satisfactorily completed a probationary period of 3 month in the same or any other occupation in the establishment concerned. Admittedly all the appointments in the respondent‑Cor poration are not of temporary nature. This is evident from the fact that a umber of employees have been made permanent in the respondent‑Cor poration. If the respondent‑Corporation had divided its jobs into per manent and non‑permanent categories and appointed persons to the second category of jobs on temporary basis then irrespective of the period for which the. appointment was held by the incumbent, such incumbent would not be deemed to be a permanent workman; as he was not appointed to a permanent job. 1n support of this view, reliance is placed on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case as Pakistan International Airlines v. Sind Labour Court No. 5 (P L D 1980 S C 323). The respondent‑Corporation, however, has not adopted any such practice. As already indicated, all employees, particularly in the grade of Assistants, are initially employed on temporary basis and are put on probation for periods ranging from 3 months to 9 months whereafter it is decided whether they should be con firmed or not. Not only employees, particularly in the grade of Junior Assistants, are not initially appointed to any specified post, which may be permanent or temporary, but despite the fact that there are a number of Sections in the respondent‑Corporation. they are not even appointed to any particular section but on the contrary they are inter changeable from one section to another. This means that an employee who is for the time being posted to a permanent job in a section, may be transferred to a non‑per manent job in the same section or in any other section and conversely an employee holding a temporary job in a section may be transferred to a per manent job in the same section or in any other section. Such a practice would enable the respondent‑Corporation to treat any employee in the grade of Assistant, who has not been confirmed, as holding his job on temporary basis, although he may have put in much more than the prescribed period of service, by the simple expediency of either posting him to a non‑permanent post or describing the post which he is holding as non‑permanent., as it is not clear how many posts and of what nature are permanent in the respon dent‑Corporation. The complete disregard of the provisions of Standing Order 2 which is prevalent in the respondent‑Corporation, is clear from the list of Assistants appointed after 9th June, 1979. who are still in the service of the respondent‑Corporation. This list has been furnished by Muhammad Amin, Manager (Administration) in the respondent‑Corporation, who was further examined before the learned Labour Court. According to that list as many as CO Assistants, who were appointed since 13th November, 1979, I.e., after the appointment of the appellant as Assistant, are continuing in the service of the respondent‑Corporation. It may further be pointed out that the appellant was originally posted in the Marketing Research Section from where she was subsequently transferred, vide office order, dated 14th February, 1980, to the Export Documentation Section. From the list of the Assistants who were appointed after the appellant and who are still in the service of the respondent‑Corporation, it appears that as many as 5 such Assistants are continuing to serve in the Export Documentation Section and 2 such Assistants in the Marketing and Research Section. If persons junior to the appellant are allowed to work in the vary section in which the appel lant was working, there was no justification for terminating the services of the appellant. Mr. Samiullah Khan‑, however, sought to argue that most of the Assistants whose names appear in the list furnished by Muhammad Amin are typists or they have some other special qualification which makes them suitable for retention in service. There is, however, no evidence on record to show that special qualifications are being possessed by the 60 Assistants whose names appear in the list submitted by the Administration Manager Muhammad Amin, who are being continued in service. Even if it be assumed that the appellant came only do the ordinary work of clerk, as con tended by Mr. Samiullah Khan, there is no evidence to show that posts of Assistants for purely clerical work are not available in the respondent‑Cor poration and that persons junior to the appellant are not holding the same, It has been admitted by Mr. Muhammad Amin that there is no cadre of clerks in the respondent‑Corporation and hence clerical work has to be done by Assistants.

6. There is another ground on which the order, dated 8th March, 1980 terminating the services of the appellant, appears to be invalid. Clause (3), of Standing Order 12 provides that the service of a workman (whether permanent or temporary) shall not be terminated unless specific reasons for such termination are specified in the order of termination of services itself. The said order does not comply with this mandatory requirements of law.

7. The upshot of the above discussion is that I hold that the order, dated 8th March, 1980, terminating the services of the appellant is invalid and in contravention of the provisions of the Standing Orders. I would accordingly set aside the same and order the re‑instatement in service of the appellant with full back benefits.

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