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Appeal No. KAR‑139 of 1982, heard on 2nd May, 1982.

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑--

---Ss. 32 (1‑A), 34 & 50‑Interpretation of settlement‑Exclusive jurisdiction of Labour Appellate Tribunal‑Union raising demands and making application to Labour Court under S. 32 (1‑A)‑Employer making application under S. 34 to Labour Court praying for direction to restrain Union from pursuing its application under S. 32 (1‑A) on ground that in view of existing Settlement Union could not raise such demands‑Question involved purely of interpretation of settlement‑Order of Labour Court rejecting application of employer under S. 34, in circumstances, held, beyond jurisdiction hence set aside with direction that matter be referred to Tribunal for adjudi cation under S. 50.

Qamaruddin Hassan for Appellant.

Abdul Majid for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 2nd May, 1982.

This appeal by the Aspro‑Nicholas (Pakistan) Ltd., to which I refer for the sake of gravity as the company, is directed against the order of the learned IIIrd Labour Court made on 10‑3‑198 , dismissing the application filed by the company under section 34, I.R.O., praying for a direction restrain the Aspro‑Nicholas Employees' Union the respondent herein, ff0O pursuing their application under section 32 (1‑A), I.R.O., for the adjudi cation of certain demands made by the union.

2. The case of the company is that the parties had entered into a mutual settlement on 26‑6‑1980, in which the union had given 2 separate undertakings, one that during the operative period of the settlement, no demands or disputes involving financial implications upon the company will be raised by the union, and the second that the settlement would remain in force for a period of 2 years. i.e., from 1‑9‑1979 to 31‑8‑1981, and wilt thereafter continue to be binding until the expiry of the service of two months notice of the termination of the settlement, The company contends that inasmuch as the requisite notice for the termination of the settlement of 1980 has not been given by the union, the latter is still bound by the settlement and cannot raise any fresh demands. The application under section 34, 1.R O , was made by the company by reason of the fact that the union had raised fresh demands and as these were not accepted by the company, the union had filed an application under section 32 (1‑A), I.R.O., which application is still pending adjudication before the learned IIIrd Labour Court

3. The union resisted the application made by the company on the around that as the operative period of the settlement of 1980 was 2 years and as the said period had expired, the undertaking given by the union had been complied with and the union was competent to give notice of fresh charter of demands and initiate proceedings under section 32 (1‑A) I. R. O.

4. The learned Labour Court, by its impugned decision, has accepted the contention of the union and taken the view that the operative period the settlement was 2 years and that the settlement cannot be said to be binding for the subsequent period of notice of 2 months thereafter, referred to in the settlement, since notice of 2 months under section 40 (2), I.R.O. is provided only in those cases where no specific period for the operation of the settlement is stated in the settlement itself. The learned Labour Court was inclined to the view that the provision of notice in the settlement of 1980, appears to be in conflict with the provision of section 40 (2), 1.R.0. It has sought support for its view from the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Siemens (Pakistan) Employees' Union v. Siemens Pakistan Engineering Company and others.

5. I have heard Mr. S. Qamaruddin, the learned counsel for the com pany, and Mr. Abdul Majeed, the learned representative for the union. It was strongly urged by Mr. S. Qamaruddin Hassan that not only the meaning of the aforesaid provisions in the settlement was clear and un ambiguous but further the union was fully aware of the fact thereof and had scrupulously followed the said provisions, which were existing in the periodic settlements arrived at between the parties in 1973, 1975 and 1978 by giving the requisite notice of 2 months to the company before raising fresh demands or entering into negotiations with the company. On the other hand. Mr. Abdul Majeed for the union argued in favour of the impugned decision and relied upon the aforementioned unreported decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court.

6. It will thus be seen that the real controversy between the parties is as to the interpretation of clauses 18 and 21 of the settlement. In the case of Fauji Sugar Mills v. Vth Labour Court and other, (C.P. No. 487 of 1974) decided on 13‑4‑1976, a learned Single Judge or the Karachi High Court, while referring the issue of interpretation of a settlement arrived at between the parties, upon which issue, depended the question whether the workmen were entitled to statutory bonus or settlement bonus in addition to the statutory bonus observed as follows :‑

'Whatever be the respective stand of the parties the fact remains that dispute is now mainly based on the interpretation of the settlement itself. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to interpret the settlement in view of the provisions of section 50 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and that an objection to the competence of application under section 34, I.R.O., was raised at the beginning but. was not entertained. Whatever be the position in this regard the provisions of section 50 of the I.R O , are very clear which state that in case a difficulty or a doubt arise as to the interpretation of any provisions of an award or settlement it shall be referred to the tribunal constituted under the Ordinance whose decision shall be final and binding on the parties. There was no alternative left for the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court but to refer the matter to the Tribunal for interpretation of the settlement regarding the grant of bonus. The provisions of section 50 are exclusive and, therefore, I would refer the matter to the Tribunal for interpretation of the settlement dated 9‑2‑1972.

7 An appeal against the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Judge was filed by the workers union, but a Division Bench of the High Court endorsed the view taken by the learned Single Judge and dismissed the appeal.

8. Respectfully following the above decision, I am of the view that the learned Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the issue of interpreta tion of the settlement, which was the exclusive function and that it should have referred the matter to this Tribunal for decision. Although the matter is now with this Tribunal, the jurisdiction which this Tribunal exercises in appeal is somewhat different from that which this Tribunal exercises under section 50, LR O., and I am doubtful whether in the exercises of appellate' . jurisdiction this Tribunal can exercise jurisdiction under section 50, I.R.O., I would accordingly set aside the decision of the learned Labour Court as to the merits of the case and direct it to refer the matter for interpretation of settlement in regard to period or its operation to this Tribunal. If a similar issue arises in the application made by the union under section 3"‑A), LR.O., a similar action would be appropriate.

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