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Appeal No. HYD‑442 of 1981, decided on 22nd April, 1982.

West Pakistan

--‑‑S. 1 (4) and S. O. 12 (3) read with industrial Relations Ordi nance (XXIII of 1969), S. 25‑A‑Employees' Old Age Benefits Insti tution set up for purpose of collecting contribution from .employees and providing prescribed benefits to employees‑Not a registered Company under Companies Act, 1913‑No purpose of commercial investment though could invest its surplus funds‑Neither an industry nor an establishment‑Insurance Company dominated as such Institution as a separate entity also not an establishment-Employees of such Institution, held, not entitled to grievance petition against illegal termination of service‑Employees' Old Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976), S. 17 (3).

Wasiullah Qureshi for Appellant.

Naimatullah Soomro for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 22nd April, 1982.

The appellant, who was appointed as a Typist, vide order dated 3rd November, 1977, in the Employees Old Age Benefits Institution, the respondent herein, was transferred from Karachi to Hyderabad under order, dated 5th November, 1980.' It appears that the appellant was unhappy over his transfer to Hyderabad and accordingly, on 4^th November, 1980, he went to see Mr. M. A. Durrani who was the Office Superintendent of the respondent and also the Genaral Secretary of the workers' union in the respondent establishment fox assistance in getting his transfer cancelled. Some incident took place during the course of the appellant's visit to Mr. Durrani, in consequence of which Mr. Durrani made a report against the appellant and the latter was served with charge‑sheet, dated 4th November, 1980, containing 2 separate charges against him, firstly, that he unauthorizedly visited the Head Office on 4th November, 1980, at about 12‑30 p. m., and secondly that during the aforesaid visit, he committed act of riotous and dis orderly behaviour and manhandled the Office Superintendent, Mr. Durrani. A domestic enquiry in respect of the above charges was held against the appellant in which the statements of Messrs Mumtaz Alam Durrani, Anwar H: Khan, Abdul Waheed and Ferozuddin were recorded. The enquiry officer, in [his report, dated 15th January, 1981, submitted to the competent authority, held that the charge of unauthorized visit by the appellant to the Head Office was not established as the Officer‑in‑charge, Landhi‑Korangi Section where the appellant was employed, had permitted the appellant to visit the Head Office, but he found the charge of misbehaving with Mr. Durrani and physically assaulting him, proved against the appellant. The latter was accordingly dismissed from service, vide order, dated 15th February, 1981. The appellant challenged the order of his dismissal before the learned VIth Labour Court, which has dismissed his grievance petition by its deci sion, given on 27th July, 1981. The learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant's grievance petition on 2 grounds, firstly, that the grie vance petition was not maintainable as the Standing Orders are not applicable to the respondent Institution, and secondly, that on merits there were good and sufficient grounds for holding that the appellant had committed An act of misconduct, in misbehaving and assault ing Mr. Durrani. The learned Labour Court repelled the conten tion made on behalf of the appellant that he was . victimized on account of his union activities. Aggrieved by this decision, the appel lant has come up in appeal to this Tribunal.

3. I have heard Mr, Wagiullah Qureshi, the learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Naimullah Soomro, Advocate for the respondent Institution.

4. Since the appellant was challenging the orders of his dismissal from service, his petition could only be maintained of it fell within the purview of clause (3) Standing Order 12 read with section 25‑A, 1. R. O., one of the essential requirements for the maintainability of such an application is that the employee must be a person employed in an industrial or com mercial establishment as defined in the Standing Orders. Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi strongly contended that the respondent Institution was a commercial establishment and he urged 2 grounds in support of his con tention. The first ground was that the Institution was doing insurance business and is, therefore, deemed to be an Insurance Company for the purposes of the Standing Orders. The alternate ground was that as the State Life Insurance Corporation has been nominated by the Government under section 4 of the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976, to be the Employees' Old Age Benefits Institution, vide notification No. 50‑179(1) 76, dated 21st February, 1976, the Institution should be deemed to be an insurance company and hence a commercial establishment for the purposes of the Standing Orders. Now, as regards the first ground urged by Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi, though the Act under reference requires compulsory insurance with the respondent institution of all persons employed in an industry or establishment, neither the insured persons nor their employers are required to pay any insurance premia but the employer alone has to pay the prescribed contribu tion. Futhermore, in return for these contributions, which are manda tory, prescribed benefits are to be given to the insured persons. It was submitted by Mr. Naimatullah Soomro that this is a welfare organization and must not be confused with commercial enterprise like insurance business. Even if the functions and the working of the institution can properly be considered as being in the nature of insurance business, this alone would not make the Institution a commercial establishment or an insurance company. It must further be shown that the Institution is a company registered or deemed to be registered under the Companies Act. It was frankly conceded by Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi that the Institution is not registered nor deemed to be registered as a company under the Companies Act. No doubt, the Institution is a body corporate but that would not make it a company much less an Insurance Company.

5. The alternate ground urged by Mr. Wasiullah also has no sub stance. The mere fact that the State Life Insurance Corporation has been nominated as the Institution for the time being would not make the Institution an Insurance Company. Admittedly, the Institution is separate from the establishment of State Life Insurance. This is clear from the fact that the appellant himself had filed a grievance petition against the Institution and not against the State Life Corporation.

6. Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi finally sought to argue that as the Ins titution is engaged in commercial transactions, therefore, it should be deemed ,to be a commercial establishment for the purposes of the Standing. Orders. In support of his contention, he invited my attention to section 17 of the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976. Subsection (3) of the said section provides that the Institution shall derive its revenue from contributions payable under the Act and the rules ; all other pay ments made by the employers under the Act and the regulations; income from investment of the moneys of the Institution ; and donations and bequests for the purposes of the Act. It was argued by ,Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi that since the Institution was empowered to earn income by investment of its monies, it should be deemed to be a commercial establishment. I regret I find no substance in this contention. The Institution has been set up not for the purposes of commercial invest ment but for the purposes of collecting contributions from the employers and providing to the concerned employees the prescribed old age bene fits. It is only the funds which are surplus with the Institution for the time being that are to be invited. This practice is followed by all Semi‑Government organisations, including Municipalities.‑ That would not make them commercial establishment for the purpose of Standing Orders.

7. Even on merits, I find that the view taken by the learned Labour Court is well founded. As already pointed out, a domestic enquiry was held against the appellant in which besides the complainant. Mr. Durrani, 2 other office employees who were sitting in the same office as Mr. Durrani namely, Anwar H. Khan and Abdul Waheed, supported Mr. Durrani that the appellant had assaulted him and had picked up a chair with which he had struck him. Mr. Durrani was further supported by the medical certificate of injuries produced by him. There was thus ample evidence of the assault on Mr. Durrani by the appellant.

8. On either view of the matter, I find no merit in this appeal and would dismiss the same.

Appeal dismissed.

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