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Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑--

--‑‑S. 25‑A read with West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S. 1(4), proviso and S. O. 12 (3),‑Grievance petition against termination of service of a worker not to connection with or in consequence of an industrial dispute or which not led to such dispute‑Not maintainable is case of worker not covered by West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968‑Grievance petition not deemed to an industrial dispute but is to be dealt with as if it were an industrial dispute-- Only a matter brought properly brought before Labour Court in accordance with S. 25‑A could be dealt with as an industrial dis pute‑Workman whose service terminated in such circumstances-- No longer a workman under Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and unless violation of S. O. 12 (3) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 involved no grievance petition would be maintainable

Karachi Development Authority v., Presiding Officer, Fifth Labour Court P L D 1976 Kar, 514 ; Karachi Development Authority v. Muhammad Siddique 19&0 P L C 515 ; Karachi Development Authority v. Muhammad Wasim Khan 1981 P L C 952 ; Johnson and Johnson v. Zubair Ahmad 1980 P L C 622 and Noor Muhammad v. M ;s. Shah Textile Mills Ltd. 1980 P L C 665 re).

Syed Muzaffar Imam for Appellant.

Ali Am,/ad for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 1st April, 1982.

DECISION

This appeal is directed against a decision of the learned Fifth Labour Court, given on 7th December, 1981 upon the grievance petition filed by the respondent workman, challenging his dismissal' from service and directing the appellant corporation to re‑instate him in service with full back benefits. The decision of the learned Labour Court is based upon the view taken by it that the respondent workman appear to have been condemned unheard and no enquiry seems to have been held against him nor an opportunity was given to him to defend himself.

2. Mr. Syed Muzaffar Imam, the learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned decision of the learned Labour Court on the sole ground that the grievance petition of the respondent was not maintainable as the Standing Orders are not applicable to the K. D. A. or its employees, in support of his view the learned counsel has relied upon the decision of the Karachi High Court in the case of Karachi Development Authority v. Presiding Officer, Fifth Labour Court (PLD 1976Kar,514) and the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Karachi Development Authority v. Muhammad Siddique (1980PLC515), in both of which it was held that as the K. D. A. is established and carried on by under the authority of the Government and has statutory rules of service, conduct and discipline governing its employees the application of the Standing Orders is excluded both as regard the K. D. A. and its employees by reason of the first proviso to subsection (4) of section (1) of the Sind Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. A similar view was taken by this Tribunal in the case of Karachi Development Authority v. Muhammad Wasiq Khan (1981 P L, C 952). Since the grievance petition challenging the termination of services is required to be filed under clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25‑A, I.R.O., it can only be filed by a person to whom the provisions of the Standing Orders are applicable, as pointed out by this Tribunal in the case of Johnson and Johnson v. Zubair Ahmad (1980 P L C 622). Relying upon the above authority it was strongly contended by Mr. Syed Muzaffar Imam that the grievance peti tion of the respondent was not maintainable and he was not entitled to the relief awarded to him by the learned Labour Court No. 5.

3. Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned counsel for the respondent workman, while not disputing the position that the Standing Orders are not applicable to the appellant corporation or its employees sought to argue that nevertheless the grievance petition of the respondent was maintainable. He based his contention on the provision of such section (4) of section 25‑A, I. R. O., and submitted that as it provides that the Labour Court is required to deal with the grievance petition brought before it as if such matter were an industrial dispute. therefore, to all intents and purpose a grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O., is to be treated as a . industrial dispute and even a worker whose services have been terminated is entitled to file a grievance petition directly under section 25‑A, I.R.O., against the termination of his services. I regret that I find no force in this contention. There appears to be three maid objections to the con tention of the learned counsel. The first is that a grievance petition can only be brought by or on behalf of a worker as defined in the I.R.O. The definition of worker in the said Ordinance excludes workers whose services have been terminated, excepting persons who have been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid off, or otherwise. removed from employment in connection with or in consequence of an industrial dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay‑off or removal has led to that dispute. Furthermore, an essential part of the scheme of individual grievance under section 25‑A, I.R.O.. is that before bringing his grievance petition to the Labour Court the worker must bring his grievance to the notice, of his employer. In other words, the law envisages that an opportunity must be given to the employer, through the instrumentality of a grievance notice by the workman himself, to redress the workman's grievance. Where the bond of employer and employee has been surrendered, as in the present case there would be no employer to whom the grievance notice could be given and an essential pre‑condition to the filing of the grievance petition would not be fulfilled.

4. The second objection to the contention raised by Mr. Ali Amjad is that clause (3) of Standing Order 12 was specifically amended by A et V of 1972, which came into force on 7th September, 1972 to entitle workmen to file grievance petitions against their termination from service. As pointed out by this Tribunal in the case of Johnson and Johnsorn v. Zubair Ahmad, this amendment by the Legislature would have 1_been superfluous if a workman whose services had been terminated was eeveu otherwise entitled to file a grievance petition under section 25‑A, I. R.O.

5. The third objection to the contention raised by Mr. Ali Amjad is that is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that the words of a statute must be construed in their context and not taken out of h as context. . The subsection relied upon by the learned Advocate read as follows :‑

"(4) If the employer fails to communicate a decision within the period specified in subsection (2) or, as the case may be, sub section (3), or if the worker is dissatisfied with such decision, the worker or shop steward may take the matter to his collective agent or the Labour Court, or, as the case may be, the collective bargaining agent may take the matter to the Labour Court, and where the matter is taken to the Labour Court it s Shall give a decision within seven days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were in an industrial dispute .

6. A bare perusal of the above subsection shows that where a matter falling under section 25‑A, I. R.O., is taken to the Labour court, it shall give a decision as if such matter were in an industrial dispute. In other words, only after the matter is properly brought before a Labour Court in accordance with the provisions of section 25‑A, I.R.O,, is the Labour Court required to give a decision in the matter as if the matter were in an industrial dispute. It will be seen that the legislature has not laid down that the matter is deemed to be an industrial dispute but it is to be dealt with as if it were in an industrial dispute. In other words the legislature was referring to the procedure of the Labour Courts dealing with such grievance petitions. It may be pointed out that subsection (2) of section 36, I.R.O., confers powers of a Civil Court up on a Labour Court only for the purposes of adjudicating and determining an Indistrial dispute. Apparently it was considered appropriate to confer such powers upon the Labour Court while dealing with grievance petitions under section 25‑A, I.R.O., as no other procedure has been prescribed for the disposal by the Labour Courts of such applications. A similar view was expressed by this Tribunal in the cases of Johnson and Johsoss v, Zueubair Ahmad and Noor Muhammad v. M/s.4Shah Textile Mills Ltd. (1980 P L C 665).

7. For the reasons discussed by me above, I am of the view t ' that the grievance petition of the respondent workman was not maintainable by the learned Labour Court and would, accordingly, accept the appeal and set aside the decision of the learned Labour Court.

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