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Appeals Nos. FD‑744 and J.M. 775 of 1981/Pb., decided on 9th February, 1983.

(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑--

--‑‑S. 25‑A‑Grievance notice and petition‑Limitation‑Workman convicted by criminal Court and sentenced to imprisonment‑ Impugned termination order sent on home address and not through Superintendent of Jail‑Workman subsequently acquitted .and on release from Jail reporting to employer and submitting within 3 months appeal against termination order‑Serving grievance notice on next date of rejection of appeal and then filing grievance petition within one month of date of grievance notice‑Contention that grievance notice and petition were time‑barred, in circumstances, rejected.

(b) Industrial dispute‑---

‑‑‑ Termination of service‑Bank employee‑Convicted and sen tenced to imprisonment by criminal Court‑Services terminated -Reporting for duty after acquittal and release from Jail‑Termina tion order passed without any enquiry or opportunity of explanation and without independently proving alleged misconduct‑‑Held, should have been re‑instated after acquittal‑Termination order further passed without one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof, held, not sustainable and rightly set aside by Labour Court‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 19691, S. 25‑A and Wage Commis sion Award, Paras. .234 (6) (a) & (7).

A. R. Sheikh and Irshad Ali Mlan for Petitioner.

Malik Ghulam Rasool for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 31st January, 1983.

The two appeals captioned above arise from the decision dated 30th November, 1981 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 5, Faisalabad, whereby the grievance petition of Ghulam Murtaza was partly accepted as he was directed to be rein stated in service without back benefits. Since both the appeals arise from the same impugned decision, they are being disposed of together through this single judgment, in which Habib Bank Limited will be described .as the appellant and Ghulam Murtaza as the respondent.

2. The respondent was a cashier, On Nth September, 1975 he was involved in a 1975 arrested: The appellant sent to him absence notice dated 31st January, 1978 for remaining absent with effect from 6th October, 1975. The respondent sent reply to it. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under section 302. The appellant terminated his services and informed him vide letter dated 16th November, 1978 Exh. P‑6. The respondent was released from jail after being acquitted on 3rd July, 1980 and went to the Bank on 12th July, 1980. He appealed against his termination on 11th October, 1980 He gave grievance notice on 8th December, 1980 and lodged the grievance petition on 4th January, 1981.

3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the departmental appeal, grievance notice and the grievance petition, all were time‑barred. The information about termination of service was sent at the home address, whereas the appellant knew that the res pondent had been sentenced to life imprisonment and was in the jail. A No evidence was produce;. to show that the order of termination was actually conveyed to the respondent. If it had been sent through Sup erintendent Jail, there may have been Borne scope to say that he had got information.. Moreover being in the jail, he was not in a position to bring departmental appeal. He went to the bank on 12th July, 198( and within three months appealed on 11th October, 1980, So it was not time‑barred. Apart from it, since the appeal was dismissed as time barred, no question of its being barred by time arises. Information about the rejection of appeal is dated 7th December, 1980 and on 8th December, 1980 he gave the grievance notice. So the notice was not time‑barred. The petition was lodged on 4th January, 1981 so this too was not time‑barred.

4. Now coming to the merits of the case, it may be said that the respondent was rightly directed, to be reinstated in service. Action was taken under rule 6 (a) of the efficiency & Discipline Rules of the bank. Since on account of being convicted in a murder case, the services of the respondent were terminated, it was necessary to charge‑sheet him and to hold an enquiry against him. It may be said that according to sub‑para. 6 (a) of the First Wage Commission Award, ‑ it was not necessary to hold enquiry, yet it was necessary to take expla nation of the respondent according to . sub‑para. 7. Moreover, since no enquiry was made and the allegation of misconduct was not independently proved against the respondent for the reason that the criminal Court had found him guilty, yet after he was acquitted, he g should have been reinstated. If the order of termination be taken to have been passed under para. 234, since one month's notice or pay in lieu of notice was not given, the order of termination was for this reason also not legal. From whatever angle the case be seen, the order of termination was not maintainable and was rightly set aside by the learned lower Court.

5. So far as the question of back benefits is concerned, the res pondent has no case. The respondent did not perform his duties during the period be remained in the jail, not for any fault of the bank but due to his own misfortune. So he was rightly disallowed back benefits.

6. As upshot of the observations made above, I do not find any force in both the appeals and dismiss them.

A.E. Appeal dismissed.

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