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Petition No. LHR‑17 of 1982/Pb., decided on 28th April, 1982.

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑--

--‑‑ S. 38(3‑A) read with Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936), 3, 17‑ Suo motu revision jurisdiction of Labour Appellate Tribunal-- Exercisable over order of Labour Court as appellate authority under S. 17 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936.

Question was whether an order passed by Labour Court as appellate authority under Section 17 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936 was open to revision by Labour Appellate Tribunal under S. 38 (3‑A) of industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It was contended that it could not be said that the appeal before Labour Court was a case or proceedings under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, so as to bring it within revisional jurisdiction of Labour Appellate Tribunal. The contention was repelled.

Held: Clause (d) of subsection (5) of section 35 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was amended by S. 19 (2) (c) of Ordinance XIX of 1970 and the words "or any other law" were added therein.

1981 P L C 307 and A I R 1961 Mad. 247 ref.

P L D 1979 Kar. 725 rel.

Hamid Ali for Petitioner.

Respondent .in person.

Date of hearing : 17th March, 1981.

This revision arises from the order dated 11th January, 1981, passed by the learned residing Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore, whereby it was held that only the payment of four times compensation had been stayed and not the original amount of Rs. 29,497.47 The lower court has held that since the word compensation' had been used by his predecessor, the payment of compensation was stopped and not the original claim. The prayer of the petitioners was this also that new order of stopping the payment of the remaining amount be made till the decision of the appeal, but the learned lower court has not passed any order to that effect. Since the petition had been dismissed, it means that the second prayer was disallowed.

2. The prayer of the petitioners in the stay application was that the operation of the impugned order may be suspended and the amount already deposited may not be disbursed to the respondent. The stay order reads as under :‑

"Notice to the other party for 29th January, 1981. Compensation amount not to be disbursed till further orders."

This is noteworthy that the word 'only' was not used in the above quoted order with the words "compensation amount'. The intention of the learned Presiding Officer was not that only the compensation of four times the claimed amount may not be paid. If the intention had been this then either the word 'only' would have been used with the words 'compensation amount' or expressly it would have been directed that the original claim amount may be disbursed.

3. It has been argued on behalf of the respondent that revision does not lie as the impugned order has not been passed tinder the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. 1981 P L C 307 has been cited in support of this argument. It has been observed that the Labour Court acting as appellate authority under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act clearly acts by virtue of the powers conferred under section 17 of the said Act and not under any powers conferred by any provision of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It has been further said that while acting as the appellate authority the Labour Court is not governed by the rules of procedure provided by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969,, but by the provisions for the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937. It was, therefore, concluded that it could not be said that the appeal before the Labour Court was a case or proceedings under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, so as to bring the case within the revisional jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Two cases were cited before my learned brother, who had delivered the judgment, but they were differentiated according to the facts of those cases. No doubt A 1 R 1961 Mad. 247, according to its facts is distinguishable but this is not the position pith regard to P L D 1979 Karachi 725. It has been observed that since Standing Order 12 of the Standing Orders Ordinance 1968 provides that the grievance petition under section 25‑A can be made to the Labour Court, therefore the Labour Court acting under section 25‑A acts under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and thus an order passed under the sand section can be revised by the Tribunal. We have to see what powers the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 gives to the Labour Courts. Claused (d) of subsection 35 reads as under :‑

"shall exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under this Ordinance or any other law."

The words 'or any other law' were added under section 19,(2)(c) of Ordinance XIX of 1970. These words were added not with a view to give authority to the Labour Courts to exercise and perform such other powers which are given to them by any other law. because even in the absence of such a provision the Labour Courts are competent to bear appeals arising from the cases under the Payment of Wages Act. Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act empowers a Labour Court to hear appeals. In the absence of the words 'or any other law' it could be said that the Labour Courts while hearing appeals under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act are not functioning under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but after the addition of the abovementioned words, they act as appellate authority under the Payment of Wages Act as well as under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. No words of a statute can be regarded as redundant. So the words referred to above added in clause (d) of subsection (5) of section 35 were not added purposelessly. The purpose was to bring the orders passed by the Labour Courts under other laws under and amenable by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Before the addition of these words not doubt the orders passed by the Labour Courts under other laws could not be taken to have been passed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance and thus could not be revised by this Tribunal under section 38 (3‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. I, therefore, hold that the impugned order, is revisable by this Tribunal.

4. As a result of the observations made above, 1 accept the revision and direct that the total amount deposited by the petitioners shall not be disbursed till the final decision of the appeal by t9'e learned Labour Court.

Petition accepted.

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