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Writ Petition No. 2616 of 1982, decided on 7th July, 1982. .

‑‑ Art. 9‑West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), Ss. 13(2) & 15 (3)‑ ‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XLI, ;‑f r. 31‑Judgment‑Both Courts below complying with provisions of a Ordinance and appellate Court not feeling necessity of any further inquiry either personally or through Controller‑Tenant admitting knowing of landlord's one of sons who had no shop‑Concurrent findings, that landlords requiring disputed shop bona fide for personal use and occupation as they carry on business on trellis; upheld in circumstances of case.

‑‑ Art. 9‑West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), S. 15‑Order passed by appellate Court under Ordinance final‑Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide matter competent to decide same rightly or wrongly‑Mere fact of another conclusion being possible on evidence adduced, held, does not make a case for interference in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction‑Tendency of filing writ petition against final order passed by appellate authority deplored.

Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afaal Sohall and others P L D 1981 S C 246 ref.

Ch. Ghulam Mujtaba for Petitioner.

This writ petition assails the validity of the Appellate Order dated 13th June, 1982 pronounced by Mr. Muhammad Anwar, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sargodha who dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and confirmed the order of the learned Rent Controller who had directed the ejectment of the petitioner from the shop in dispute situate in Block No. 19, Sargodha City.

2. The relevant facts giving rise to this constitutions petition in substance are that Muhammad Rafique, the petitioner acquired the shop in dispute on rent from one Ilam Din, the predecessor‑in‑interest of res pondents Nos. 1 to 5. According to the respondents he did not pay the rent of the shop in dispute regularly and damaged the property in dispute so as to impair its value, Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 also took a specific plea that they required the disputed shop in good faith for their personal use and occupation.

3. The petitioner deified all these allegations and the learned Rent Controller formulated the following issues

(1) Whether the respondent has committed default in payment of rent T O. P.P.

(2) Whether the applicant requires the disputed shop in good faith the disputed shop for his personal use

(3) Whether the respondent has diminished the value and utility of was the shop O.P.P.

(4) Relief.

Issues Nos. 1 and 3 were decided against the landlord whereas the ejectment of the petitioner was ordered on the basis of the findings on issue No. 2. These finding were confirmed by the learned Additional District Judge and hence this writ petition.

4. At the very outset, it has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the learned Appellate Court is not in accordance with Order XLI, rule 31, C.P.C. as it does not indicate the reasons. 1t may be noted that .the reasons, "although not elaborate", have been given in the impugned order. The contentions of both the parties have been noted and it was held that the contentions raised by the petitioner were without force and the appeal was dismissed.

5. Instead of extending the provisions of Order XLI, rule 31, C.P.C. I think that the provisions contained in the special enactment i.e., section 15, para. 3 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) should be applied. The requirement of the aforementioned pro visions of law is that the Appellate Authority shall "decide" the appeal after sending for the record of the case of the Controller and also give the parties an opportunity of being heard, and if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Con troller. In the instant case, the imperative provision of law is that the Appellate Authority should "send for the record" of the case and should give the parties an opportunity of being heard. Both the learned Courts have complied with these provisions and they did not feel the necessity of any further inquiry either personally or through the Controller. There are concurrent findings of fact by both the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that respondents Nos. 1 to 5 required the shop in dispute bona fide for the personal use and occupation as they carry on their business on trollies The petitioner had admitted, when he appeared in the witness box, that be knew one of the sons of Ilam Din who had no shop. The petitioner does not know the other sons of Ilam Din.

6. 1n a similar case namely, Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail and others (1) it was held that in ejectment cases, finality is attached to the Appellate Order and the Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide' a matter is competent to decide it rightly or wrongly and the mere fact of another conclusion being possible on evidence adduced, held does not make it a case for interference in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. In the said precedent, the tendency of filing writ petition in the High Court against the final order passed by the Appellate Authority was deplored. Relying on the said dictum, I see no merit in this writ petition and dismiss the same in limine.

M. A K. Petition dismissed.

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