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SULEMAN SADIQ KHAN versus NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION


Section 22B Interim Constitution Order (of I 1981) The jurisdiction of the Chairman, with the sole discretion of arbitrary power under section 22B, is widely assigned to oversee and monitor the affairs of the Commission. Organizing is involved. Such powers include the authority to regulate the work of the Bench and to move matters from one bench to another.

1983 C L C 1702

[Lahore]

Before Muhammad Afzal Lone, J

SULEMAN‑ SADIQ KHAN‑Petitioner

versus

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN AND4 OTHERS‑Respondents

Writ Petition No. 2881. of 1983, decided on 4th July, 1983.

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑

‑‑‑S. 22‑B‑Provisional Constitution Order (I of 1981), Art. 9 Transfer of case‑Contention that Ordinance having no provision for transfer of case as such order passed by Senior Member. National Industrial Relations Commission for transfer of case is without lawful authority, held, has no force‑Power of "superintendence" preceded by adjective "general" in S. 22‑B confers on Chairman jurisdiction fairly extensive in character to supervise and regulate affairs of Com mission including working of Benches ‑Such supervisory power of Chairman under S. 22‑B quite exhaustive and not only confined to administrative . matters but includes power to regulate working of Benches and transfer cases from one Bench to other‑Such power cannot be denied to Chairman‑Provisions of procedural law to receive liberal construction.

The provisions which relate to procedural law, should receive liberal construction and given that meaning which will advance the purpose in tended to be achieved thereby. The provisions of section 22‑Bare, therefore, to be constructed in a manner, which may accomplish the object thereof, namely "efficient performance of the functions of the Commission." It can hardly be denied that the transfer of the cases from one Bench to another, is essential for such efficient functioning of the N.I.R.C.

Mst. Gaman v. Taj Din P L D 1968 Lah. 987 and Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey I L R 5 All. 163 ref.

Asmat Kamal Khan for Petitioner.

ORDER

Suleman Sadiq Khan petitioner filed a grievance petition under section 25‑A of the I.R.O., before the N.I.R.C. questioning his transfer from PECO Badami Bagh Works to Kot takhpat Works, Lahore. The petition was initially heard by Mr. Aziz Ahmad Khan,, the learned Member of the Com mission,, but on a reference made by him for transfer of the case, the learned Senior Member of the Commission, by his order dated 11th April, 1983 assigned it to an other learned Member, namely Raja Iftikhar Ullah Khan. When the latter intended to embark upon the hearing of the case, the peti tioner objected to his jurisdiction, on the plea that there is no provision in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, empowering the Chairman or for that matter the Senior Member of the Commission to transfer the cases from one Member to another. The learned Member referred to section 22.B of the I.R.O. which vests the Chairman of the N.I.R.C. with the authority to exercise general superintendence, over its affairs. In his opinion by virtue of such power, the latter was clothed with the jurisdiction to transfer the cases from the file of one Member to that of another. He further relied upon the explanation to section 22‑B (vi) which provides that the 'expression "Chairman' includes the Senior ‑Member of the, Commission., The fact that there is no prohibition in the Ordinance on such transfer, also influenc ed his decision. Thus, by his order dated 30th May, 1983," he overruled the petitioner's objection and assumed the jurisdiction. The validity of this order has been called in question through invocation of writ jurisdiction.

2. In support of that writ petition, the argument advanced before the Tribunal below has been forcefully repeated and it is contended that for withdrawing the case from one Member and assigning it to another, there should be some express provision in the Statute. According to the learned counsel, the power of general superintendence does not include the power to transfer cases. He referred to subsection (7) of section 38 of the Ordi nance under which the Labour Appellate Tribunal on its own motion or on the application of a party, can transfer any proceedings, within its jurisdic tion, from one Labour Court to another. The argument was that where the power to. transfer cases was intended to be given, a specific provision in this behalf, was made in the Ordinance. He went on to argue that as with regard to such powers of the Chairman, there is no provision in the Ordinance, similar to subsection (7) ibid, the order dated 11th. April, 1983 passed by the Senior Member, is without lawful authority.

3. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel. His argument though apparently attractive has no intrinsic merit. To gague its real im port, section 22‑B, in so far as it is relevant for the purposes of this case re produced below :

"(1) The Chairman of the Commission shall exercise general superin tendence over its affairs.

(2) For the efficient performance of the functions of the Commission, the Chairman shall‑

(a) a Full Bench of the Commission which shall consist of not less than three members of the Commission ; and

(b) as many other Benches of the Commission consisting of one or more members of the Commission as he may deem fit.

(3) ... ... ... ... . . ... "

The power of "superintendence" which is preceded by the adjective' "general" confers on the Chairman a jurisdiction fairly extensive in character, to supervise and reg6late the affairs of the Commission, including the work ing of the Benches, which he under subsection (2) is competent to constitute. I am of the view that the supervisory power of the Chairman, under section 22‑B is quite exhaustive and is not only confined to administrative matters, but includes the power to regulate the working of the Benches and transfer the cases from one Bench to another. A situation may arise that a particular Member, proceeds on leave, or on account of illness is disabled from hearing the cases, on his file. In such circumstances, cannot the learned Chairman, in exercise of his supervisory jurisdiction, assign these cases to some other Member If such power is denied to the Chairman the working of the Com mission will be paralized. The Chairman's power to exercise general superintendence is analogous to the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 102 of 1962 Constitution which fell for consideration in Mst. Gaman v. Taj Din (P L D 1968 Lah. 987). In the absence of a specific provision in the Family Courts Act, 1964, to transfer a case pending in one Family Court to another Family Court. K.E. Chauhan, J in exercise of the powers enjoyed by the High Court, under this Article to superintend subordinate Courts, transferred a case pending in the Family Court at Lahore to Family Court at Vehari. Since the power of superintendence, envisaged by section 22‑B (1) incorporates the powers to transfer cases from one Bench to an other, it was wholly unnecessary for the Legislature, to add any provision in the Industrial Relations ordinance, in respect of the Chairman's power to transfer cases from one Member to an other.

4. The learned Member's reference to absence of any prohibition in the Ordinance, in respect of the powers of the Chairman, to transfer cases from one Bench to another is not inapt. I may refer here with advantage, to very weighty observations made over a century ago by Mahmud, J. in Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey (I L R 5 All. 163)

"...the Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle, prohibitions cannot be presumed .."

These observations squarely apply to the case in hand. It is well settled that the provisions which relate to procedural law, should receive liberal construction and given that meaning which will advance the purpose intended to be achieved thereby. The provisions of section 22‑B are, there fore, to be constructed in a manner, which may accomplish the object there of, namely "efficient performance of the functions of the Commission." I can hardly be denied that the transfer of the cases from one Bench to an other, is essential for such efficient functioning of the N.I.R.C.

5. For the foregoing reasons, I uphold the‑view taken by the learned Member and dismiss the writ petition in limine.

M. A. K. Appeal dismissed.

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