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Writ Petition No. 12458 of 1980, decided on 10th February, 1982.

‑‑Art. 199‑Writ‑‑Scope Application for eviction‑Landlady's statement as to property being needed for her personal use bona fide, fully corroborated by independent witnesses‑Rent Controller as well as appellate Court accepting statement of landlady‑Additional District Judge however giving finding of fact, namely, landlady's statement An cross‑examination as to premises being needed for business of her son, resulted from some misunderstanding‑Held, such statement cannot be interfered with effect of minor contradic tions and discrepancies in statement (of landlady) cannot be reappraised, and appreciation of evidence cannot be undertaken in exercise of writ jurisdiction.‑[Evidence].

Mrs. Gool v. Mrs. Nasim A. Rahman P L D 1979 S C 843 and Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others P L D 1974 S C 139 ref:

K. H. Khurshid for Petitioner.

Akhtar Mir Warsi for Respondent.

Date of hearing : 8th February, 1982.

This writ petition has been directed to challenge the validity of the order dated 30‑11‑1980, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala.

2. The facts relevant for the disposal of the writ petition may be briefly stated. Respondent No. 2 filed an application on 26‑5‑1979 for eviction of the petitioner under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) (hereinafter called the Ordinance) in respect of house No. B‑XVII‑20‑S‑15, Gujranwala, on ground default in payment of rent, damage to the property and that the same was required by her in good faith for her own use as well as for her son. Reference may be made to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the ejectment application which read thus :‑

3. The petitioner in his written statement denied the allegations. The learned Rent Controller, in view of the pleadings of the parties, framed seven issues including issue No. 4 relating to personal need. All the issues were answered in favour of the petitioner except issue No. 4. Accordingly, the learned Rent Controller directed the ejectment of the petitioner vide his order dated 24‑7‑1980. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Guaranwala, vide his order dated 30‑11‑1980. The learned Additional District Judge concurred with the findings of the learned trial Court that the house, in dispute, was needed by respondent No. 2 for her personal use bona fide.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner calls in question the validity of the ejectment order on three‑fold grounds :‑

(a) firstly, that respondent No. 1 wanted to convert the residential building, in dispute, to non‑residential premises which is unwarran ted by law, inasmuch as, she stated in her statement before the Rent Controller that a shop for her son was to be set up after getting possession of the house ;

(b) secondly, that respondent No. 2 bad categorically stated before the Rent Controller as A W 3 that the house, in dispute, was not needed for her personal use and, therefore, the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below on this aspect are contrary to evi dence on record,

(c) thirdly, that the son of respondent No. 2 has gone abroad and, therefore, the need of bona fide use has disappeared.

5. Mr. K. H. Khurshid, the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the definitions of the words "non‑residential building" and "residential building" as contained in clauses (d) and (g) of section 2 of the Ordinance. The learned counsel has also referred to sections 11 and 13 of the Ordinance in support of his first contention and argued that a land lord cannot seek eviction of a tenant from a building for any other purpose except for which it was let. He further submits that in the instant case, the building was let out for residential purpose and, therefore, the eviction of the petitioner for the purpose of setting up business by the son of respon dent No. 2 is un‑warranted by law. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn my attention to the leave granting order in Mrs. Gool v. Mrs. Nasim A. Rahman PLD1979SC843 in which leave was granted inter alia on the question as to whether property if falling within category of non‑residential build ing" could be got vacated from tenant when landlady required it in good faith for her own use or for use of her children. '

6. I am afraid, there is no substance in the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. I have perused the evidence on record with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. The respondent No. 2 has nowhere stated either in the application for ejectment or in her evidence before the trial Court that she wanted to convert the "residential building" into a "non‑residential building". The learned Additional District Judge, after appreciating the evidence at length, has given a find ing of fact that the statement of respondent No. 2 in her cross‑examination to the effect that the premises, in dispute, were needed for the business her son, was due to some mis‑understanding. The effect of minor contra dictions discrepancies in the statement of the landlady cannot be re‑appraised in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The learned Additional District Judge concurred with the findings of the learned Rent Controller that the property, in dispute, was needed by respondent No. 2 for personal use bona fide. The statement of the landlady is fully corroborated by independent witnesses which having been accepted by the learned Rent Controller as well as the appellate Court, cannot be interfered with in the exerce of writ jurisdiction.

7. As regards contention No. 2, the matter essentially relates to appreciation of evidence which cannot be undertaken in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Reference may be made to Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others PLD1974SC139, where it was held that "when there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction".

8. As regards the third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the son of respondent No. 2 has allegedly gone abroad and, therefore, the need of bona fide use has disappeared, I am afraid, this contention has also no force, inasmuch as, it is a disputed question of fact and also because the Court is not concerned with the alleged subsequent events.

In view of the above, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.

K. M. A. ‑‑‑‑ Petition dismissed,

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