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Appeal No. 366/654 of 1980, decided on 5th January, 1981.
‑‑ Ss. 4 & 5 read with Punjab Board of Revenue Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958‑‑Adjudication by Service Tribunal‑Legal point Tribunal not debarred to take notice of an issue involving point of law ‑Impugned order passed by authority not competent to do so Jurisdiction objection not raised in memorandum of appeal--Allowed and taken notice of by Tribunal‑‑Order regarding removal from service of Naib Qasid passed by Deputy Commissioner who according to delegation of powers rules was appellate authority Impugned order, in circumstances, held without jurisdiction, hence set aside.
‑The appellant, Muhammad Shoib, ex‑Naib Qasid (Recovery), Tehsil Dora Ghazi Khan has filed an appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, [914, in which he has impleaded D. C., D. G. Khan and Commissioner, Multan Division as respondents.
2. The brief facts of the case as that the appellant was appointed as Naib Qasid in the year 1976‑77 and continued as such till 6‑2‑1980 when ho was removed from service by D. C. Dera Ghazi Khan vide order dated 6‑2‑1980. His appeal against this order before the Commissioner also failed vide his order‑dated 28‑5‑1980.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for appellant as well as tile Government Pleader assisted by Sh. Abdus Salam, City Magistrate, D. G. Khan. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that according to the Board of Revenue Delegation of Power Rules, 1958, the appointing authority and the authority competent to suspend, reduce in rank, retire by way of removal or dismiss in the case of a Naib Qasid would be a C. S. P. or P. C. S. Officer whom the Deputy Commissioner may appoint and where the appellate authority would be the Deputy Commissioner himself. It has been argued that appellant's removal by the impugned order dated 6‑2‑1980 would be void ab initio as an order of authority which was not competent to do so. Similarly the order of the Commissioner would be ineffective and void as it has proceeded on the assumption of a void order itself. This point was further elaborated with the submission that the Deputy Commissioner being the appellate authority, the Commissioner of the Division could not assume that power. On the other hand the Government Pleader while agreeing to this legal position has raised an objection that this plea was not taken in the grounds of appeal and thus it should not be taken into consideration.
4. We have given our anxious thought to the pros and cons of this case and have no hesitation to hold that the Board of Revenue Delegation of Power Rules, 1958, are very clear on this point, Therefore, it would be a case where the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner will not hold any field. With regard to the objection taken by the Government Pleader that this legal point was not raised in the memorandum of appeal, it would be sufficient to say that there can be no legal bar for this Tribunal to take notice of an issue, which involves point of law. It has been held by the Superior Courts that the legal points can always be raised during the course of arguments although the same may not have been specifically mentioned in the grounds of appeal.
5. In view of the above we are satisfied that the impugned order is without jurisdiction and accept the appeal. The appellant would be considered to have remained in service from the date of his removal with all the benefits to which he is entitled under the rules.
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